

MUSLIMS IN THE AGE OF MIGRATION



ANALYSIS

Exiled Egyptians in Istanbul: Phantoms, Ambivalence & Hope

Mariam Agha

INTERVIEW

“A dynamic and flexible migration management strategy is essential.”

Mehmet Köse

INFOGRAPHIC

Migration Data at a Glance

ANALYSIS

The Palestinian Diaspora in the Struggle for a Free Palestine

Taher Labadi

Research Centre for Social Thought and Policy (TODAM) was founded to realize the goal of a just, equitable, and prosperous society. In addition to contributing to social thought, it aims to propose practicable solutions to contemporary social challenges. We aim to witness the different dimensions of social change based on knowledge and to bring solutions to social problems on the axis of common values and benefits. The activities we carry out at TODAM are based on a realistic understanding and constructive approach to current social issues from the lens of social sciences. In this way, we act as a bridge between researchers, decision-makers, and civil society and advance the possibility of producing independent knowledge about our social world.

PLATFORM

Platform magazine is published within the body of TODAM of the İLKE Foundation for Science, Culture and Education to provide up-to-date and original perspectives on the intellectual, political, social, economic, and cultural agendas of Muslim societies. Platform is an output of the Thought and Movements in Muslim Societies Project. It aims to be a platform where the affairs of the Muslim world are followed and analyzed through the activities of influential think tanks, research centers and institutes, universities, and political, religious, and social movements. The Muslim world's contributions to global issues and the ongoing intellectual accumulation are presented to Türkiye and the world through Platform magazine. It keeps its finger on the pulse of the Muslim world through its website and its database of current institutions, movements, activities, and personalities.

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Design	: Betül Berra Kurt

İLKE Publication No : 229

E-ISSN : 2980-1249

Editor's Note

Migration is a story as old as humanity itself. While tracing the patterns of migration, we essentially trace the patterns of the history of humankind as well. Migrations, which have been pivotal throughout history, continue to shape political, economic, cultural, and social life today. Muslim societies, in particular, play a significant role in contemporary human migration. In this edition of Platform, we follow the traces of Muslims in this “age of migration.”

The Palestinian diaspora is a crucial part of the Palestinian struggle. Sıtkı Karadeniz discusses the social reproduction of refugee status due to the inequalities faced by Palestinians migrating from Palestine to Jordan. Taher Labadi, on the other hand, examines how the Palestinian diaspora organizes in their fight for a free Palestine. Istanbul stands out as a hub for migration within the Muslim world. While Mariam Agha portrays the lives of exiled Egyptians in Istanbul, Usama Hazari emphasizes Istanbul's significance as a center of faith for both Muslims and non-Muslims.

In our interview section, we talk with Mehmet Köse about migration management in Türkiye. In this issue, we also cover other important topics such as Afghan migration, the management of Syrian migration, the Muslim diaspora in France, sociological reflections on migration and culinary, anti-immigrant policies in the UK, and the psychosocial perspective of migration.

We hope this issue opens up new perspectives on migration studies and benefits our readers.

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
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
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


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
International Migrant Stock



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), 2020

Referring to any person who has changed their country of residence regardless of legal status or the motivation for migration, the number of international migrants has steadily risen over the past few decades. According to UN DESA data, the number of individuals living outside their country of birth or citizenship increased from 173,230,585 in 2000 to 280,598,105 in 2020. In terms of gender distribution among migrants, female migrants comprised 48.1% of the international migrant stock, while males comprised 51.9%.

The Largest Countries of Origin and Host Countries for Asylum Seekers




*The first 3 countries of origin and host countries are indicated on the map.

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2022

By mid-2023, there are 6.1 million asylum seekers in the world. While Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria are among the largest countries of origin for asylum seekers as Muslim-majority countries, the migration crisis in Venezuela is one of the largest in the world. The political turmoil, unstable jobs, and lack of access to basic rights and needs caused over 1 million people to leave Venezuela and seek asylum somewhere else. On the other hand, while the United States of America stands out for hosting almost 2 million asylum seekers in 2022 due to its strong economy of the USA, providing job opportunities for rebuilding lives, Türkiye remained the third-largest host country with 272,336 asylum seekers. Türkiye's long history of offering refuge to people fleeing hardship and proximity to conflict zones like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan makes it a natural transit point and potential destination for asylum seekers.


The Largest Refugee-Hosting Countries



Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2022

With its proximity to conflict-affected areas, Türkiye remained the largest host country for refugees, primarily from Syria, for almost a decade. However, Iran has emerged as the world's second-largest host country for refugees, following Türkiye, as the number of refugees in the country has quadrupled from 798,343 in 2021 to 3,425,091 in 2022. With the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, millions of Afghans took refuge in Iran since it is a neighboring country, and most of the Afghans know and talk in Dari, which is a dialect of Persian. Also, Iran's refugee policies, which grant Afghan refugees access to education and health services, might be another factor for Afghans to go to Iran.


The Largest Countries of Origin for Refugees



Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2022

The deepening food security and economic instability, coupled with the earthquake in June and the Taliban takeover in August in Afghanistan, caused 5,661,717 people to leave Afghanistan and take refuge in other countries in 2022. Although there has been continual migration flow from Afghanistan to neighboring countries, the fact that the number of refugees doubled from 2,712,869 in 2021 to over 5 million in 2022 shows the magnitude of the refugee crisis. On the other hand, there is a slight decline in the number of Syrian refugees. While there were 6,848,865 Syrian refugees in 2021 worldwide, this number has decreased to 6,559,736 in 2022 due to factors such as changes in migration policies in host countries and the efforts by states like Türkiye and international organizations like UNHCR, which provide humanitarian aid and development assistance.


Where have the refugees from Islamic countries migrated to in 2022?



Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2022

Although Türkiye hosts the largest number of refugees and asylum seekers worldwide, Syrian refugees make up the largest portion of refugees in Türkiye, with over 3 million refugees just in 2022. However, although there are 12,946 Afghan refugees and 126,387 Afghan asylum seekers registered in Türkiye as of mid-2023, Türkiye is the 12th country for Afghan refugees to go to, and that is why the migration flow from Afghanistan to Türkiye is not explicitly displayed in the figure. Also, the migration flow indicates a regional accumulation and highlights the fact that refugees seek safety and shelter in proximity to their countries of origin.


Internally Displaced Persons, By Years



Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2023

The consistent escalating conflict and violence, along with climate change and global heating all around the world, worsen the conditions of displacement. The number of internally displaced people worldwide has reached 71.1 million by 2022, which means that it has increased 20% from the previous year. While with Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, 16,870,000 people had to flee from Ukraine, monsoon floods in Pakistan in 2022 triggered 8,168,000 displacements, both making up 41.11% of the total 60.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2022.


Internally Displaced Persons in Gaza since October 7



Source: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) Situation Reports, 2023-2024

With the Operation al-Aqsa Flood launched by Hamas and other resistance groups, there has been a significant increase in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Gaza. While only a day after the operation, the number of IDPs increased by 40%, at the end of October, it increased to almost 1.5 million people, surpassing 1490%. By the end of 2023, on the other hand, 1.9 million people, equivalent to nearly 85 percent of the total population of Gaza, were displaced, including those who have been displaced previously and repeatedly. As indicated in the figure, although UNRWA provided shelter to IDPs, the number of the displaced exceeds the provided facilities, leaving millions more vulnerable to the worsening conditions.

Distribution of International Migrant Workers, By Host Region



Source: International Labour Organization (ILO) Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers Report, 2021

It is estimated that there were 169 million international migrant workers in 2019, and they constituted 4.9% of the global labor force of destination countries. Also, migrant workers mainly come from the Asia and Pacific region and are employed in the services sector in Europe and Central Asia. This signifies that they fill the gap in certain sectors due to demographic shifts, aging populations, or declining birth rates and are more willing to accept non-standard employment arrangements, such as part-time work and temporary contracts. Similarly, migrant workers in Arab states are primarily low-skilled workers who are employed in construction and domestic work since Arab states are highly engaged with urbanization, infrastructure development, and large-scale construction projects.

Social Reproduction of Refugee Status: Palestinian Refugees in Jordan



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<http://dx.doi.org/10.26414/pmdg142>

The fact that the Jews established their own political body after living as “nomads” or “homeless” from the “first exile” until the middle of the last century led to the dispersal of Palestinians across the globe as disembodied bodies. Especially after the Nakba (1948) and the Six-Day War (Naksa, 1967), Palestinians have been scattered as refugees everywhere, especially in neighboring countries, but mainly in Jordan. There are undoubtedly many historical and political reasons, but we will not dwell on them for now. Instead, we will focus on the problem of education for Palestinian refugees living in Jordan and how it reproduces inequalities in reference to Pierre Bourdieu’s theories on the relationship between inequality and education. However, as we will analyze, not only education but also living in or outside the camp, citizenship, and identity politics play significant roles in reproducing these inequalities. In other words, we will see that in addition to its function of reproducing existing inequality, education is a result of these secondary conditions.

Today, a significant portion of Palestinians living in Jordan reside in major cities, primarily Amman, outside the settlements officially designated as “camps.” However, a considerable number (around 450,000) still live in ten settlements¹ classified as “camps” for various reasons. According to UNRWA, there are currently a total of 2,307,011 registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan. Considering Jordan’s current population is around 11 million, this constitutes a significant proportion. So, what is the level of social participation among this population? This can be better answered when we consider access to education.

Forms of Inequality in Refugee Status

According to the latest data from UNRWA², 121,000 Palestinian refugee students in grades 1 through

1 Amman New Camp (Wihdat), Baqa’a, Husn, Irbid, Jabal el-Hussein, Jerash, Marka, Souf, Talbieh, Zarqa.

2 The most recent data provided by UNRWA is for 2019-2020. See <https://www.unrwa.org/activity/education-jordan>. For other data, see <https://pirls2021.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Jordan.pdf>. For an overview of the education system of Jordan, see https://www.epdc.org/sites/default/files/documents/EPDC_NEP_2018_Jordan.pdf



10 across Jordan receive education in shifts under the supervision of 3,902 teachers in 169 schools located in the mentioned ten official camps. This is not the same as the Turkish practice of having different groups of students studying in the same school as morning and afternoon classes; rather, it is a system in which two or three different schools use the same building in shifts. Firstly, the physical capacities of the camps are not suitable for constructing an adequate number of independent school buildings. Since the land allocated when they were first established has remained the same despite the increasing population, the problem is being solved with multi-story buildings, which are often illegal but tolerated. As UNRWA's reports show, buildings are often rented as schools, even though the infrastructure is not very suitable. Consequently, most schools share the same building in rotation, sometimes with two or even three different schools using it alternately. This initial inequality manifests itself in the physical realm.

The second form of inequality also revolves around the camps. Firstly, there exists a "natural" stratification between the camps and areas outside the camps because of the inadequacies of the camps themselves. Additionally, there is a hierarchy among the camps. For instance, the camps established after

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Although students in the camps are subject to the same curriculum, this “natural” stratification not only determines the general student profile but also influences the quality of education provided.

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the Naksa (1967) have much poorer infrastructure, employment opportunities, and social standards than those established after the Nakba (1948), which determines social integration and, consequently, the

Jerash Camp

Source: Ahmad Abu Sitteh, UNRWA Photo



quality of education. In a situation where the almost sole gateway to leaving the camps is “economic capital,” conditions that hinder access to this capital are reproduced alongside policies accompanying them. Thus, the camps become places of “fate.” Those who have the ability to create practices to escape this fate, when they leave the camps, become spectators to the darker fate of those left behind. They contribute to shaping a camp demographic that becomes increasingly impoverished, unemployed, uneducated, unhealthy, and prone to crime. Therefore, although students in the camps are subject to the same curriculum, this “natural” stratification not only determines the general student profile but also influences the quality of education provided. Students in the camps must exert more effort to compete with those outside because they are responsible for attending classes and contributing to their families’ livelihoods (Günenç & Karadeniz, 2015). An extension of this stratification between the inside and outside of the camps also occurs between Palestinians and Jordanians. A statement by a Palestinian refugee youth summarizes the second form of stratification: “We are worker-students, while

Jordanians are just students.” Ultimately, everyone becomes involved in this competition with all forms of capital they possess or lack.

Another form of inequality, of course, is related to who can study where and under what conditions, which is interconnected with the previous ones. For example, on page 28 of UNICEF’s *2020 Jordan Country Report on Out-of-School Children*³, it is stated that “Higher education is not free. The tuition fee payable depends on the nationality of the student.” This statement seems to indicate a very ordinary situation and may not be seen as a practice that anyone would find strange. After all, it is expected that each country would prioritize its own citizens in such a differentiation. However, the implications are different when it comes to the status of Palestinians in Jordan due to the variation in their refugee status after each war. The education system itself functions as an elimination mechanism from the very beginning. While Palestinian refugees provided with citizenship by UNRWA can enter university for free or at lower tuition fees, the majority residing in Marka and Jerash camps, mainly Gazans, cannot benefit from this right because they are not citizens

3 <https://www.unicef.org/jordan/media/5501/file/OSC-Report-EN.pdf>

A Palestinian refugee, Abed Alqader Qwader, shows his temporary Jordanian passport.

Source: Abid Katib, Getty Images



(Özcan & Şenses, 2022). Therefore, Gazans are kept as hostages in a “permanent/permanently temporary” status in Jordan by not being included in the citizenship class and not being allowed to integrate into existing social structures in any way.

The “Refugees” of the Refugees: Palestinians

The way in which the fundamental rights regulating citizenship based on identity are implemented in Jordan not only creates a distinction between Palestinians and native Jordanians as citizens but also among Palestinians themselves, turning some into the “refugees” of refugees. Gazans are taken out of the equation through citizenship rights and are often denied opportunities for upward

There are significant differences in the tone of Palestinian identity and motivation for return between inside and outside the camps.

mobility, which are instead reserved for citizens. If you happen to be a Palestinian who has managed to obtain citizenship and perhaps a university education, you must wait a few years to find a job; however, as a Jordanian native, you may not have to wait at all by using *wasta* (relationships of patronage). If you are a Palestinian looking for a job in Jordan, you must work much harder than Jordanians, but even when you start working, you are almost barred from advancing

beyond a certain point; for example, if you work as a police officer, you cannot rise to the rank of a senior commander (Achilli, 2015). Thus, Palestinians can be teachers but cannot be principals; they can be police officers but cannot be directors; they can even be prime ministers but cannot have the “true” Jordanian passport.⁴ Citizens who are included in the

4 To preserve the “true” Jordanian identity and thus to make the distinction between Palestinians and “original” Jordanians clearer/visible, the Jordanian state uses different symbols on their passports: Palestinians have a P (Palestinian), while Jordanians have a J (Jordanian). Hence, being stamped with “refugee” is not limited to camps or camp conditions; even being a citizen does not prevent a Palestinian from being labeled as a “refugee.”

economy and pay taxes but still maintain refugee status are kept in a zone of uncertainty, away from areas where the functioning of the state is thin, and they could intervene in that of the state. Citizenship, which leads to identity being dragged into the zone of uncertainty, along with the existence of identity components such as relative channels for upward mobility, can be seen as a situation specific to Jordan (Karadeniz, 2018).

Jordan certainly has its justifications behind the policies outlined here; in fact, some Palestinians we talked to in camps or outside even believe (or let's say, they interpret it with good intentions) that these policies aim to prevent Palestinians from losing their identities and their right of return. We don't know if this is really the intention behind these policies. However, when we look at the results, we must acknowledge that this is indeed happening. There are significant differences in the tone of Palestinian identity and motivation for return between inside and outside the camps. Living in a camp and being a refugee are closely associated with Palestinian identity. This can also be observed in the interactions in these camps, as seen in the fieldwork conducted by Ferhat Gökdağ in 2016.⁵ Palestinians living outside the camps, who receive a good education, experience increasing levels of prosperity, and can somewhat blend in with Jordanians, show a significant decrease in their emotional investments and sense of belonging to Palestine. Hence, the policies and practices that exclude Palestinians from education, employment, social, and cultural life remind them that they are always refugees and temporary residents and must return one day, thus continuously reproducing their refugee status. Even merely characterizing where they live as a "camp" plays a significant role in this reproduction.

