Following the Operation al-Aqsa Flood launched by Hamas on October 7, Israel launched an all-out attack on Gaza with no regard for civilians. In these weeks-long attacks, 15,000 civilians, mostly women and children, have lost their lives, and many more have been wounded; also, there is no information about the whereabouts of around 7,000 Palestinians. Therefore, Israel is trying to create a Gaza Nakba for Palestinians by starting a process similar to the Deir Yasin massacre on April 9, 1948 (Cafiero, 2023). As people around the world rise against Israel’s genocide, the stance of many Arab and Islamic countries on the Palestinian cause has become a matter of debate, and the Gulf countries have become key actors in this regard.
Doha Diplomacy
In the war between Israel and Hamas, Qatar stands out as one of the most active actors. Indeed, Doha has continued its long-standing role as a mediator in the war in Gaza (Ereli, 2023) and played a critical role in the prisoner exchange (“Hamas releases two women held hostage after Egyptian-Qatari diplomacy,” 2023). In this sense, Qatar’s diplomatic initiatives have been effective in reducing tension and have achieved success in prisoner exchanges, which was the previous step of negotiations. In an environment where Israel is expanding its air and ground attacks, the risk of the war evolving into a regional conflict increases day by day. The implementation of the hostage negotiation agreement by Doha represents a crucial step in terms of regional and global security. In other words, many Western actors view the peace process in the Middle East as directly linked to Doha’s diplomatic success (Pack, 2023). In this regard, Qatar’s success is closely associated with the network of global and regional relations built specifically for Doha. Hosting the largest U.S. base in the region, Qatar was also declared a non-NATO ally of the U.S. in 2022 (Saidy, 2017). In addition to institutional collaboration with the U.S., Qatar hosts senior officials of Hamas and manages a process of unofficial coordination with Israel in Gaza. Qatar, as an active actor in negotiations for hostage exchange, is also under serious pressure from the U.S. (“Qatar’s Delicate Balance Between Hamas and the West,” 2023). Indeed, 113 members of the U.S. Congress have called on the Biden administration to pressure Qatar to cut all ties with Hamas. Similarly, the Zionist Organization of America is forming public opinion against Doha for the evacuation of Hamas officials in Qatar. Therefore, while managing this process through diplomatic steps, Qatar is also in a dilemma.
Many Western actors view the peace process in the Middle East as directly linked to Doha’s diplomatic success.
The crux of Qatar’s dilemma lies between supporting an Islamic movement and being accused of supporting terrorism. In the Gulf crisis between 2017 and 2021, Qatar faced similar accusations from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but adopting a relatively challenging policy, it did not condemn Operation al-Aqsa Flood and Hamas. However, to avoid jeopardizing relations with the West, Qatar has made pragmatic statements to open some room for maneuvering. For example, Qatar’s ambassador to Washington rejected allegations that Qatar was funding Hamas, stating that hosting senior Hamas leaders does not imply that they approve all of the policies of the movement. These statements, which somewhat appeased Western actors, triggered actions in Israel. Some Israeli figures criticized Doha’s Hamas policy, threatening that Qatar would pay the price after Hamas. For example, former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett took a firm stance against Doha’s position by making social media posts declaring Qatar an enemy. Although Bennett’s rhetoric does not represent a complete consensus, it reflects the views of a significant part of the people about Israel’s view of Qatar. Despite all the pressures from the West and Israel, Qatar continues to support Palestine through broadcasts on channels at the center of its soft power, such as Al Jazeera.
Qatar faced similar accusations from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but adopting a relatively challenging policy, it did not condemn Operation al-Aqsa Flood and Hamas.
Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Balance of Power
As one of the most important actors in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia’s policy towards Israel’s attacks on Gaza can be read through the politics of balance of power. In this sense, it is seen that the Riyadh administration evaluates the process through many parameters. The first is related to the search for “strategic autonomy” that started with King Abdullah and continued under King Salman and Mohammed bin Salman. In order to reduce its dependence on the U.S., the Riyadh administration has taken many steps not fully to submit to Washington’s dictates. This political choice can be easily seen in Saudi Arabia’s relations with China and Russia, as well as in its criticism of Israel. For example, Mohammed bin Salman, who has stated that he is getting closer and closer to normalization with Israel, has made statements implying that they have frozen the normalization process after the U.S. support for Israel. Furthermore, Prince Salman made a call during an online BRICS conference for countries selling weapons to Israel to cease such activities (Cafiero, 2023). Therefore, Saudi Arabia is sending a message to the U.S. in the war that Israel is conducting against Hamas and is relatively challenging Washington’s impositions in foreign policy. However, Saudi Arabia is unable to take definite, challenging steps, such as the closure of U.S. military bases in the country. This situation can be interpreted as Riyadh aiming to strengthen its position in various diplomatic negotiation processes, particularly normalization with Israel, and consolidate its strategic autonomy rather than move away from the U.S. orbit in the short term.
Saudi Arabia is sending a message to the U.S. in the war that Israel is conducting against Hamas and is relatively challenging Washington’s impositions in foreign policy.