To summarize, firstly, we must acknowledge that the education system itself continues to formally produce and reproduce refugees through the distinction between citizens and non-citizens, those who live in camps and those who do not. Secondly, regardless of its physical conditions, labeling a space as a "camp" establishes the codes for reproducing refugee status; living there, regardless of the conditions, defines one as a refugee. Thirdly, Jordan's government policies on citizenship and refugee status produce a kind of "the refugees of refugees" by hierarchically organizing Palestinians within themselves and layering refugee status through distinctions made between those living in camps or outside and those who are granted or denied citizenship. Lastly, by marking the passports and identity documents of those who have been granted citizenship, it creates the groundwork for sustaining inequality. Thus, by first creating spatial and status-based distinctions among Palestinians and then establishing a second level where Palestinians and Jordanians can be distinguished, it ensures the reproduction of inequalities.

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5 Ferhat Gökdağ spent part of 2023 conducting fieldwork for his thesis titled "Ürdün'deki Filistinli Mültecilerin Kudüs Algısı: El-Hüseyn ve Beka Kampları Örneği" in the mentioned camps.

The Involvement of the Palestinian Diaspora in the Struggle for a Free Palestine



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<http://dx.doi.org/10.26414/pmdg143>

Estimates show that nearly 50% of Palestinians live outside of Palestine. Among them, 6.4 million live in Arab countries (44.7% of the total), and about 800,000 (5.6%) live all around the world. Meanwhile, 5.4 million (37.8%) live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and 1.7 million (11.9%) live within the Green Line and hold Israeli citizenship¹.

The Hindered Connections Between the Palestinian Diaspora and the Homeland

Most Palestinians outside of Palestine are refugees exiled in the 1948 Nakba². Later waves of forced migration have taken place from both Palestine and host countries, underlining the vulnerability of Palestinian settlements outside of Palestine. Warfare and attacks on refugee camps, discriminatory policies in host countries, the rise and decline of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and other socioeconomic factors have shaped the geographic distribution of the Palestinian diaspora worldwide.

As a result, Palestinians have been exposed to varied cultural, social, and political conditions and have been granted different civil rights and legal status. This has hindered their ability to move and connect with each other and with Palestine. The context also includes restricted and often entirely prohibited access to their homeland because of Israeli policies. The creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the wake of the Oslo Accords³ and the revival of a formal Palestinian nationality has not changed this reality. The colonization and dismemberment of ancestral Palestine and the growing “bantustanization” of the areas officially under PNA control further affect Palestinians’ relationships with their

1 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, July 2022.

2 When the state of Israel was established in 1948, about 800,000 Palestinians, almost 60% of the total Palestinian Arab population at that time, were forced into exile.

3 Officially, the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements” agreement between the PLO and the Israeli government was negotiated in Oslo and signed in Washington on 13 September 1993. The Declaration of Principles was supplemented by other documents that provide certain practical provisions about the so-called “peace process” as well as PNA prerogatives.



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The colonization and dismemberment of ancestral Palestine and the growing “bantustanization” of the areas officially under PNA control further affect Palestinians’ relationships with their homeland.

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homeland. It is still Israel that controls the borders and restrains the right of permanent residency in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs). Although they are regularly subject to harassment and arbitrary “entry denial” because of their Palestinian origin, technically, Palestinian refugees who obtain foreign passports can enter as foreigners, requiring a three-month Israeli tourist visa.

Organizing the Struggle of Palestinians in Exile and Moving the Struggle Inwards

As a result of their plight, Palestinians have consistently been prominent activists worldwide. During the 1950s and early 1960s, Palestinian refugees quickly became involved with Arab political parties while also engaging in cross-border guerrilla actions against Israeli targets. This period saw a growing assertion of national self-confidence. This converged with the emergence of Palestinian-led political organizations that emphasized a specific Palestinian identity. The 1967 Arab defeat further

impelled Palestinian armed organizations established in Arab countries to grant effective control over the struggle to the PLO. The PLO resembled a government in exile, with a transnational elected “parliament” (the Palestine National Council) and an “executive cabinet” (the executive committee). The Palestinian national movement countered the effects of the global dispersal of the diaspora by providing a common political framework for Palestinian activism, with the intent to voice and eventually achieve Palestinian national ambitions.

The PLO’s banishment by Israel into the OPTs and its later expulsion from Jordan in 1971 and from Lebanon in 1982 resulted in the growing paralysis of Palestinians in exile. Achieving statehood and not the liberation of all Palestine became the primary national goal - to secure an autonomous territorial base where Palestinians could be free of their vulnerability to outside pressures and threats. Meanwhile, the Land Day uprising among Palestinians within Israel in 1976 and the Intifada that erupted in the OPTs in 1987 embodied the inward relocation of the focus of the Palestinian struggle.

The Political Vacuum and The Renewed Struggle among the Diaspora

The Oslo Accords in 1993 and the establishment of the PNA as a self-governing body in Palestinian-controlled areas marginalized Palestinians abroad, especially those living in refugee camps. Indeed, one key feature of the Oslo process was the lasting

degeneration of PLO institutions and the concentration of political decision-making within the PNA apparatus. With the establishment of the PNA in the early 1990s, the PLO’s critical role in organizing and voicing the diaspora diminished dramatically. Meanwhile, the PNA does not have the ability or legitimacy to govern the diaspora effectively.

This political vacuum in diaspora representation brought about the growth of initiatives undertaken outside of Palestine. This renewed activism was characterized by the rise of Palestinian political involvement in Western countries and Palestinian marginalization in Arab countries. Moreover, it is representative of the heterogeneous experiences and

trajectories of the second and even third generation of the Palestinian diaspora. In this regard, it is noteworthy that mass media and the internet also offered new ways of connecting between scattered Palestinian communities and redefining the importance of borders and geography. Palestinians in the diaspora, especially youth, still provide an important contingent of activists underpinning solidarity movements and campaigns worldwide. They are highly involved in organizing demonstrations and events in reaction to Israeli crimes in the OPTs, but also in voicing political

claims, particularly on the right of return. They also regularly write opinion pieces, give interviews, and use social networks to make their voices heard. This goes hand in hand with annual commemorations (e.g., Nakba, Land Day), cultural education, and social work that are crucial in community-building and reviving the Palestinian legacy.



Source: Palestinian Youth Movement

Organizing Their Involvement and Voicing Palestine

There have been numerous meetings and conferences aiming at bringing Palestinians together on a transnational scale to enhance their participation in national decision-making alongside their counterparts in the OPTs. In the context of Palestinian internal division, the diaspora has also become the locus of competition between different political forces seeking legitimacy and support for their movements and policies. Examples include the annual

gatherings of Palestinians in Europe or the United States, attempts to revive the Palestine National Council, or the formation of the transnational Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM). At the height of its activity in 2010-2014, the PYM created a dozen branches in Palestine, the Arab world, and Western countries and had several hundred members around the world. Even though most of these branches have now disappeared, the movement is experiencing a new revival, mainly in North America, from where it is resuming its international expansion. This experience is symptomatic of a change in the relationship of Palestinians, from the outside and inside, to Palestine in a “post-Oslo” context. What is most

This renewed activism was characterized by the rise of Palestinian political involvement in Western countries and Palestinian marginalization in Arab countries.

striking is the break made by the PYM with the Palestinian national narrative promoted by the PLO/ANP and the reconnection with the Palestinian liberation project.

Palestinian intellectual, cultural, and artistic production is also important in any discussion about the diaspora. Palestinian writers, poets, musicians, and visual artists have contributed significantly to spreading and enriching Palestinian culture, and some Palestinian academics are among the most highly regarded in their respective fields. Not only have they shaped the field of Palestine Studies, but they have

also become spokespersons for the Palestinian struggle and have actively taken part in defining and expanding its scope. The same occurs in the cultural and artistic sphere, with a whole new generation of artists navigating between their homeland and the rest of the world.

Today, Palestinians in the diaspora are still at the forefront of the mobilizations taking place worldwide to denounce Israel’s genocidal war against the Gaza Strip and the increase in Israeli crimes throughout occupied Palestine. While they are the most direct relays of the voices of their people inside Palestine, they still lack the spaces in which to think collectively about the goals and strategies of their struggle.

“The Ones Who Walk Away”: Phantoms, Ambivalence & Hope within Exiled Egyptians in Istanbul



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<http://dx.doi.org/10.26414/pmdg144>

It was in the Spring of 2018 when one of my professors assigned us to read Ursula K. Le Guin’s short philosophical fiction, *The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas*. Published in 1973, Le Guin’s allegory depicts a seemingly utopian city, Omelas, where all its residents live prosperously and happily. Nonetheless, the reader gradually discovers that the city’s prosperity is essentially built upon the torture and suffering of one single child locked up in a broom closet. The people of Omelas also come to comprehend this reality, and only a tiny portion of them, moved by a strong emotion of guilt, decide to withdraw from the city altogether (Le Guin, 1973). Despite its shortness, this allegory features an ever-lasting situation in which individuals grow to recognize numerous spots of injustices inborn in the larger structures of their lives. In their instinctual strive for happiness and fulfilling a good life, individuals respond and act differently towards these many broom closets. Whether they choose to bypass these dark closets or decide to change something about them, we are usually left with a flood of emotions that involve moments of a sense of agency and occasions of complete helplessness. Annabel Herzog writes, “The case of ‘Omelas’ reveals the hopelessness of change and the ambiguity of resistance against a society believed to be optimal. What can be done against a system like that of Omelas except to leave, and what does leaving mean?” (Herzog, 2021, p. 76).

In the summer of 2018, I emigrated from Egypt and settled in Istanbul. Following the Eid morning prayer and right in front of the ancient Egyptian obelisk centering the square of The Blue Mosque, I stood rapt in awe while gazing at the large number of Egyptian expatriates occupying the space. On the 3rd of July 2013, following street protests, the army toppled the former first democratically elected president Mohamed Morsi and suspended the constitution. Subsequently, massive arrest campaigns, street violence, and mass murder started taking place in the months after, targeting senior leaders and members of the Muslim Brotherhood together with variant opponents of the new regime. In consequence, the Turkish regime instantly showed sympathy and support, condemning the military coup. Thereupon, Türkiye received thousands of Egyptian expatriates, many of whom were Islamists and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to senior Turkish officials quoted in the media in 2019 and 2020,



some 15–30,000 Egyptians live in Türkiye (Ayyash, 2022). Expatriates imagined Türkiye as a fertile space for possible transnational activism and political engagement with their homeland.

The ones who walk away from Egypt are different from their Omelian counterparts. A good number of them did not choose to leave but were rather forced to. They certainly did not escape a utopia where all citizens are thrilled and well-off. But what one finds common between the fictional work and this reality is the ghost of their homelands and the memory of the suffering child in the broom closet, personifying a state of ongoing structural violence over which a rapid and radical urban innovation process is taking place. In this paper, based on my ethnographic research, I try to take it from where Le Guin ended and look into the new lives of deportees. I dig into the nuances of what it is like to be an Egyptian political migrant living in Istanbul. Looking at the potentialities between the “not yet” and the “no longer” and the spaces between hope and despair, my prime purpose is to fathom how these exiled Egyptians engage emotionally with the political situation in Egypt, given that their physical presence became elsewhere. I argue that most of my interlocutors were constantly haunted by the past, which evoked a liminal state of being, and the only way out for many of them was to abandon the Egyptian political sphere and find potentialities of hope elsewhere.

The Presence of an Absence (Haunted)

After a long transportation journey, I finally arrived at “Beykoz Kundura,” located on the Northern end of the Bosphorus shore in the district of Beykoz. “Beykoz Kundura” is an industrial, cultural area with a spacious complex encompassing numerous film studios. I entered the filming location, which features a dull prison building with lots of dimly lit prison cells and strong cigarette smoke. A group of exiled Egyptian filmmakers were filming a drama series titled *Dungeon 55* that narrates the story of several political prisoners and their everyday struggles with a psychopathic police officer. During the break, Ali, an old actor who played the role of a jailer in the drama series, breathed a deep sigh of sorrow and looked at Jamal, his fellow actor, sharing the heavy thought that had just crossed his mind. He expressed his sympathy toward the political prisoners in Egypt. Ali revealed to his friend that the atmosphere of the filming location and the role he played made him acutely fathom what it is like to be a political detainee. Specters were always looming somewhere between the words in the site visits and during the interviews. The figure of the ghost or the absentee often took different forms. Sometimes, it is a friend or a relative who is politically detained. Other times, it was a martyr. Specters also came in the form of flashbacks to street protests, the January revolution



itself as an abstraction with a package of connotations and meanings or an earlier subjectivity tied to it.

Bringing up the influence of absences on reality and the return of remnants of the past in the presence, Jacques Derrida coins the concept of “hauntology” in his seminal work *Specters of Marx* (1993). The term “hauntology” is a portmanteau formulated from the fusion of two words. The first is “haunt,” which refers to the appearance or the materialization of a ghost or an absent figure. The second word is “ontology,” which is concerned with the nature of being. In that sense, the term as a whole translates to “the persistence of a present past or ‘the return of the dead’” (Sami, 2021, p. 380). Mark Fisher reflects further on Derrida’s choice of the term. He remarks that Derrida was attempting to challenge the conventional “ontology,” which illustrates being exclusively based on existence and presence while dismissing the profound role that absences play in this illustration. To most of my interlocutors, the Egyptian public space, with all its materiality and sentimentality,

To most of my interlocutors, the Egyptian public space, with all its materiality and sentimentality, is distant, absent, and only accessible through virtuality or digital platforms.

is distant, absent, and only accessible through virtuality or digital platforms. While carrying a digital ethnography, however, it was quite compelling to see how particular spaces in exile, like the art sphere, carried phantoms that had a recognizable influence on my interlocutors.

One of my interviewees, Amir, who works as an art director and was among the crew working on the aforementioned drama project that tackles the issue of political imprisonment in Egypt, disclosed to me that he had to sleep in the filming location, a prison. Amir illustrates that men often suppress their emotions and do not prefer to share them with their fellows. Yet that night, he could not sleep and recognized his friend who could not sleep either. Both Amir and his friend were imprisoned before they left the country. “The moment each of us takes a break, the general atmosphere immediately reminds us of voices embedded in our ears,” he took a deep breath and continued (Amir, 27).



Living on a Threshold (Perplexed)

Ambivalence and unclarity were recurrent effects that many of my interlocutors expressed during our interviews as a consequence of this hauntological condition. While conversing with Ahmad, a 30-year-old actor, he told me, “I am like the ones who danced in the stairwell, neither seen by those above nor those below... I cannot go back to my country, and I am not able to live comfortably in Türkiye either. I am not a Muslim Brother, nor am I isolated from them. I am always in the middle of everything” (Ahmed, 30). I tried to unpack these emotions of perplexity and confusion through the lens of Turner’s “liminality” and Szokolczai’s “permanent liminality.” Liminality in the fieldwork appeared in two forms.

The first aspect of this liminality lies in the conflictual emotions of wanting to both remember and forget. Hassan, a 25-year-old art director, revealed that he genuinely wishes to completely forget the day of the Rabaa massacre, which he survived. Towards the end of our conversation, however, he told me that he found a soundtrack on the internet titled “The Carnage.” The sound collage combines the sounds of hovering military aircraft, bullets, screams, prayers,

and sirens from the day of the Rabaa massacre. Hassan shared that he finds himself searching that track occasionally and listening to it despite his deep desire to let go of that memory. The second bearing of liminality was hesitating whether to hold on or let go of a particular subjectivity built during the years of street activism preceding exile. One of the artists I interviewed demonstrates an internal conflict that constantly gives him a strong sense of confusion and fogginess. He illustrated that he is interiorly living in two parallel universes. On the one hand, he is getting married and planning to travel and build a stable life for his family. On the other hand, his parents nurtured in him an identity of a revolutionary reformer, and he feels as if he is gradually losing this identity as he moves on with life. He clarifies that he continuously asks himself, “Where is the revolutionist? Where is the one who walked the streets and wanted to change something? This past self is almost dying” (Amir, 27). I asked him if he wanted this persona to die. He answered that he did not have an answer to this question even though it kept crossing his mind. The only partially satisfying answer he has reached is that he will continue building a stable life. Yet the moment a revolution outbursts, he shall be the first to join, leaving everything behind because this is where he belongs.

Hope in the Hopelessness, Agency in the Helplessness

While attending one of the social gatherings carried out by a group of Egyptians living in Istanbul as a participant observant, Salih, a father of three in his late 40s, used a metaphor to describe why he thinks that most of the collective efforts done by Egyptians in exile are ineffective. Salih gave the analogy of a group of expatriates coming from a desert environment who have just landed on a new island with which they are completely unfamiliar. Immediately upon their arrival, the group started working using the exact surviving techniques they were previously living with before leaving their homelands. None of the new arrivals paused to observe the new space and fathom its nature, which was radically different from their past habitus. Neither did any of them thoroughly grasp that their stay on the Island was permanent, not temporary. This analogy is quite powerful as it summarizes the state of many of my interlocutors who are regularly haunted by the absentees and are stuck between a past of activism leading to forced migration and a present reality of exile that is no longer temporary and legal precarity of many young Egyptians who have had their passports expired and could not renew it from the Egyptian embassy in Türkiye as a punishment for their earlier political participation.

In spite of the survival guilt that comes with the visiting phantoms and the confusion that accompanies a condition of permanent liminality. I argue that the closing of Egypt's political and public sphere continually sparked feelings of hopelessness and defeat, which compelled many of my interlocutors to look for

strength and capability elsewhere. In the fieldwork, three characteristics of becoming were evident. The first one is the desire to "become something," which was typically mentioned in relation to professional development, success, holding some sort of material power, etc. The second aspect of becoming is the impulse to "become normal," which speaks to their intense desire to recover and rid themselves of an identity that is trauma-oriented. The third one is about wanting to let go of their previous subjectivities and affiliations. Likewise, many of my interlocutors avoided thinking about change on a large scale and developed a preference for microscopic transformational activity in the domains in which they excelled, remolding the idea of transnational activism and reproducing new ways of imagining agency and change in times of hopelessness and helplessness.

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Istanbul: The Sacred Tapestry of Migration and Faith



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<http://dx.doi.org/10.26414/pmdg145>

In the enchanting labyrinth of Istanbul, where minarets pierce the sky, and the euphonious call to prayer reverberates through the ancient streets, a silent migration unfolds—a journey of souls seeking solace, enlightenment, and the warm embrace of Islam. This essay endeavors to explore the compelling phenomenon of migration to Istanbul by non-Muslims and converts to Islam, drawn by the desire to deepen their understanding of the faith or to practice it more freely. The illustrious city of Istanbul, steeped in the grandeur of its past as the capital of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, casts a spell upon all who walk its cobblestone streets. Its rich cultural and religious heritage, woven into the very fabric of its being, echoes through time in the majestic mosques, venerable madrasas, and hallowed historical sites that serve as beacons of Islamic learning and practice. Situated at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Istanbul has emerged as a melting pot of cultures and ideologies, captivating seekers of spiritual knowledge from every corner of the globe.

The decision of non-Muslims and converts to Islam to migrate to Istanbul is driven by a myriad of compelling factors. Firstly, Istanbul offers unparalleled access to esteemed Islamic scholars, venerable institutions, and invaluable resources, creating an immersive learning environment for those eager to delve deeper into the teachings of the faith. Moreover, the city's cosmopolitan ambiance fosters an atmosphere of inclusivity and tolerance, providing a sanctuary for individuals from diverse backgrounds to explore their spiritual journey without fear of discrimination or persecution. Furthermore, Istanbul's historical significance as a bastion of Islamic civilization exerts a magnetic pull on those enchanted by the spiritual heritage of the Muslim world. The opportunity to immerse oneself in the resplendent tapestry of Islamic art, architecture, and culture serves as a catalyst for spiritual growth and self-discovery. Additionally, the vibrant Muslim community in Istanbul offers a supportive network for newcomers, extending a hand of guidance, companionship, and solidarity on their quest for religious enlightenment.

In the Western context, many individuals who embrace Islam find themselves navigating a cultural landscape that might be considered degenerate. In such environments, the practice of Islam can often be hindered by societal norms and influences that



contradict the principles and values of the faith. Despite their sincere desire to live in accordance with Islamic teachings, these individuals may encounter challenges in maintaining their religious observance amidst a culture that glorifies excess and indulgence. As a result, they may seek refuge in places like Istanbul, where the rich Islamic heritage and supportive community provide a sanctuary for spiritual growth and fulfillment.

Throughout history, cities like Cairo, Damascus, and Madinah have served as primary attractions for those interested in Islamic knowledge and practice. Cairo, renowned for Al-Azhar University, has long held sway as a bastion of Islamic learning. However, following the military coup in 2014 and subsequent government intervention in the institution's affairs, Al-Azhar has witnessed a decline in its reputation and popularity among seekers of Islamic knowledge. Similarly, the University of Madinah, once esteemed for its

role in higher Islamic education, has faced challenges to its credibility. The Saudi Arabian government's crackdown on prominent scholars and efforts to stifle dissent have tarnished the university's reputation, causing many to question its integrity and independence. With its rich historical and cultural heritage, Damascus was another hub for Islamic learning. However, the ongoing conflict in Syria has disrupted its academic institutions and diminished

its appeal to aspiring students of Islam. The devastation wrought by war has rendered Damascus less accessible and conducive to learning for newcomers. In contrast, Istanbul has emerged as a favored destination in recent years, attracting a growing number of seekers of Islamic knowledge. The city's cosmopolitan atmosphere, coupled with its historical significance as a center of Islamic civilization, appeals to individuals from diverse backgrounds. Moreover, Istanbul's relative stability and

Istanbul has emerged as a favored destination in recent years, attracting a growing number of seekers of Islamic knowledge.



welcoming environment have made it an attractive option for those seeking refuge from political instability and conflict in other regions. The global appeal of the Hanafi school of thought, prevalent in Türkiye, further enhances Istanbul's allure as a destination for Islamic education. The compatibility of Hanafi jurisprudence with the temperament and preferences of the average person adds to its attractiveness as a place to deepen one's understanding of Islam. Furthermore, Istanbul has become a hub for renowned Islamic scholars from around the world, including those displaced by conflicts in their home countries, such as Syria. Their presence contributes to the city's vibrant intellectual and spiritual landscape, providing valuable guidance and mentorship to aspiring students of Islam. Hence, while traditional centers of Islamic learning like Cairo, Damascus, and Madinah continue to hold historical significance, Istanbul has emerged as a preferred destination for seekers of Islamic knowledge who have been affected by factors such as political instability, government intervention in academic institutions in the mentioned countries and the global appeal of the Hanafi school of thought.

Experiences of Migrants

Over the last year, I have had the honor of working in the Center for Cross-Cultural Communication (KİM Vakfı) in Süleymaniye, Istanbul. During this time, I have interacted with new Muslims and individuals who have been interested in Islam for such a long time and noted the fact that the experiences of non-Muslims and converts to Islam who migrate to Istanbul are as diverse as they are profound. For many, the journey represents a profound personal and spiritual transformation as they navigate the complexities of adopting a new faith and integrating into a foreign society. Some individuals may encounter challenges such as language barriers, cultural differences, and social stigma, which can impact their sense of belonging and identity. Among the most common challenges faced by migrants are economic hardships, with some leaving countries with stronger currencies to pursue a closer connection with God, often making material sacrifices in the process. Many new Muslims have had to depart Istanbul midway through their journey due to financial constraints or a lack of stability and growth prospects. Additionally, navigating the migration system, which often involves arduous processes to

obtain or renew residence permits, presents another significant hurdle for migrants.

However, despite these obstacles, many find solace and fulfillment in their newfound faith and community. The process of learning about Islam in Istanbul enables individuals to explore the teachings of the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in depth, fostering a deeper spiritual connection and sense of purpose. Moreover, the opportunity to experience the call to prayer five times a day and participate in communal prayers, religious rituals, and charitable activities enriches their spiritual journey and strengthens their bonds with fellow believers. At the heart of this experience lies the exceptionally welcoming, hospitable, sincere, and pure-hearted Turkish citizens, whose generosity knows no bounds. The Turkish fascination with converts to Islam comes as no surprise, given the country's own intellectual evolution in modern history.

Implications for Individuals and Society

The migration of non-Muslims and converts to Islam to Istanbul holds profound implications for both individuals and broader society. On an individual level, the experience offers a pathway for spiritual growth, self-discovery, and personal fulfillment. By immersing themselves in the teachings and practices of Islam, migrants are able to cultivate a deeper understanding of their faith and forge meaningful connections with the Muslim community. Moreover, the migration of individuals to Istanbul for religious purposes enriches the city's cultural diversity and cosmopolitan ethos. As newcomers integrate into society, they bring with them unique perspectives, experiences, and talents that enrich the social, intellectual, and artistic landscape of Istanbul. This cultural exchange fosters dialogue, understanding, and mutual respect among people of different backgrounds, ultimately strengthening the social fabric of the city. Furthermore, the presence of non-Muslims and converts to Islam in Istanbul challenges prevailing stereotypes and misconceptions about Islam and Muslims. By engaging with the local community and participating in interfaith dialogue, migrants serve as ambassadors for their faith, promoting tolerance, coexistence, and pluralism in a globalized world. Their

presence reflects the universal values of compassion, justice, and mercy espoused by Islam, transcending boundaries of nationality, ethnicity, and religion.

The migration of non-Muslims interested in Islam and new Muslims to Istanbul for the purpose of learning about Islam or practicing the faith reflects the city's status as a global hub of Islamic learning and culture. By offering access to renowned scholars, institutions, *waqfs*, and resources, Istanbul provides fertile ground for spiritual growth, self-discovery, and communal solidarity. The experiences of migrants underscore the transformative power of faith and the universal appeal of Islam as a source of guidance, inspiration, and hope. As individuals from diverse backgrounds come together in pursuit of spiritual enlightenment, they contribute to the cultural richness, social cohesion, and pluralistic ethos of Istanbul, embodying the timeless values of tolerance, understanding, and mutual respect.

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THEME: Muslims in the Age of Migration

Migration Management: Interview with Mehmet Köse



Türkiye stands as one of the central points for waves of migration due to its geopolitical position, and this trend is anticipated to continue in the coming years. In this context, how do you evaluate Türkiye's migration policies?

Yes, as you rightly pointed out, Türkiye constantly deals with human mobility due to its geopolitical position, and this continuity shouldn't be confined solely to the modern era. Geography significantly influences migrations and other movements, as in the case of Türkiye, located at the center of civilizations throughout history. However, explaining migration movements only in relation to these features would, of course, not be sufficient. Political, economic, and cultural developments also play crucial roles in explaining human mobility, and a country's political stability, economic growth, cultural richness, and scientific dynamism attract people. For instance, European countries emerged as migration destinations in the past century, but the same countries were sources of continuous migration in previous centuries. If you look only at the period between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries, Africa, Asia, Russia and the Americas were the destination regions of European migrants. For example, Catherine the Great's incentive policies and religious and cultural pressures in the migrants' home countries influenced migration to Russia during the 18th century. Germany, which took the lead in mass migration in this period, is one of the countries with the largest diaspora today. The Italian migrations to South and North

America in the 19th century were driven by the desire to escape political and social crises and to access land and economic opportunities. From the second half of the 20th century onwards, the migration trend reversed. Europe has become a preferred region for human mobility due to its limitation of wars and bigotry, political stability, and economic progress.

We have had similar experiences in our region, Türkiye, as well. Turkish communities settled in Anatolia for economic, political, and religious reasons, building

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It would be wrong to analyze migration movements in Türkiye solely through refugee migration due to the crisis in Syria.

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a civilization there. Over time, it witnessed more human mobility and even encouraged migration. If we only look at Türkiye's recent migration movements, we'll again observe similar experiences. The 1960s marked the onset of massive out-migration, when the country faced economic challenges and three-quarters of the active labor force was openly and secretly unemployed. During that time, public finance structures were reliant on external aid, and investment and employment-generating resources had not yet been created. Hence, both skilled and unskilled out-migrations remained part of Türkiye's political and economic agenda for a long time.

Before the 2000s, migrations were mainly limited to humanitarian and natural crises, yet became more diverse during this period. People from different backgrounds, including intellectuals, scientists, politicians, investors, and entrepreneurs, preferred Türkiye. The number of international students, which was 5000 or 10000 almost 40 ago, exceeded 300,000. Political stability and economic development significantly improved Türkiye's global perception and position in our region. Socio-cultural dynamism and advancements in science and technology also rapidly increased. However, due to crises in neighboring countries, the migration of refugees has also been quite important for Türkiye. It was also a period of increased internationalization of Turkish society, especially in tourism, education, and trade. Sometimes, only these economic opportunities attract migrants. However, the migrations to the mentioned countries are largely seen as seasonal labor movements. It's noteworthy that the countries under this category are mostly rentier economies with closed and distant social classes. We can categorize Gulf countries in this regard. These countries offer significant economic opportunities to attract the skilled migration they need.

In summary, geopolitical position is a significant factor in human mobility. However, it is not enough on its own. A country's geopolitical position may be associated with transit migration or refugee migration due to crises. Attracting migrants can only be achieved through positive developments. In this context, migration to Türkiye in recent years is linked to the political and economic improvements in the country in the 2000s. It would be wrong to analyze migration movements in Türkiye solely through refugee migration due to the crisis in Syria. Türkiye has been experiencing similar refugee migrations for the past 300 years. Whether from the Balkans, the Caucasus, or the Middle East, these mass migrations are closely related to Türkiye's historical and cultural background, as well as its social ties.

Do these statements indicate that you consider migration movements to be positive developments?

Actually, yes. But, of course, we need to set compulsory migration aside here. When people are faced with life-threatening situations, they immediately seek refuge in the nearest country, and the crucial factor here is to escape threats as soon as possible. We can mention many examples, like the Rohingyas seeking refuge in Bangladesh or the Sudanese fleeing to Egypt and neighboring countries. Every country that seeks development or aims to sustain its development must have comprehensive migration management. Today, you can see that more than half of the member countries of the United Nations have migration management. There's increasing competition among countries to attract the required human resources. When you examine the details of migration management, you'll inevitably encounter differences in motivations among target groups and processes. Any country that can avoid populist approaches or manage such pressures invests in migration management. The competition among



Every country that seeks development or aims to sustain its development must have comprehensive migration management.

Western countries to attract Ukrainian migrants by mobilizing all possible resources immediately after the war in Ukraine cannot be simply interpreted as solidarity with Ukrainians due to socio-cultural proximity. They have embraced this opportunity wholeheartedly because they encounter a migrant profile that won't pose difficulties in explaining to their societies to sustain their development and overcome demographic shrinkage.

The main point here is to have effective migration management. Preventing irregular migration and minimizing the risks of migration require proactive migration management. Controlling irregular migration is one of the fundamental aspects of migration management. Building walls or closing borders cannot be considered migration management.

Could you elaborate on migration management? What should we understand by migration management?

Migration management involves a wide range of responsibilities, including developing migration policies, determining migration strategies, controlling and managing irregular and mass migration movements, monitoring migrant flows, and effectively planning socio-economic and legal integration and social cohesion measures. Migration management should not be limited to visa issuance and deportation procedures or focused solely on preventing irregular migration, as such approaches not only fail to achieve success but also impose political, diplomatic, and economic costs on the country. Migration management requires a comprehensive approach.

The first step in migration management naturally lies in having a migration policy. Migration policy is a critical component of migration management and should be comprehensive, dynamic, and participatory for successful migration management. The

development and regular revision of migration policy should be based on data and information. So, investing in the development of detailed and reliable data is essential. The efficiency of public administration depends on having a proper and transparent data system. Data that will contribute to migration policy, such as demographic statistics like birth rates, aging, and labor needs, data on the economic sector, and statistics on regular and irregular human mobility in Türkiye and neighboring countries, are crucial for determining both the need for migration and the roadmap for managing uncontrolled migration. Today, the birth rate in Türkiye has fallen to 1.5%, which is alarming for Türkiye as the average rate should be 2.1%. Participatory processes that involve political, social, and economic sectors bring ownership to migration management. Since migration is about human beings, it cannot be managed with static policies and requires periodic revisions of policies.

The most critical stage of migration management is the process after the migrants cross the borders of a country. Managing this process with a focus on human and social benefits must be regarded as essential for achieving social cohesion while maximizing the benefits of migration and minimizing its risks. In this regard, providing access to the labor market, establishing infrastructure for migrants to utilize their skills and professions, and providing opportunities will benefit migrants and ensure their social integration. When we look at the issue from this perspective, it is necessary to make legal regulations based on residence in the exercise of the profession and inclusion in the workforce. The failure of Türkiye's policy to promote skilled migration, as emphasized in its development plans, government programs, and strategies, is related to the closed nature of the job market and workforce. In countries with successful migration management, the basis

for inclusion in the workforce is residence rather than citizenship. Indeed, in some countries, paying taxes comes before the legality of residence. While the turquoise card has been introduced in Türkiye to attract skilled individuals to the country, its success depends on suitable employment opportunities for them. Even though the laws and regulations for the turquoise card program were made almost ten years ago, it is as if it does not exist because of the lack of promotion. Only a few people have benefited from this program through administrative decisions so far. For the evaluation process to begin, the application for the program needs to be opened. However, due to the problems in the process, an accomplished academician who immigrated to Türkiye cannot become a university faculty member or chairperson of a department. This means that even a qualified migrant who has previously served as a department chair or dean at Harvard, for example, and has obtained residency in Türkiye, can only work with a one-year contract at universities in Türkiye. According to the YÖK (Council of Higher Education), the number of immigrant academics should not exceed 2% of the total teaching staff. However, over one-third of the University of Oxford's professors are foreign nationals, and many leading universities have similar ratios. The same situation applies to many other professions, where problems arise due to issues related to professional laws when obtaining work permits. In this regard, the "restricted work permit" in labor laws is also problematic. Instead, there should be an "unrestricted work permit." Restricted work permits are commonly encouraged on a sectoral and regional basis worldwide but are not typically applied as a universal rule.

Another essential element of success in migration management is education policies, requiring a bilateral effort. These policies should not only focus on helping the new population adapt to the country but also on promoting a paradigm that enhances

their understanding and acceptance of the host community's culture. The education system should aim to produce individuals who understand their own culture and the world and foster cultural diversity within the school environment. It should also have an inclusive curriculum that represents different social groups in society and be supported by teachers who have internalized this understanding and received appropriate training so that migration management ensures diversity. Considering that migrations have significantly influenced Turkish society, the curriculum should include places like Komotini, Kardzhali, Skopje, Novi Pazar, Aqmescit, Makhachkala, Khiva, Bukhara, Samarkand, Mosul, Kirkuk, Erbil, Damascus, Aleppo, and other regions with their literature, history, and culture so that our children and society can recognize these regions, their cultures, and

people. Furthermore, individuals from these regions, whether they have arrived in Anatolia because of territorial losses, forced migrations, or voluntary resettlement, should see themselves as part of this society, sharing common values. A society that is unaware of its history and culture becomes alienated and hostile towards each other. Whether forced or voluntary, people who migrated to Türkiye predominantly come from regions with which we share common historical and cultural ties.

We all encounter different perceptions regarding the Turkish diaspora, who have settled abroad but come to their homeland for vacation in the summer. We must acknowledge the issues with the language used in the media, the behavior on the streets, and the attitudes of shopkeepers, which stem from the insufficient representation of those living in the diaspora, who are our relatives and acquaintances, in textbooks and curricula. Our lack of recognition of our diaspora in all its aspects and awareness of their contributions to this country nurture negative behaviors. When determining strategies and work programs in all areas of responsibility of all public institutions, action

Since migration is about human beings, it cannot be managed with static policies and requires periodic revisions of policies.

should be taken considering all the population within the borders of the country, adopting a residency-based approach. The global trend indicates a shift in public services, moving from a focus on citizenship to residency.

Migration management cannot be effectively implemented without considering perspectives beyond security and law enforcement. Yes, it is a part of them, yet the societal dimension of migration management also relies on the education system and the workforce. Revising these areas with visionary, comprehensive, and dynamic policies is essential for successful migration management.

Can we say that racism and xenophobia stem from Islamophobia?

Preventing the increase in discrimination, hatred, racism, and Islamophobic behavior is also directly related to education policy. Unfortunately, today in Türkiye, we are witnessing Islamophobia-driven, hate-motivated behaviors from both political circles and some segments of society. Anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments are referred to as Islamophobia in the media and public discourse. According to the definition provided by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), it is evident that the source of hatred in some segments of Türkiye stems from Islamophobia. Generally, when looking at the profile targeted by xenophobia, we observe that this hatred is directed towards Muslim immigrants coming from regions with which we share common historical and cultural ties.

These approaches threaten social cohesion and development as well as Türkiye's relations with its neighboring regions in terms of politics, economics, and security. They have a negative impact on Turkish investments and projects, limit service exports, and result in political costs. The largest customer base for health tourism consists of customers from Muslim-majority regions, including the Middle East,

The failure of Türkiye's policy to promote skilled migration, as emphasized in its development plans, government programs, and strategies, is related to the closed nature of the job market and workforce.

Africa, and Central Asia. There is a noticeable shift in preferences towards exploring new destinations, while overseas business visas for Türkiye have witnessed similar decreases. From this perspective, immigration, if well managed, would have been positive for Türkiye. However, prevailing negative approaches and discourses harm Türkiye's interests.

Of course, we cannot talk about humanitarian values with a profit-oriented approach. We express these to highlight the fact that when we move away from a humane and human-centered approach, it will not only affect our values and humanity but also lead to economic, political, and strategic costs.

Many argue that the current situation in Türkiye is caused by irregular and mass migration. Do you think stopping irregular migration and reversing the flow of mass migration will change the situation?

Migration management is a comprehensive concept that involves handling irregular migration, refugee flows, and foreign white-collar workers using the same approach. Türkiye regularly deals with irregular migration and refugee flows due to geopolitical reasons, as well as since these migrants often come from societies with historical and cultural ties to Türkiye.

The essence of managing irregular migration is a dynamic and flexible migration management strategy. The restrictive and closed nature of current labor laws actually contributes to today's irregular migration. It is well known that there is a high demand for human resources in the service sector, agriculture, livestock, information technology, and technical fields. If the irregular migrants in the service and agriculture sectors were sent back today, these sectors would collapse, and this is a well-known fact. As we mentioned above, what needs to be done is to develop migration policies based on regularly produced data that identifies the needed areas. If

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The essence of managing irregular migration is a dynamic and flexible migration management strategy. The restrictive and closed nature of current labor laws actually contributes to today's irregular migration.

immigration intake, visa/residence arrangements, and labor laws are updated to address the gaps in specific sectors, the irregular migration stock will quickly diminish. No one will risk their life and endure inhumane treatment trying to enter the country irregularly, so such attempts will be minimized. More importantly, informal employment will decrease, and taxes will be paid, creating a situation where all parties benefit.

Another important policy step is to combat irregular migration from the source. It is necessary to develop policies to improve the conditions in the source regions that force people to migrate, based on data and research, and to ensure the implementation of these policies through national and international initiatives. This requires a wide range of programs and projects, such as foreign aid and international development projects, civil society efforts, and security sector collaborations. Policies should focus on improving public services, border management, and local development programs in the origin countries.

To summarize, Türkiye has been implementing migration policies for the past three hundred years. The migrations that began with territorial losses during the Ottoman period are not considered international migration. However, they were managed as migration in essence. It is seen that public authorities planned and executed all processes, from settlement planning to adapting to economic life. Türkiye has continued to attract migrants since the early years of the Republic. During this period, the aim was to enrich the country with an insufficient population structure. Migrations from the Balkans and other former Ottoman territories were prioritized. The

negative policies of Balkan countries, which tried to reduce their Muslim populations in their nation-state efforts, also played an important role. Migration was managed through bilateral agreements with some countries like Yugoslavia. Türkiye has long maintained its importance as a significant transit migration route.

However, until the establishment of the Presidency of Migration Management with the law enacted in 2013, migration was managed by the Section for Foreigners and the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change and occasionally through temporary provisions. The 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection can be considered as the first important step in this regard. The Presidency established during that time had to manage the crisis and complete its establishment processes simultaneously. In recent years, increasing hate speech and manipulative and provocative actions have disrupted the development of healthy, information- and data-based migration management.

As mentioned above, migration management must be comprehensive. From the admission process to all stages, policies and practices should align with fundamental management principles. All units of public administration should similarly take the necessary steps as part of migration management. The aim should be to interact with and include civil society and the private sector in the processes. Moreover, there is a need for academia and think tanks to contribute to research and policy development. However, in recent years, universities have not sufficiently focused on the issue although it is a crucial issue to be addressed.

Migration from Afghanistan to Türkiye: Field Notes



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<http://dx.doi.org/10.26414/pmdg146>


Türkiye has a significant migration history, as it has served as both a destination and a transit country. Being located in a central position in the world where migration has become a global issue, Türkiye has been receiving migration from different countries such as Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran for years, each with varying degrees of intensity and at different times. At this point, Afghanistan stands out with its half-century-long migration history and the increasing migration intensity in recent years.

Afghanistan is one of the leading countries of origin for migrants in the world because of the invasions, wars, civil unrest, economic crises, and poverty ongoing for years. As of 2022, there are 26.4 million refugees globally. While five countries account for 68% of refugees, Afghanistan ranks third with 2.6 million refugees (McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021, p. 46). However, it should be kept in mind that Afghanistan was the world's largest country of origin for refugees until the Syrian Civil War. While these statistics indicate the scale of migration from Afghanistan, it would be misleading to look at the situation solely from a present-day perspective.

While migration from Afghanistan to Türkiye has a history of around 40 years, there has been a significant increase in the number of migrants coming through the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran corridor, especially in recent years. However, it is not possible to clearly indicate this increase with figures. The public data on irregular migration to Türkiye by the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior Presidency of Migration Management (GİB), the primary official institution in Türkiye on migration, is limited. On the other hand, the GİB regularly shares other indirect data that help to reveal the intensity of migration. The number of Afghan migrants caught in just 2018 and 2019 exceeded 300,000, accounting for almost half of the total irregular migrants caught during those two years combined. Moreover, when examining the distribution of nationalities among irregular migrants caught from 2018 to the present, it's observed that Afghan nationals are the most frequently caught irregular migrants every year (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior Presidency of Migration Management, 2024).

Figure 1. Distribution of Irregular Migrants by Citizenship by Year (By 21.03.2024)

Source: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior Presidency of Migration Management



An Unavoidable Stopover for Migrants from Afghanistan: Van

The Türkiye-Iran border spans 534 kilometers, with 295 kilometers located in Van. Therefore, Van has been an unavoidable stopover for migrants from Afghanistan who aim to cross into Türkiye or European countries via Türkiye for decades. For this reason, I have conducted field research regularly in the city center, districts, and border villages of Van since 2021. The memory of half of a century of migration in the city has become prominent when we examine the migration

process from the perspective of local actors (Ünay, 2022). Also, especially in recent years, the increasing intensity has led Türkiye to structure its migration policies in a security-centered form. Policies have been implemented to prevent migrants from entering the country through the Iran border, similar to those at the Syria and Iraq borders along the migration route. Hence, Türkiye's wall policy, which aligns with global trends, has also been implemented along the Iranian border. Türkiye is building a 295-kilometer

While migration from Afghanistan to Türkiye has a history of around 40 years, there has been a significant increase in the number of migrants coming through the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran corridor.

wall along its border with Iran that passes through Van. While strengthening the wall with technological equipment, Türkiye has also significantly integrated law enforcement into the wall, particularly after 2021.

From the Field: Current Developments

During the summer of 2021, images circulating on social media and various media outlets, often depicted as a "flood of migrants coming to Türkiye," were in the spotlight for a long time. In the field research I conducted during this period, especially in inter-

views with villagers, although some stated that there were predominantly young male migrants, there were also women and children migrants. In this regard, the methods of smugglers for smuggling migrants across borders are important as the images shared with the public are closely related to this. Smugglers separate young men, women, and children into separate groups during border crossings to speed up the process for each group and reduce the risk of being captured by authorities. That's why

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A migrant from Afghanistan is on the road for 18-20 days on average, and this period can be shorter or longer depending on the conditions.

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there were more young male migrants compared to other groups reflected in those images. Hence, while it is true that young men are predominant among Afghan migrants, it would be a misconception to say that only young men are crossing the border. Another misconception is that the migrant density increased radically in the summer of 2021. In fact, there has been a similar density of migrants crossing the border for nearly 40 years, and if there is an increase, it has been observed as of 2018.

During my interviews in Van, I learned that around 1200-1500 migrants cross the border daily, and it can be argued that migrants cross the border, particularly at high rates in July and August. According to the information I got from villagers, the number of migrants has reached twice the population of the villages. Although there was a decrease after the publicity of migration, daily migrant crossings were around 800-900, even in October. On the other hand, although the number of crossings decreased even further due to the harsh winter conditions,

around 300-500 migrants crossed into Türkiye daily, according to my interviews in January. Migrants from Afghanistan generally leave their country due to the danger posed by the Taliban and the poor economic conditions in Afghanistan. While the smugglers determine the routes of the migrants, according to my interviews, a migrant from Afghanistan is on the road for 18-20 days on average, and this period can be shorter or longer depending on the conditions. While much attention has been given to the number of migrants arriving from Afghanistan to Türkiye, it is known that dozens of migrants have lost their lives due to freezing in harsh winter conditions (Ünay, 2022).

All these challenging processes stem from the nature of migration and the migration route in question. In addition, the implementation of increased security measures at the Iran and Türkiye borders, the routine use of pushback practices that violate human rights, the harsh treatment of migrants by border officials, and the growth of bandits and kidnappers in recent years have all worsened the process for migrants. On the other hand, the cost of the Afghanistan-Türkiye (Van) route, which was around \$1500-\$2000 in 2020, has now reached up to \$5000¹. In exchange for this fee, migrant smugglers usually allow migrants to cross the border up to three times. However, the recent radical increase in pushback and deportation practices results in far more pushback than this number, making border crossings significantly more difficult for migrants and often causing the money they paid to smugglers to go to waste.



Suggestions for the Future of Migration to Türkiye from Afghanistan

Despite all these difficulties and the increase in security measures, it would be quite wrong to assume that migration from Afghanistan to Türkiye

1 The data is based on the author's field research called "Decentering the Study of Migrant Returns and Readmission Policies in Europe and Beyond (GAPs)" for the Horizon project in Van in January 2024. For the further information, see <https://www.returnmigration.eu/>



will decrease, pause, or end, and this misconception stems from the lack of sufficient knowledge and understanding of migration and migrants. Aside from a 40-year-long migration history, there is a similar continuity in all migration processes around the world, regardless of the obstacles. Indeed, the cliché that migration dates back as far as human history itself, which has become a cliché subject to criticism, embodies this misconception. From this point of view, it has become an obligation to make some humble suggestions regarding migration from Afghanistan to Türkiye:

- Türkiye should aim to handle migration not only from a security standpoint but also from a broader perspective.
- While ensuring border security, these security policies should not lead to practices that violate the human rights of migrants.
- The idea of building walls at borders to prevent migrants is an absurd practice that should be abandoned immediately. In the field, it has been observed firsthand that walls can be easily overcome with a ladder higher than the wall, a tunnel that can be dug, or a blanket thrown over barbed wires. Border walls could only contribute to changes in migration routes and lead migrants to longer and more dangerous paths, which increases the risk of life-threatening situations for migrants.

- The recent radical increase in pushback and deportation practices at the borders should be abandoned. The legal process of deporting migrants should not be disregarded, and efforts should be made to prevent human rights violations and not normalize such violations.
- Humanitarian diplomacy should be reconsidered as the primary focus of migration policies. And these migration policies should prioritize addressing the root causes of migration in countries of origin.
- Migrants should not be used as a tool of domestic or foreign policies.

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Remigration Patterns of Muslim Diasporas in the West: The Case of French Muslims



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The 4.7 to 5.1 million French Muslims, according to our estimates (Refas, 2021), have recently developed new migration behaviors that have not been studied in the literature. We observe three patterns mainly: a selective migration to high-income countries (including booming migration flows to GCC countries), a rapidly expanding migration to Türkiye and Malaysia, and a resurgence of migration to former colonies that had previously experienced a consistent reduction in migration flows from France since the 1980s. Overall, more than 140,000 people migrate to Muslim-majority countries from France every year today, and that flow of permanent or temporary migrants offers a wide range of economic potentials that ought to be studied further. The drivers of migration decisions are the main focus of our research.

Going back to history first, note that in the 1970s and 1980s, large cohorts of Muslims from post-independence African countries and Türkiye left their native lands to live in the West. At the time, the typical push and pull factors of labor migration were their main motivation for leaving their homeland, family, and native culture by ferryboat and immersing themselves in a completely foreign environment. In the case of France, this wave of labor migrants was predominantly coming from former North African and Sub-Saharan colonies (e.g., Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Cameroon and Mali) with dominant or large Muslim populations. A few years later, thanks to progressive immigration laws, the families of these labor migrants also immigrated under the “regroupement familial,” a right recognized under French law in 1978, and thanks to the birthright (“droit du sol”) which grants French nationality to whoever is born in France since the 16th century, they gave birth to millions of second-generation Muslim migrants who predominantly settled for good in France.

Using recent demographic evidence, we estimate that 45 years later, the Muslim immigrants of first, second, or third generation in France range today between 4.7 to 5.1 million (see Table 1). Due to a range of economic and social factors, we observe a growing trend of migration amongst this population, back to the home country of their parents (return migrations) or, interestingly, to third countries (transnational migrations). We also observe other migration patterns, such as temporary migrations or migration strategies involving two or three countries simultaneously (hybrid migrations).

Table 1. Self-declared religious affiliations of migrants and descendants of migrants in France

Source: Trajectoires et Origines 2008, INED

%	Migrants	Both Parents Migrants	One Parent Migrant	Native Parents	Total
No Religion	19	23	48	49	45
Catholic	26	27	39	47	43
Orthodox	3	1	0	0	0.5
Protestant	4	1	1	1.5	2
Muslim	43	45	8	1	8
Jew	0.5	1	2	0.5	0.5
Buddhist	2.5	1	0.5	0.5	0.5
Other	2	1	1	0.5	0.5
Total	100	100	99.5	100	100

To understand these migration flows, we need to focus on three questions mainly: how these populations have changed over time, in particular in terms of preferences and economic or social behavior (demand-side), how France has changed since the 1970s, and accordingly, if there are new push factors inducing the migration decisions, and how destination countries including homeland of their parents have changed since then and offer new pull factors dragging migration flows.

In a nutshell, if we focus on the population of Muslim migrants in France first, we observe that the predominantly blue-collar population that first immigrated to France has put a lot of emphasis on education as a social promotion mechanism, and their progeny is now well-educated and well-inserted in the various social strata of the country (see Figure 1). 33% of the descendants of migrant couples have now graduated with a higher-study degree compared to

5% of their parents (Beauchemin & Simon, 2023). Among second-generation migrants, the proportion is now 44%, i.e., even higher than the rest of the population (43%).

Despite the social recognition and improvements, these populations feel increasingly discriminated against. In 2019-2020, 26% of Maghreb immigrants reported having suffered unequal treatment or discrimination in the last five years (Beauchemin & Simon, 2023). Interestingly, the same data reveals that discrimination linked to origins has, however, decreased due in part to a shift towards religious motive: 11% of people declaring themselves to be religious Muslim women report religious discrimination, compared to 5% ten years ago. Other social issues specific to the context in France affect the migration decisions of these populations. According to the OECD (2022), for example, 34% of the population in France was at risk of depression in 2021, up





Figure 1. Progression of Higher-Study Graduation Rate Across Generations in France

Source: Trajectoires et Origines 2, INED-INSEE, 2019-2020 (TeO2)

Figure 2. Total Migration to Muslim Majority Countries and Top 4 2017 Migration Destinations from France, 1980-2017

Source: World Bank



from less than 10% in 2019, due to a range of factors, including loneliness during the COVID-19 pandemic.

On the other hand, the world has changed since the 1970s, and new opportunities for migration have emerged for this population, predominantly French and well-qualified. Classical migration theory predicts that the typical pull factor for a worker is the labor price differential (real or expected) offered for the same profession in destination countries. GCC countries, or other OECD countries, offer such opportunities and, therefore, drag migration flows in line with traditional migration models. However, field observations and structured interviews also indicate that for an increasing number of migrants, despite negative labor price differentials, migration from the West back to the homeland of their parents or to other Muslim countries such as Türkiye is a desired option.

Figure 2 below shows that the total number of migrants from France to Muslim-majority countries has slowly decreased over the period 1980-2013, with a major dip since 2000. But after that, the number of migrants boomed and doubled between 2013 and 2017 for the 16 main destinations of French migrants within Muslim-majority countries. This would strengthen the assumption that due to increased Islamophobia in France and increased religiosity among French Muslims, French Muslims are increasingly looking forward to relocating, generating transnational migration flows that remain to be studied in detail.

The tabulation of recent migration data helps identify some growing trends:

- The massive growth of migration to GCC countries and Malaysia (UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar) with growth from 8 times (Malaysia) to more than 100 times (UAE, Bahrain) in the annual outflow of migrants from France between 1980 and 2017;
- The return to annual volumes is slightly higher than in 1980 for former colonies such as Morocco, Tunisia, or Chad, with the noticeable exception of Algeria, which shows a major reduction in the number of migrants in recent years;
- The massive growth of Türkiye as a destination for French migrants, with 28,507 migrants to Türkiye in 2017, i.e., more than 5 times the 1980 number;
- The significant growth in the number of migrants to Morocco since 2013 could be interpreted as a growth in return migrations or a growth in new migrants, especially among retired French citizens and industrial employees.

It is worth noting that data limitations do not enable us at this stage to distinguish between Muslim and non-Muslim migrants in the data presented, a caveat that an ongoing statistical exercise is trying to correct.

Overall, the economic implications of the migration trends remain relevant for Muslim populations in France and Europe. In 2017 alone, more than 140,000



French citizens or residents have migrated to 16 Muslim-majority countries that we identify as main destination countries. This figure was up from about 70,000 in 2013. The economic implications of that massive outflow of migrants can be studied from the perspective of the recipient or origin country. Countries such as Morocco, Jordan, and Türkiye have developed over the years support programs to facilitate investments and return from their expatriated citizens, but the full economic impact of these investments, in particular the spillover effects on the rest of the economy, are yet to be fully understood.

A simplified evaluation of the economic potential of the remigrations of Muslim diasporas in the West to Muslim-majority countries could be attempted by looking at the average savings of these populations and the related investment capacity. For example, Arrondel and Coffinet (2019) report a median wealth of €113,300 per household in France. The 4.7 - 5.1 million Muslims in France (assuming an average of 2.9 persons by household as reported by INSEE) could have an accumulated wealth of €183 to €203 billion in 2019. If the transnational remigration assumption is confirmed for the majority of the 141,153 annual migrants from France to the Muslim-majority

In 2017 alone, more than 140,000 French citizens or residents have migrated to 16 Muslim-majority countries that we identify as main destination countries.

countries reported, the potential repatriation of the savings of these migrants to their new country of residence could reach €5.5 billion on an annual basis (€1.4 billion and €1.1 billion for Morocco and Türkiye alone). Other economic implications include transfer or knowledge through direct investment, entrepreneurship or corporate and academic channels. In 2014, Philippe Legrain published *Immigrants: Your Country Needs Them*, an excellent book about immigration, showing why Western countries should welcome migrants (Legrain,

2014). Ten years later, we probably now need such a book to discuss why transnational migrants are highly needed in Muslim-majority nations.

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Muslims, Migration and Cinema



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Invented in the late 19th century, cinema has not been accepted as simply moving photographic images with technological possibilities since the first moment it emerged. As an art form, it has its own linguistic structure. This structure is inherent to modernism and is more inclined to construct global narratives rather than national or regional ones. Hence, since its invention, cinema has traveled across the globe and quickly become an indispensable phenomenon for peoples worldwide. Originated at a time when global trade accelerated as never before, cinema is the product of an era in which not only commercial goods but also ideas and people were on the move. Therefore, regardless of the context in which we consider the concept of migration, it has an equivalent in cinema.

Egypt was the first country among Muslim populations to establish large-scale contact with cinema. The process that began with the construction of large film studios in the 1930s resulted in the establishment of one of the world's leading film industries. Many immigrant filmmakers contributed to the emergence of Egyptian cinema, which became known as the "Hollywood of the East" (Mejri, 2014, p. 32). Among these filmmakers were Turks like Vedat Örfi Bengü. The melodramatic narrative constructed in these films would later significantly influence Turkish cinema as well.

After the Second World War, countries in the Global South gained political independence, and there was a significant influx of migrants from these countries to the prosperous West. These countries, which were largely no more than fronts in the world wars and were primarily governed by colonial policies rather than being policymakers, were predominantly Muslim-populated regions. There were multiple social and economic reasons for migration. Western countries benefited from this influx of migrants by replacing the workforce lost during the war and providing employment for their developing industries.

The migration flow has also had a significant impact on cinema. However, before delving into the cinematic representation of mass migrations, let us examine it on an individual level. Firstly, it should be noted that the lack of cinema education and infrastructure in Muslim countries, or their non-existence altogether, forced many individuals to migrate to Western countries, albeit mainly out of necessity. For example,



many Turkish citizens received education in cinema and photography in Europe. However, they were compelled to return to their countries with the outbreak of the Second World War. After their return, their involvement in the cinema greatly influenced Turkish cinema (Onaran, 1994, pp. 41-42). In countries under Ba'athist regimes, on the other hand, sending individuals abroad for cinema education was implemented as a state policy. Thus, Syria and Iraq transferred directors from Egypt and Lebanon to make films in their countries. In some cases, filmmakers were forced to migrate to other countries, mainly to Europe, for political reasons, and they continued with their productions there.


Diasporic Cinema

The phenomenon of diasporic cinema resulting from mass migration flow is worth examining

The lack of cinema education and infrastructure in Muslim countries, or their non-existence altogether, forced many individuals to migrate to Western countries, albeit mainly out of necessity.

beyond the individual level as it sheds light on the experiences and transformations of Muslim communities in Western countries over decades, as articulated by Hamid Naficy (2024). Muslim diasporic communities exist in various parts of Europe, including Pakistanis in Britain, North Africans in France, and Turks in Germany. The individuals comprising these communities do not fully belong to their homeland nor entirely to the society they currently reside in. Therefore, they construct a unique identity as diasporic communities.

The transformation in the way this identity is presented over time can be easily read through the films. While issues such as integration problems, exclusion, racism, and identity fragmentation are prominently featured in the first two or three generations, and diasporic solidarity is emphasized (Higbee, 2013), today, such issues have largely



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been overcome. Although cultural, religious, and physiological differences are not entirely ignored, the differences between minority groups and the majority have largely given way to interconnectedness. For example, Fatih Akin, born in Germany, while touching upon the sensitive issues between Turkishness and Germanness in his films, does not convey negative messages about integration. He constructs a multicultural framework and focuses on raw human stories. Similarly, director Rachid Bouchareb, of Algerian descent, may make films about Algeria and Algerians, but fundamentally, he is a French filmmaker, creating popular productions for a French audience. These and similar filmmakers have become significant parts of their national cinemas and do not see themselves as pioneers in highlighting the struggles of a diasporic community.

Understanding the two main axes of contemporary cinema is essential to comprehend migration-themed films made by Muslim communities. On one side of the coin, there is national cinema, while on the other, there is art cinema. National cinema refers to a structure where films are produced within a national context, as implied by its name. These films are often only presented to a specific audience. In these productions, the story progresses in a more linear manner, with fewer formal experiments. The meaning constructed in this context is also more suitable for national understanding. National allegories constructed throughout the film

culminate in catharsis at the end; in other words, order is restored and justice prevails. On the other hand, art films are productions primarily supported by private and national funding institutions, mostly in Europe, and are presented to audiences mainly at film festivals and websites showcasing art cinema. The productions prioritize global messages over national contexts. A linear flow of content and form is not strictly followed. Art films, along with films rooted in local contexts in many national cinemas, are presented to a global audience. However, only art films might be produced in many countries due to the lack of national production, distribution, and screening networks.

In many African countries, film production takes place within this context. Since many African filmmakers have been educated in Europe, have close ties with Europe and even live there, migration is one of the dominant themes in African cinema. Unlike national productions, achieving catharsis is not a priority in these films. Instead, they convey global messages, prioritizing the appreciation of festival audiences. *Une Saison en France* (A Season in France, 2017), directed by Chadian filmmaker Mahamat Saleh Haroun, provides a case in point. The film portrays a person who flees to France and emphasizes the universality of values such as fatherhood, love, and the struggle for survival. Similarly, *Atlantique* (2019), directed by Senegalese filmmaker Mati Diop, focuses on labor exploitation and family pressure in Senegal through the love story between a person attempting to migrate from Senegal to Spain and his lover left behind. Throughout the film, young people drowned in the Atlantic Ocean appear as zombies in

the bodies of different individuals to take revenge.

Filmmakers from Muslim countries direct a notable portion of contemporary films that share the theme of migration, and the economic, social, political, and cultural issues that force Muslim populations to migrate are portrayed by directors in these films. However, the fact that these films are supported mainly by European funding organizations and integrated into the global art cinema network prevents a discussion environment among Muslims through these productions. As a result, the problems experienced and awaiting solutions cannot go beyond serving a background of the productions presented to the global audience and adorned with aesthetic concerns. Except for Türkiye and Qatar, hardly any Muslim country prioritizes supporting global cinema, and cinema, in general, is not widely recognized as a platform for discussion. Therefore, this important art form is not utilized to its fullest potential. Moreover, the ongoing discussions predominantly unfold within a framework established by the West.

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The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Management of Syrian Migration: The Example of Istanbul



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<http://dx.doi.org/10.26414/pmdg149>

The Syrian migration directed towards neighboring countries in response to the civil war that erupted in 2011 has shown a significant quantitative increase, generally in Türkiye and specifically in Istanbul. As stated in the literature, Istanbul is considered the most noteworthy sample for evaluating the contribution of nongovernmental organizations to migration management. In this context, this research conducted with a total of 75 nongovernmental organizations¹ working with Syrian migrants in Istanbul reveals the general trends in the activities of these organizations and their networks.

The first wave of Syrian migration witnessed by Türkiye in April 2011 has grown steadily, approaching nearly 4 million according to official records (Presidency of Migration Management, 2024). This migration movement, in its current form, has become the largest human mobility seen since World War II (Sezer, 2000, p. 11). Hence, this migration has become unique in its scale and nature, differentiating itself from previous migrations experienced by Türkiye (Erdoğan, 2015, p. 342). During this process, civil society organizations have taken on a significant portion of the workload of AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency) under the leadership of the Turkish Red Crescent (Erdoğan, 2018, p. 7).

The literature frequently states that the effectiveness of civil society organizations in the field of social policy has increased due to the impact of globalization. It is particularly emphasized that in the new era, there has been a transition from migration management to migration governance through state-NGO-private sector partnerships (Coşkun, 2022, p. 13; Akatay & Harman, 2017, p. 96). It is also noted that civil society organizations contribute to this partnership with their complementary welfare function (Özdemir, 2007, p. 375). In this context, the potential contributions of nongovernmental organizations to the unique migration movement of Syrians in Türkiye's history are of significant importance.

¹ Editor's Note: Although there are some differences between civil society organizations and nongovernmental organizations in terminology, both terms are translated here interchangeably.




Figure 1. Distribution of the Activities by NGOs for Syrians by Years




Figure 2. Distribution of the Activities by NGOs for Syrians by Their Fields of Activity




Figure 3. Distribution of the Activities by NGOs for Syrians by Types of Aid




Figure 4. Distribution of the Activities by NGOs for Syrians by Types of Social Services

Overview of Nongovernmental Organizations

When examining the period during which nongovernmental organizations began to play a role in the Syrian migration, it is noteworthy that 74% of these organizations initiated aid and support programs for

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When examining the main areas of activity in which these civil society organizations are involved in the migration process, it is seen that humanitarian aid stands out the most.

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migrants within the first five years of the migration (see Figure 1). This indicates that they have been actively involved in the process to a large extent since the early stages of the migration.

When examining the main areas of activity in which these civil society organizations are involved in the migration process, it is seen that humanitarian aid stands out the most (Figure 2). This suggests that during the initial phase of migration, the basic needs of the Syrian migrant population attracted more civil society organizations to the field.

On the other hand, when we look at the humanitarian aid provided by civil society organizations to Syrians, it is evident that there is a high level of interest in basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter, medical and hygiene supplies.

However, when we look at the social services NGOs provide to Syrians, we see that educational support programs, medical assistance, and integration services stand out, while employment and translation support, as well as guidance and counseling, are relatively less prominent.

Additionally, while this imbalance is attributed to the existing knowledge and resources of civil society organizations (Çorabatır & Hassa, 2013, p. 19), it is also noted that the establishment of new civil society organizations in recent years has led to the development of new areas of social services (Mackreath & Sağnıç, 2017, p. 22).



Coordination among Nongovernmental Organizations

One of the critical points in migration management is the coordination and collaboration among relevant organizations. In terms of both preventing the concentration of services in certain areas and improving the impact of the services, the connections between organizations are crucial. In this context, it is observed that out of the 75 civil society organizations participating in the research, 48 have established 10 or fewer contacts. In contrast, 27 have established more than 10 (Mengü, 2022, p. 18-20), which indicates that the tendency for joint operations among civil society organizations is not widespread. We can suggest that the predominance of organizations that prefer limited contact could pose significant handicaps in organizing fieldwork.

In this regard, when we look at the networks among civil society organizations, we can see that they lack an outward policy for collaboration with other NGOs. Other studies also show that coordination among civil society organizations in Türkiye, in general, is weak and fragmented (Bikmen & Meydanoğlu, 2006, p. 118-119), especially in the context of Syrian

migration (Erder, 2017: 130). In this context, the two ego networks identified align with the research findings. The Turkish Red Crescent leads civil society organizations (Erdoğan, 2018, p. 7), while the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) leads among organizations with Islamic principles (Deniz, Ekinci, & Hülür, 2016, p. 77).

Conclusion

The Syrian migration has been a significant test for civil society organizations working with migrants in Türkiye revealing both their limits and their impact. The findings show these organizations' supportive role and sensitivity in addressing this issue. Notably, they were involved in the support services since the first wave of migration. However, while there was a strong mobilization to meet basic needs initially, the response has been relatively limited in addressing other needs as the migration continues, which is attributed to the predominance of humanitarian aid organizations among civil society organizations in Türkiye. Although efforts in areas other than humanitarian aid have been relatively weaker, there has been a gradual development of activities aimed at addressing new needs arising from migration. It can also be argued that civil society organizations are starting to show interest in law, education, and

integration services to help migrants and refugees. However, civil society organizations must improve their existing connections to improve their efficiency and impact. Because as the research shows, non-governmental organizations working with migrants tend to work more inwardly in terms of coordination and form limited collaborations with specific organizations. Therefore, there is an ongoing need for common platforms where civil society organizations can come together and exchange their experiences.

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Interview on Gurbet Hikayeleri

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How did “Gurbet Hikayeleri” begin? What motivated you to start such a project?

The story of “Gurbet Hikayeleri” began as the collective idea of a group of friends who had previously been involved in different social projects. We all suffered from rising hostility towards refugees, xenophobia, and discrimination. So, we created “Gurbet Hikayeleri” to address these issues.

People tend to become hostile toward those they don’t know, haven’t interacted with, or shared anything with. Moreover, it’s only possible to be hostile toward an entire unknown group through some form of dehumanization, and it only requires the shutting down of all the channels for empathy. It’s not easy to hate another person whom you know has dreams, pleasures, desires, fears, and anxieties, just like you.

Gurbet Hikayeleri was actually established as a front to fight this dehumanization by reminding people that refugees living in Türkiye are more than just abstract labels or statistics. For the past few years, there has been a tremendous wave of hostility towards refugees on social media. Perhaps it is even more hysterical and destructive than what happens in

everyday life. Therefore, we found it particularly important to intervene in this issue through social media. Our main idea was simple: to convey the stories of refugees to the Turkish public in the refugees’ own words. Our readers hear these stories in their own inner voices without being influenced by elements such as appearance, clothing, or accent, which can easily lead to stereotypes. Thus, we aim to make it possible for even those who have never encountered refugees in their lives to empathize with them. We try to make the Turkish public feel that people categorized as refugees, or Syrians (“Suriyeli”), are actually just like everyone else, with their own concerns, desires, and fears.

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It's only possible to be hostile toward an entire unknown group through some form of dehumanization, and it only requires the shutting down of all the channels for empathy.

How do migrants and refugees reach “Gurbet Hikayeleri,” and how do you contact them?

We had all previously formed friendships with refugees living in Türkiye through various means. Our initial stories came from one-on-one relationships based on trust. As we published these stories, it helped us gain recognition and paved the way for new stories to reach us. Especially our Facebook account became our main platform in this regard. We publish entirely in Arabic on Facebook. Under many of our story posts, refugees living in Türkiye discuss at length in their native languages and share their ideas and opinions. The community there constitutes our main source for new stories.

Anyone living in Türkiye as a “foreigner” with a story to tell can reach us through all our social media accounts and the “Submit Your Story” page on our website. They can submit the stories they want to tell in Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, Persian, English, and French. Moreover, they can send voice recordings as well. After passing through an editorial screening, review, and proofreading, we publish the story in Turkish and Arabic.

What gap does this project fill in Turkish civil society? What kind of feedback have you been receiving?

The Turkish public doesn't really know refugees. Millions of people have been living with us for over a decade. They work here, they live here, and they get an education here. You can see refugees everywhere. However, the number of people who actually sit down, chat, and form friendships with refugees is relatively low. Additionally, refugees living in Türkiye don't have much representation in the media. When the most critical discussions about their fate are being held, no one asks them about their experiences or opinions. As a result, the feelings of anger,

hatred, and anxiety remain. Therefore, increasing the platforms where refugees can be active participants is essential.

“Gurbet Hikayeleri” operates on social media, where people don't interact with each other and where it's easiest to say the most bitter words. Indeed, anyone who takes a look at our social media accounts will see that the comment sections under the most notable stories often turn into a battleground. On one side, there are refugee haters, and on the other, their defenders. However, there are also surprising reactions. Sometimes, you come across someone who admits, “I am actually a racist, but what this person went through is unacceptable,” or those who genuinely ask questions to challenge their own preconceptions. For those who engage, these interactions can be educational in one way or another.

What are your future goals for the project?

Currently, we only publish the stories in written form. Additionally, we create an illustration for each story using an AI application based on the story's content. These illustrations usually depict the main character of the story. This way, we provide a unique and striking representation. However, it's evident that reading rates in our era are quite low. People now prefer watching and listening over reading. Therefore, we will turn our stories into videos in the next phase. We will combine the AI-generated illustrations to bring the stories to life in a way.

In the medium to long term, we aim to organize face-to-face activities that will bring together the refugee community we are in contact with and our Turkish readers. Through these efforts, we hope to contribute to a social practice where refugees can find enough support to become active participants in society.

Migration from a Psychosocial Perspective



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The socio-economic effects resulting from civil wars, terror attacks, natural disasters, climate change, and regional instability accelerate both forced and voluntary migration worldwide (Meladze, 2022). Migration fosters economic growth, adjusts labor markets, and enhances social interactions. Nonetheless, there is a growing tendency to perceive migrants as an inconvenience. Migration, from a psychosocial perspective, entails understanding the complex interplay between individual psychological experiences and the larger social context in which these experiences occur, taking into account migrants' mental health, identity, social networks, and community integration, as well as the societal attitudes, policies, and practices that influence their lives. To comprehend this, it is required to investigate migration deeply from a psychosocial perspective, beginning with the psychological impact of migration and continuing to the societal consequences and factors that may be used to minimize the adverse effects before concluding with recommendations for adaptable migration as a result of analyzing migration from a psychosocial perspective.

Psychological Impacts of Migration

Forced migration can significantly affect children's mental health and familial connections in both the short and long term. Migrants may experience a variety of stressors, including separation from family, loss of social status, language barriers, discrimination, and uncertainty about their future. These stressors can increase the likelihood of mental health concerns like anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which can be treated with psychosocial intervention methods (Tonkuş & Kalin, 2022). It is crucial to understand these issues and provide culturally relevant mental health support services. However, despite the hurdles, many migrants show incredible resilience and develop excellent coping strategies to help them manage their new lives. Understanding the variables that promote resilience, such as a strong sense of community, positive social relationships, and access to resources, can help to shape supportive behaviors and policies (Valtolina & Barachetti, 2020).



Social Impacts of Migration

Migration involves navigating between distinct cultural identities, as well as the process of acculturation, in which people adjust to a new culture while retaining characteristics of their old culture. This process can impact one's self-identity, family dynamics, and community connections, potentially resulting in stress or psychological growth, depending on the individual's experiences and resilience. The psychological well-being of migrants relies heavily on their social support networks. These networks offer emotional support, practical assistance, and a sense of belonging. However, migrants struggle to reestablish these networks in a new country, which can be a significant source of stress and isolation. Experiences with prejudice and social isolation can have a significant impact on migrants' psychological well-being, causing feelings of marginalization and low self-esteem and impeding proper integration into the host society (Boland, 2020). Thus, addressing these difficulties necessitates individual support and more extensive societal measures to promote inclusivity and eliminate discrimination.

Despite the hurdles, many migrants show incredible resilience and develop excellent coping strategies to help them manage their new lives.

Maintaining transnational linkages, or connections with one's home country, is essential for psychosocial adjustment for migrants. These connections can provide emotional support, a sense of belonging, and practical advantages. However, they can also provide difficulties, such as the stress of managing long-distance family relationships. On the other hand, international migration also promotes innovation, the business climate, patents, and economic growth while enhancing ethnic and cultural variety; nonetheless, it may influence the consumer price index, competition, unemployment, and public budgets. Moreover, adolescents of migrants display a hybrid identity that combines religious,

cultural, and ethnic components with a connection to their new homeland. They negotiate their sense of inclusion and belonging through a variety of cultural practices (Kóczán et al., 2021).

Factors for Handling Migration Challenges

Policy and institutional support are essential in determining the psychosocial experiences of migrants. Policies that encourage access to education, employment, health care, and legal services

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The psychological well-being of migrants relies heavily on their social support networks.

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can significantly reduce stress and improve overall well-being. Conversely, restrictive policies can exacerbate vulnerabilities and limit integration. Hence, handling migration issues requires considering a wide range of elements, both individual and societal, including:

1. Effective policy and legal frameworks, including legislation on immigration, asylum, refugee resettlement, and adaptation, are critical for addressing migration issues. Transparent and equitable policies can help respect migrants' rights while addressing security issues.
2. Migrants' well-being and integration depend on meeting their fundamental requirements, which include food, shelter, healthcare, and education. Access to these services helps migrants maintain their dignity and contribute to society.
3. Cultural competence significantly increases the efficiency of psychological and social support services for migrants. This includes recognizing migrants' cultural backgrounds, honoring their unique experiences, and offering services that are accessible and relevant to their needs.
4. Promoting social integration entails facilitating relationships between migrants and the host community. Language and cultural orientation programs, community events, and projects promoting intercultural understanding and acceptance are such examples.
5. Access to jobs and economic opportunities is critical for migrants seeking to establish sustainable livelihoods and contribute to their new communities. Policies and programs that encourage migrants' skill development, job placement, and entrepreneurship can assist them in overcoming economic obstacles.
6. Investing in migrants' education and skill development, including language training and vocational programs, improves their ability to adapt to their new surroundings and participate in the labor market.
7. Providing psychosocial support services is critical to improving migrants' mental health and well-being. This includes counseling, trauma-focused rehabilitation, and support groups to assist migrants in coping with the stressors of migration and displacement.
8. Engaging local communities in migration management promotes understanding, empathy, and collaboration. Volunteer programs and cultural exchange events are examples of community-based initiatives that can assist migrants and host communities connect.
9. Women, children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities should all be protected. This includes guaranteeing their safety, providing access to necessary resources, and protecting them from exploitation and abuse.
10. Countries of origin must address migration difficulties, including tackling the underlying causes of migration, such as violence, poverty, and environmental degradation.

If policymakers, practitioners, and communities work together to address these elements comprehensively, they can effectively manage migration difficulties and establish inclusive and welcoming cultures for migrants. As migrants in the host country, migrants must ensure flexible movement while accepting responsibility for their integration, which includes identifying both cultures. They should remember the importance of embracing their heritage culture while avoiding assimilation or separation from the host culture.

Recommendations for Adaptable Migration

Adaptable migration (Kononov & Ledeneva, 2021) refers to the ability of migrants to adjust to a new nation and conditions successfully, with an understanding of the host country's legal system, culture, language, and resource accessibility. It is highly recommended to ensure that migrants have the means to access advocacy and legal assistance services to help them navigate immigration procedures, resolve legal concerns, and advocate for their rights. Through legal empowerment, migrants can assert their rights and obtain justice when necessary. Focusing on language proficiency, which is required to access education, jobs, and social services, can help migrants find meaningful jobs and contribute to the local economy, giving them a greater sense of belonging and self-sufficiency.

It is crucial to acknowledge the importance of social support networks for migrants, such as peer groups, community organizations, and religious or cultural institutions, which is essential for adaptable migration. These social relationships offer emotional support, practical help, and opportunities for social integration. It is also important to ensure that all migrants, regardless of immigration status, access high-quality education and healthcare services. Education allows migrants to gain new skills and possibilities for social mobility, while healthcare improves their physical and emotional health.

Migrants locate safe and affordable homes and establish livelihood prospects, where they must have stable accommodation and income to integrate into their new communities and establish a long-lasting future. Creating linkages between migrants and


host communities promotes mutual understanding, empathy, and social cohesiveness. Therefore, it is recommended that relationships between migrants and the host community be facilitated by organizing community engagement activities, cultural exchange programs, and volunteer opportunities.

In general, it is critical to prioritize providing mental health services to foster resilience and facilitate effective adjustment to new surroundings. A psychosocial perspective on migration emphasizes the importance of considering the internal psychological processes and the external social environment in understanding migrants' experiences. It highlights the need for a holistic support approach that addresses individual and systemic factors.

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Kitchen in the Migrant's Suitcase: Migration, Food and Sociology



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<http://dx.doi.org/10.26414/pmdg151>

“After migrating to Istanbul, we’re eating the same meals; not much has changed in my daily life. I’m with my family, but still, I can’t get the same taste because we’re far from home.” These are the words of Ahmet, who fled the war in Syria and migrated to Istanbul from Damascus in 2019. Ahmet, residing in Fatih, works as an assistant manager in a restaurant selling Syrian-style kebabs. The language he speaks, the music he listens to, the work he does, the social environment he is in, and the food he eats are almost exactly the same as in Syria, but the taste is not the same. Why? How do migrants establish a connection with food, and how does the process of migration impact this connection? Here, we can look at the distinction between food and taste as a starting point. In this distinction, the symbolic values that food gains culturally transform the sense of taste beyond a mere biological or physiological one. That is to say, there is a sociological and cultural explanation for not getting the same taste from the same food, which cannot be explained solely by superficial or environmental factors. With the migration process and the changing sociocultural environment, this sociological phenomenon of taste also changes. These transformations affect not only the migrating but also the hosting societies deeply. In the following sections of the article, we will address different aspects of the relationship between migration and food in Türkiye under headings such as the connections migrants establish with food, sociocultural transformations after migration, daily life practices, social integration, and intercultural interaction.

Does Food Create a Shared Identity?

The strong connection between food, belonging and identity stands out when we look at the relationship between migration and food from a sociological perspective. Just like elements such as language, music, clothing, architecture, and religious rituals, food and culinary practices as cultural and social symbols have a profound impact on the creation of migrant identities and the sense of belonging (Haviland, 1999, pp. 42-53). In the aftermath of migration, where the sense of belonging to a place or group is deeply shaken, the bond established with



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Diaspora communities often choose to build new cohesive identities based on shared culinary cultures while disregarding ethnic, religious, and individual differences within themselves.

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food often functions as a mechanism of resistance. When we analyze different migrant communities both in Türkiye and internationally, we observe that migrants construct cultures with plural and mixed identities rather than singular national and cultural identities. Diaspora communities often choose to build new cohesive identities based on shared culinary cultures while disregarding ethnic, religious, and individual differences within themselves (Gasparetti, 2012). Food, especially those with important traditional values, is a fundamental unifying element in constructing new identity practices.

It would be more accurate to say that it is not just the food itself but the act of consuming those foods and the shared consumption patterns that transform into a symbol of identity. Because when people consume a dish specific to their homeland together or at the same table, it leads to a sense of group belonging among migrants and fosters an awareness of identity based on cultural symbols (Agutter & Ankeny, 2017). In this process, “reference to the culture of origin,” which is a focus for resistance for international migrants, “helps them maintain self-esteem in a situation where their capabilities and experience are undermined” (Castles & Miller, 2008, p. 53). In other words, food practices become a means for migrants or refugees to reconstruct or restore their shaken psychological-cognitive integrity and endangered values after migration. In addition, culinary culture is an important tool for coping with the sense of in-betweenness, frequently referred to in many studies focusing on belonging and identity among migrants, and ensuring cultural continuity.

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In Türkiye, falafel, which is identified with Syrian refugees and considered a representative of “refugee fast food,” seems to have assumed the role of representing Syrian culture and national identity.

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The Politics of Food

However, the relationship between migration, food, and identity inevitably carries a political character (Firat, 2024). Especially when nation-culture ideologies and nationalist discourses are prevalent, migrant foods can often be the source of conflict due to the political and ideological meanings attributed to them. For instance, we can look at the use of food associated with immigrant Turkish-Muslim culture, such as kebabs and döner, as a part of political propaganda in ultra-nationalist or anti-Islamic discourses against immigrants of Turkish origin in Europe. For example, the perpetrator of the mosque attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2019, in addition to publishing a manifesto embracing neo-Nazi ideologies, used the song “Remove Kebab,” which became a symbol of Serbian ethnic nationalism during the Bosnian War, as an anthem (Akova & Kantar, 2020). However, elements specific to migrant cultures, especially foods (such as couscous), are often symbolized and used in racist, anti-migrant protests not only against Turks but also against migrant groups coming from Africa or Asia to Europe or the USA. In many examples, we can find different reflections of these discriminatory discourses and policies both at the state-administration level and at the social level (Tuchler, 2015; Uzunçayır, 2014). In Türkiye, falafel, which is identified with Syrian refugees and considered a representative of “refugee fast food,” seems to have assumed the role of representing Syrian culture and national identity in Türkiye, especially in Istanbul (Beylunioğlu, 2023; Alpaslan, 2017).

The preservation of culinary culture also means the preservation of one’s community and culture.

Interaction Among Intercultural Cuisines

Another important issue in the relationship between migration and food concerns the functions of food in terms of mutual cultural interaction and social integration. The most frequently raised question in this field examines whether food acts as a bridge or a barrier in intercultural communication and integration. When do culinary cultures bring people together, and when do they create divisions among individuals and communities? The primary determinant here is often the performances of culture and identity reproduced through everyday life practices (Goffman, 2018). For example, certain culinary practices such as the types of dishes prepared at home, the choice of restaurants when eating out, setting tables with immigrants from a similar culture, exchanging food with neighbors, and sitting (or not sitting) at the same table with strangers—all signify certain boundaries in the realms of food-belonging-integration within the new migrant culture.

The preservation of culinary culture also means the preservation of one’s community and culture. Because in the modern age, culture is perceived as a “fortress under siege,” and refugees (foreigners) are often considered among the groups that should never be fully included in this fortress (Bauman, 2011, pp. 67-68). Therefore, any transformation or loss in culinary practices or culture signifies a loss of a part of cultural belonging. That is why a barrier is consciously or unconsciously

constructed against new cultural values or practices while also preserving cultural values. Hence, the interaction between migrant and host communities can also be studied in this context of culinary and intercultural exchanges.

When we look at the case of Syrian refugees, who constitute the largest migrant population in Türkiye, we see that Turks and Syrians, who have a high cultural similarity due to factors such as common historical background and geographical proximity, generally approach each other's culinary cultures with prejudice and develop a mutual "palate conservatism" (Onaran, 2015) towards trying different cuisines (Demirel, 2019; Gürhan, 2018). However, when we examine groups gathering around the same table in cafes, restaurants, or neighborly settings, we observe that these prejudices are broken down over time, and sharing meals has a positive reconciliatory effect. As a result of factors such as language barriers between the two cultures, claims of gastronomic superiority, and hate speech, which sometimes rise to the level of gastronomic racism, particularly in the host community, food can function to drive the two communities apart.

In summary, whether forced or voluntary, people who move from their homeland to another place carry more than just their belongings - they also carry their memories and cultures. Therefore, sometimes, a story, a piece of music, or a recipe becomes the most precious possession in the migrant's suitcase. The place certain foods hold in memory, through senses like smell and taste, ensures the continuity of individual and collective memory in the new life after migration. Additionally, as a result of mutual cultural interactions in the culinary realm, not only migrants but also host communities become subjects of sociocultural change. While food practices can sometimes be divisive, they also present a positive starting point for reducing intercultural distance and breaking down societal prejudices.

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Anti-Immigrant Policies of Immigrant Politicians: The Case of United Kingdom



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<http://dx.doi.org/10.26414/pmdg152>

Increasing migration movements bring along the rise of far-right and anti-immigrant movements in Europe. The electoral successes of nationalist figures such as Le Pen in France, Meloni in Italy, and Wilders in the Netherlands are quite concerning for the future of immigrants in Europe. The increasing hatred and xenophobia within society profoundly contribute to the spiral of violence and alienation in the region. Although anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe is often discussed in the context of far-right movements, there is a growing problem recently: European politicians with immigrant backgrounds support and implement anti-immigrant policies. While this may seem like a dichotomy in itself, it creates many complex sociological and political relationships. This is particularly evident in countries like the UK, where ethnic diversity is high. It brings the term “post-racial,” which indicates a period without racial prejudice and discrimination, to our attention in a neoliberal era where conventional patterns are broken.

As is well known, the UK is a country that receives a significant number of immigrants from different parts of the world. The relatively high economic and social prosperity compared to many other countries makes the UK a center of attraction for immigrants as well. The UK’s colonial and imperial legacy has resulted in a cosmopolitan society that makes it easier for immigrants to adapt to the existing multicultural and ethnic environment. However, although this process seems to be working in theory, there is also a strong reaction against immigrants, as in many other Western states. For example, Indian Prime Minister Rishi Sunak emphasizes that the country will no longer accept immigrants who come through illegal means, and there are also plans to send undocumented migrants arriving via the English Channel to Rwanda as part of a new treaty with Rwanda (“PM Sunak defends plan to send asylum seekers,” 2023).

We witness that former Home Secretary Suella Braverman, another Indian-origin political figure, strongly supports Rishi Sunak’s policies. Braverman defines the arrival of illegal and undocumented immigrants to the UK as an injustice, emphasizing that building a life in the United Kingdom should be through safe and legal migration and asylum routes, thus highlighting the reality of contradictory and strict immigration policies advocated by ethnic minority politicians. In this context, the implementation



of harsh anti-immigrant policies by politicians from immigrant backgrounds in the UK presents a different discussion beyond far-right nationalist movements. This discussion revolves around the fact that anti-immigrant policies are shaped not by the “white supremacist” right-wing ideology but rather by the right-conservative wing represented by ethnic minorities.

In the UK context, not only politicians like Rishi Sunak and Suella Braverman but also Nadhim Zahawi, Sajid Javid, and Kemi Badenoch are among the most prominent figures of the transforming right-conservative politics. For example, the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, Kemi Badenoch, has supported Rishi Sunak’s anti-immigrant stance by calling for “much, much tougher” measures to be taken in response to increasing migration movements (“Kemi Badenoch pushes Sunak for ‘much, much tougher’ immigration measures,” 2023).

Shared Heritage and Britishness

The increasing ethnic diversity within the Conservative Party in the UK does not necessarily bring about a liberal and pluralistic perspective but rather

reinforces a predominantly right-wing, traditional, and Britishness-supporting stance already inherent in the party’s ethos. This situation aims to reproduce the racial status quo that has become part of the Conservative Party’s agenda in a post-racial era and to legitimize this status quo through ethnic minorities. While theoretically, the dominant idea sug-

gests that minority politicians should support liberal policies that are not anti-immigrant, the real issue is that a party such as the Conservative Party, which criticizes ethnic diversity and multiculturalism and is anti-immigrant and has racist tendencies at its core, has attempted to legitimize itself in this way (Begum et al., 2023).

In this context, if we were to claim that ethnic minority politicians view immigration policies from a White British perspective, based on Marx’s

concept of “false consciousness” (Eyerman, 1981), it could lead us to overlook the complex relationship underlying this issue. However, we can analyze this complex relationship in the context of British colonialism, the “Commonwealth,” and the concept of “Britishness” maintained during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Commonwealth refers to the ties of friendship and practical cooperation Britain established with its former colonies during the post-colonial era (“Commonwealth,” 2024). At the

“The implementation of harsh anti-immigrant policies by politicians from immigrant backgrounds in the UK presents a different discussion beyond far-right nationalist movements.”



same time, it also points towards the cosmopolitan structure inherent within Britain today as part of its colonial heritage, indicating the existence of a shared identity. This identity, particularly representing a symbol of the post-racial era, embodies a shared British identity that is fundamentally non-racial.

Invisible Colonialism

Although there is a focus on bringing British society together and highlighting its pluralistic structure through the promotion of Commonwealth and Britishness ideals, it reveals a different presentation of the fundamental principles bearing traces of the colonial era within British politics. As mentioned above, it can be observed that the idealized policies of politicians from immigrant backgrounds in the British Conservative Party do not necessarily guarantee racial justice despite the ethnic diversity. Therefore, we can argue that it manifests a dilemma where the principles deeply embedded in British politics, such as racism and xenophobia, are carried out through ethnic minorities in the neoliberal era. This dilemma arises as ethnic minority politicians in the United

“The implementation of minority and anti-immigrant policies that are embedded in British politics by minorities themselves signifies an invisible colonialism continuing in the post-colonial era, with the white British mindset (Walsh & Ferazzoli, 2023) in the background.”

Kingdom attain significant positions, representing diversity and social progress while simultaneously promoting anti-immigrant and neglectful policies toward the rights of ethnic minorities (Begum et al., 2023). In other words, the implementation of minority and anti-immigrant policies that are embedded in

British politics by minorities themselves signifies an invisible colonialism continuing in the post-colonial era, with the white British mindset in the background.

Being the “Model” Minority

It is undoubtedly true that the prevailing understanding in the Western world, particularly in the UK, lies in discussions of race and class. In this context, the concept of “model minority” has also found its place in societal and political discourse. This concept suggests that immigrants who come to the country are subjected to a hierarchical system based on their skills/achievements. Moreover, their ability to speak English as well as a white, university-educated British and their integration into the hierarchical system further solidifies the perception of them as model minorities/immigrants. For instance,

“

While British society maintains its character of white supremacy, it appears to include ethnic minorities in the center of society by acknowledging their contributions through the Commonwealth.

”

Ukrainian migrants are more easily integrated into British society than other migrants from Afghanistan, Syria, or Somalia who have fled war (Kirk, 2022). In addition, in this hierarchy of hegemonic whiteness, adherence to social conservatism and the white Protestant work ethic is also an important factor for the model minority. Politicians such as Rishi Sunak and Braverman have been rewarded for meeting this criterion (Begum et al., 2023).

Although Braverman emphasizes that the anti-immigration policies of the ruling Conservative Party are not about racism but rather about protecting the borders against the immigrant “invasion” that threatens the British “national” character, studies show the opposite (“Suella Braverman’s most controversial quotes,” 2023). It is very well-known that in British society, migration is still closely associated with race and racism, and even ethnic minorities who are born and raised in the UK are still at the center of the immigration debate. Strict immigration policies, visible and invisible everyday practices targeting minorities, and the use of anti-immigrant rhetoric contain a process that affects all ethnic minorities, particularly undocumented migrants (Khan and Weekes-Bernard, 2015), and perpetuates the existing debates. Therefore, it allows ethnic minorities to integrate with the White Conservative elite and gain politically important positions by supporting Britain’s anti-immigrant and post-racial discourses and actions. While it counteracts the negative connotations of immigration in British society and prevents the exclusion and marginalization of ethnic minority politicians, it also restructures the understanding of British nationhood and further emphasizes the importance of the Commonwealth concept. Hence, while British society maintains its character of white

supremacy, it appears to include ethnic minorities in the center of society by acknowledging their contributions through the Commonwealth.

In conclusion, when we evaluate this complex structure of British politics, we can see why politicians from immigrant families are devoted representatives of anti-immigration policies.

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
BOOK REVIEW: Migration and Islamic Ethics: Issues of Residence, Naturalization and Citizenship



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<http://dx.doi.org/10.26414/pmdg153>



Migration and Islamic Ethics: Issues of Residence, Naturalization and Citizenship

**Ray Jureidini & Said Fares Hassan
(Eds.), 2019**

The historical narrative of human migration has been a constant throughout civilizations. This phenomenon significantly influenced the inception of Islam, exemplified by the migration of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) from Mecca to Medina, a pivotal event that marked the commencement of the Islamic calendar. Emulating his journeys, followers of Islam have historically sought new homes in distant lands, driven by the quest for improved livelihoods and divine guidance. Having personally experienced migration twice, delving into this subject has not only been enlightening but has also provided a profound understanding of the historical, scientific, and religious aspects that underpin our existence. In the contemporary era, with the shadow of colonialism receding, Muslims constitute a significant portion of the global migrant and refugee population. In *Migration and Islamic Ethics*, the eleven contributors expand on the ethics of *mu'akha* (brotherhood), *diyafa* (hospitality), *ijāra* (providing protection and support), *amān* (providing safety), *jiwār* (neighborliness), *sutra* (protection, esp. in case of marriage), and *kafala* (to guarantee someone) (p. 1) in general outlines and sociological case studies.

Ray Jureidini and Said Fares Hassan, the editors of the book, assert in the introduction that the book aims

to present an analysis of Islamic ethics regarding migration without centering on a particular group. They believe that by exploring the principles and teachings of Islamic ethics, a deeper understanding can be gained regarding the issues surrounding migration. The book aims to provide a comprehensive perspective that transcends cultural, political, and geographical boundaries, fostering empathy and compassion for all individuals on the move in search of a better life. Through this inclusive approach, they hope to contribute to the ongoing dialogue on migration and ethics in a way that promotes unity, understanding, and respect among diverse communities.

A distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Los Angeles School of Law, Khaled Abou El Fadl presents a compelling opening chapter entitled “Islamic Ethics, Human Rights, and Migration.” In his meticulous analysis, he intricately depicts the contemporary Muslim world, shedding light on the political and environmental factors contributing to the widespread displacement of Muslims worldwide. Fadl not only attributes responsibility to the West for its role in the displacement within Muslim-majority regions but also underscores the accountability of the Arab world for its lack of intervention and hospitality towards these refugees. He critiques the notion of strictly adhering to the concept of “dar al-Islam,” cautioning against the potential pitfalls of nationalism, ethnocentrism, and racism. His intention is not to deconstruct the concept but to highlight that, as Muslims, embracing the values of brotherhood and neighborliness can transcend the need for delineating borders. He says, “...it does take a certain amount of incredulous mythological thinking to continue ignoring the socio-historical realities, and insist that Muslims do in fact adhere to conceptual categories found in medieval texts written for a different time and place” (p. 23).

Succeeding Fadl’s eloquent introduction is Abbas Barzegar’s chapter, which delves into the essence of Muslim humanitarianism. Termed “The Living *Fiqh*, or Practical Theology, of Muslim Humanitarianism,” this chapter centers on Islamic principles guiding Muslims in their altruistic endeavors. His insightful analysis sheds light on the intrinsic connection between Islamic values and humanitarian efforts, showcasing how acts of kindness and compassion

are deeply rooted in the teachings of the faith. Barzegar approaches humanitarianism from a pragmatic perspective, emphasizing how preserving human dignity impacts intellect, life, faith, wealth, and posterity. These fundamental aspects collectively contribute to human development, which forms an ethical standard that should underpin much of human conduct. Barzegar advocates using *Urf*, or customary practices, as a framework for Muslims to infuse their humanistic values into daily life, adapting them to contemporary cultural and societal contexts.

In the fourth chapter, Tahir Zaman delves into the ethical considerations surrounding neighborly relations and the art of welcoming individuals into one’s country. Türkiye and Syria serve as poignant examples, with Türkiye exemplifying a hospitable stance toward its neighbors seeking refuge and opportunities for peaceful coexistence. Zaman astutely highlights the inherent dichotomy within Turkish society in his subchapter “Dissonance—between Hospitality and Exclusion,” where he underscores the governmental stance of facilitating the return of Syrians without encouraging their prolonged stay on Turkish soil in the spirit of neighborliness. Zaman continues to elucidate the Islamic principles underpinning the concept of *Jiwar*, emphasizing that it transcends the mere provision of temporary shelter, advocating instead for a harmonious daily cohabitation devoid of racial or linguistic biases. He mentions Arif, an Iraqi refugee he met in Damascus in 2010: “An Islamic narrative allows refugees to re-imagine their migration.” Arif reminds us: “All the land belongs to God,” i.e., territorial sovereignty belongs to God rather than the state. Everyone has the right to move freely without hindrance—borders have no place under this schema. The Islamic narrative demands that the stranger is entitled to “find a place to live and work wherever [she goes]” (p. 59-60).

Dina Taha writes a very poignant chapter about Sutra marriage, focusing on the case study of Syrian refugee single mothers in Egypt. Titled “‘Seeking a Widow with Orphaned Children’: Understanding Sutra Marriage Amongst Syrian Refugee Women in Egypt,” the chapter touches upon the disregard for women’s safety in certain fatwas concerning their status as refugees and their vulnerability to exploitation for Sutra. This sociological analysis sheds light on culturally ingrained practices in the Eastern context

within a postcolonial framework. It also illuminates that not all women affected by these circumstances perceive the Sutra solely as a form of protection; some exercise a degree of autonomy despite the challenges they face. To Dina Taha's astonishment, she finds herself reevaluating her perspectives on the nuclear family after witnessing these women's readiness to marry men for protection without love, a practice that challenges her preconceived notions influenced by colonial ideologies.

In "The Islamic Principle of Kafala as Applied to Migrant Workers: Traditional Continuity and Reform," Ray Jureidini and Said Fares Hassan collaborate on this chapter to explain how kafala is a system often misunderstood and misapplied. Contrary to common misconceptions associating it with Western colonization, its essence lies in offering protection through granting a residence permit and sometimes taking care of their living expenses by providing them a job. "The main function of this regulation is to guarantee the interest of the work itself, the maintenance of security, the prevention of chaos and tension in the work environment. Once these regulations are set, both sides, employers and employees, should follow the contractual conditions and commit themselves to its conditions" (p. 97).

Despite numerous fatwas asserting that a contract-based kafala relationship lacks Islamic legitimacy, many migrants still unknowingly enter into agreements they struggle to comprehend, left isolated from their native language and cultural context. Even though these fatwas are subjective and culturally aware, there's still a dearth of safeguarding the "makful" (sponsored/employees) from the "kafil" (sponsors/employers). Jureidini and Hassan conclude that the kafala system currently within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is systematically different from that of the Islamic tradition, in which it becomes a commercial and exploitative transaction rather than a helpful act. It becomes up to the state to protect those exploited in their lands for their labor.

The following chapter, "Normativity of Migration Studies Ethics and Epistemic Community" by Dr. Sari Hanafi, presents a thorough sociological analysis of the Muslim diaspora in the West, examining it through intellectual, spiritual, and political lenses. This theme is further explored in chapters eight to

eleven through different race groups in different regions. For instance, Radhika Kanchana's chapter, "How do Muslim States Treat their 'Outsiders?': Is Islamic Practice of Naturalisation Synonymous with *Jus Sanguinis*?" is a sociological study concerning the citizenship laws in eighteen Muslim nations, challenging the misconception that acquiring citizenship under Islamic governance is unattainable. In many of these countries, being Muslim is not a prerequisite for citizenship. The discussion also encompasses the legal concept of *jus sanguinis*, which pertains to acquiring nationality through the nationality of one or both parents.

Rebecca Ruth Gould focuses her chapter on the historical narrative of the Caucasus region and the migratory trends of the nineteenth century. Throughout the historical recollection in "The Obligation to Migrate and the Impulse to Narrate: Soviet Narratives of Forced Migration in the Nineteenth Century Caucasus," Gould explains the concept of freedom within the Chechen culture, alongside the different meanings of hijra for the people of Caucasus as they were forced to flee from the violent collision of the Ottoman and Russian empires. Seen as a means of Jihad and banishment, Gould argues that Hijra is a "paradoxically a unifying concept, a way of living with and through trauma, that gives meaning and structure to the experience of exile and displacement, including, for Chechens, the ongoing experience of the 1944 deportation" (p. 171).

Mettursun Beydulla records the mass Uyghur forced migration to Türkiye and the US after the secular communist rule in China. Titled "Experiences of Uyghur Migration to Turkey and the United States: Issues of Religion, Law, Society, Residence, and Citizenship," Beydulla highlights the dichotomy between migrating to a Muslim and a non-Muslim state and the process of integrating into different cultures and being subject to different laws during the migration period, simultaneously assimilating and becoming a legal or illegal citizen. He also touches upon the group's tight grip on personal identity amidst their diaspora in the West, especially when affected by a complex assimilation experience.

In the eleventh and final chapter, Abdul Jaleel P.K.M. writes his research on a more optimistic perspective regarding the Arab migrants who found a new home under Hindu rule in Malabar through means of trade


and economics in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. “Arab Immigrants under Hindu Kings in Malabar: Ethical Pluralities of ‘Naturalisation’ in Islam” seeks to challenge the negative portrayal of relocating to a non-Muslim territory based on medieval religious ideologies. Instead, Abdul Jaleel explores historical accounts that highlight positive instances of Muslims assimilating in distant non-Muslim regions under

different political regimes, shedding light on the often overlooked but significant legal viewpoints regarding the integration of Muslims. This initiative also aims to counteract any anti-immigrant sentiments that complicate the naturalization process while highlighting the distinct contrast in the assimilation of Western and Eastern states.

BOOKS

MIGRATION






Asile et Réfugiés dans les pays afro-arabes (Asylum and Refugees in Afro-Arab Countries)

Khadija Elmadmad, 2002


Focusing on Afro-Arab countries, Elmadmad offers a new perspective on migration movements in Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia. She draws attention to the dilemma between law and tradition that Afro-Arab countries, which are subject to both Islamic law and modern migration law, face in the issue of migration. The book reintroduces concepts in migration defined by tradition and modern law and analyzes legal regulations regarding migration in Afro-Arab countries. She argues that although Afro-Arab societies have many conceptual frameworks for protecting refugees, they have not been able to sustain their traditions until today, and aims to blend traditions and modern refugee law in forming migration law while discovering the need to return to traditional and religious norms.



Journey into Europe: Islam, Immigration and Identity

Akbar Ahmed, 2018


In this book, Ahmed explores the experiences of Muslims who live in Europe and challenge the European hegemony of the global age. The book is divided into three parts and analyzes Europe's challenges and the shift of Islam from being a center of science and culture to the redefinition of "pluralism" in the West. The second part of the book examines the concept of Islam in Europe and the issues of identity, citizenship, generational change, and multiculturalism in relation to the experiences of Muslims. The final part focuses on the understanding of concepts like terrorism and Islamophobia in Europe and their implications for Muslims.



Migration and Islamic Ethics: Issues of Residence, Naturalization, and Citizenship

Ray Jureidini & Said Fares Hassan (Eds.), 2019


This book, edited by Jureidini and Hassan, explores how Islamic ethics such as brotherhood, hospitality, providing protection, providing security, neighborliness, and protection, especially in the case of sutra (marriage) and kafala (sponsorship), can address issues related to migration and displacement in the modern period. The first chapter of the book includes theoretical approaches to the field of migration and conceptualizations within an Islamic framework. The second chapter analyzes empirical cases of migration affecting the present, while the third part examines the experiences of Muslims in migration historically. While challenging traditional literature focused on the post-colonial field, the authors propose that migration is a right and a natural process that requires overcoming the concept of "state borders" in migration.



Uyghur Identity and Culture A Global Diaspora in a Time of Crisis

Rebecca Clothey & Dilmurat Mahmut (Eds.), 2024


Composed of different articles, this book addresses both the historical challenges and contemporary issues faced by the Uyghur diaspora. In the book, the authors argue that the Uyghur diaspora, spread across communities in Australia, Central Asia, Europe, Japan, Türkiye, and North America, must take responsibility for preserving their language and traditions to ensure their transmission to future generations. Moreover, they criticize the Chinese government's censorship of Uyghur literature and the Western media's coverage of Uyghurs. The struggle of Uyghurs for existence against geographical and psychological pressures and ethnocide is discussed in the light of terms such as sociology, migration, culture, and human rights, while the authors make a global call to action against human rights violations.



At Distance: Representation of The Migrants in Turkish Textbooks

Zafer Çelik, 2024

Regardless of their primary purpose, textbooks can act as actors that facilitate social conflict or reconciliation based on their content. Therefore, changes in the content of textbooks can lead to political and social transformations, whether as supporters of maintaining social order and peace or as triggers of social conflict and unrest. In this regard, the author Çelik argues that textbooks that marginalize migrants by portraying them as “guests” and “needy” and exclude their achievements and cultural contributions reinforce negative attitudes towards them. Furthermore, he emphasizes that providing more detailed information about migration and immigrants in textbooks and preparing content that considers pluralism and the contributions of immigrants would contribute to changing this negative and exclusionary attitude towards immigrants.




Refugees and Migrants in Contemporary Film, Art and Media

Deniz Bayraktar & Robert Burgoyne, 2022

In the 21st century, migration has become one of the most crucial issues of the modern world and a phenomenon of increasing urgency due to civil wars, climate crises, and famine. This book, edited by Robert Burgoyne and Deniz Bayraktar, examines the involvement of creative artists in the global migration crisis. It offers a new perspective on the experiences of migrants through eleven articles that analyze alternative forms of representation. The collection covers a wide range of art, from well-known artworks to


refugee film workshops and virtual reality installations to cinema. While analyzing the visual expression of mass migration in the 21st century, the book has become an important anthology in terms of the artistic responses offered to this global crisis.



Islam, Migrancy, and Hospitality in Europe

Meyda Yeğenoğlu, 2016

Academics and researchers who have studied the concepts of migration and refugees in Europe have focused on the structural and social dimensions of immigration and offered different solutions. In this book, Yeğenoğlu reconsiders fundamental issues such as European values and immigrant acceptance from a deconstructive perspective. She examines the role of factors like cosmopolitanism and nationalism in European culture, and how they contribute to the immigration problem, and how these factors can be resolved through social transformation. Focusing particularly on concepts such as Western enlightenment and secularism, the author analyzes how these ideals can affect the social acceptance of immigrants in Europe. The book critically evaluates Islam, immigration, and hospitality in Europe, providing readers with an up-to-date and in-depth theoretical perspective.



Memories of Burmese Rohingya Refugees: Contested Identity and Belonging

Kazi Fahmida Farzana, 2017

In this book, Farzana explores the connection between the identity construction processes of Rohingya refugees fleeing from Burma and the establishment of the Myanmar state. While examining the challenges, exclusion, and traumas faced by refugees in light of concepts such as marginalization, forced migration, and social belonging with identity, she focuses on how these concepts interact with various power dynamics. Relying on ethnographic research, including observations and interviews conducted in refugee camps, the author portrays the identity struggles and the search for belonging experienced by Rohingyas on the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. Furthermore, Farzana offers an alternative perspective by deeply analyzing the manipulation exerted by state policies for political purposes on the identity construction of Rohingya migrants.

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