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman, April 18, 2023
Source: Palestinian Presidency
Parameters determining Saudi Arabia’s policy towards Israel’s Gaza attacks include issues such as Iran and political Islam. These two issues are coded as threats to regime security by the al-Saud family (Rakipoğlu, 2013). Accordingly, the fact that the political bureau chief of Hamas, Ismail Haniyya, and Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’ leader in Gaza, maintain close contacts with Iran and that Khaled Meshaal, who is closer to Saudi Arabia, was appointed to a diaspora office affected Saudi Arabia’s policy regarding the events in Gaza. Indeed, Hamas’ rapprochement with Iran and its adoption of discourses such as “Qasem Soleimani is a martyr of Jerusalem” have raised concerns in Riyadh. In other words, Hamas’ rapprochement with Iran, which has been Saudi Arabia’s rival since 1979, has hindered Riyadh from taking an active stance against Israel. In this sense, it can be argued that the Saudi Arabian leadership considers the open support of Hamas as a reinforcement for Iran’s regional expansion; therefore, it uses Palestinian support instead of Hamas support. Secondly, although Hamas did not define the movement as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in its “New Policy Document” published in 2017, differentiating it from its 1987 form, Saudi Arabia still sees Hamas as a political Islamist movement (Telci, 2023). Seen as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was declared a terrorist organization in the kingdom in 2014, Hamas has been under serious pressure in Saudi Arabia since 2019. Thus, due to Saudi concerns about Hamas’s connection to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Saudi government refrains from supporting the movement altogether. However, Saudi Arabia, which has to respond to the support for the resistance in the “Arab street,” shapes its Palestine policy by choosing a very sensitive and balanced rhetoric (Davis, 2023). Emphasizing public diplomacy, Saudi Arabia wants to preserve its prestige in the Islamic world and eliminate potential threats to the regime by hosting meetings such as the Arab-Islamic summit.
Kuwait’s Support for Palestine
Among the Gulf countries, Kuwait stands out as one of the countries with the most explicit stance on the Palestinian issue, firmly standing by the Palestinians. Although there were some problems in relations in the 1990s due to the position taken by the Palestine Liberation Organization during Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, Kuwait has continued to support Palestine against Israel (Mattar, 2023).
After October 7, Kuwait also expressed a strong reaction to Israel’s genocide in Gaza. Rejecting normalization with Israel, Kuwait has taken important steps in support of Palestine both on the political and civil society level. For instance, 39 out of 50 members of the Kuwait National Assembly issued a statement declaring their rejection of normalization with Israel. Kuwait, which characterizes Israel’s attacks as murderous, has also contributed to humanitarian aid to Palestine significantly. For instance, Kuwait announced the launch of relief operations through an air bridge to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Similarly, nearly 50 civil society organizations called on the government, demanding that normalization be considered a criminal act. In addition, hundreds of meetings, demonstrations, and events, pioneered mainly by civil society and supported by the Kuwaiti state, were organized in support of Palestine. Hence, Kuwait stands against the Israeli attacks in Gaza and defends the rights of Palestinians in the Palestinian issue. It has repeatedly declared that the issue of Israel will not be resolved until an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital is established within the 1967 borders.
Stances of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain
The Palestinian policy of the UAE and Bahrain, which normalized their relations with Israel by signing the Abraham Accords initiated by then-US President Donald Trump in September 2020, and their reaction to the events in Gaza show that these actors have taken a pro-Tel Aviv stance. In fact, many high-ranking officials, including the UAE’s UN representative, did not condemn Israel’s genocide in Gaza in the early stages of the process while accusing Hamas of terrorism. Later, they had to give in to pressure and warn Israel. Therefore, while both the UAE and Bahrain condemned Hamas for October 7, their reactions to Israel’s attacks were rather symbolic. In addition, social media influencers close to these two actors tried to cover up the genocide in Gaza by claiming that Israel had the right to self-defense. For example, Bahraini Emced Taha tried to legitimize Israel’s bombing of the Al-Ahli Hospital in Gaza in a post on his social media account. In this sense, Emced Taha implied that criticism should be directed towards terrorists rather than Israel in the aftermath of the attack. These statements of Emced Taha, who praised Israeli soldiers and made anti-Hamas statements in an interview in 2020, should not be evaluated independently of the regime in a repressive country like Bahrain; on the contrary, this process should be read as part of a pro-Israel propaganda war (Jones, 2023). In other words, the governments in the UAE and Bahrain allow or condone the formation of pro-Israeli public opinion, which explains the Palestinian policies of these actors. Oman, even though it has no diplomatic relations with Israel, did not take an active stance, merely calling for a ceasefire in Gaza without openly engaging in the conflict.
Conclusion
Gulf countries have prioritized their national interests over the Palestinian issue, adopting a Palestinian policy that relegates it to the background. While Qatar took an active position in the process due to its diplomatic steps in both ceasefire and mediation, the UAE and Bahrain adopted a more pro-Israel stance. In contrast, Kuwait has increased its support for Palestine, while Oman has adopted a passive stance. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, did not make a radical change in its traditional Palestinian policy and suspended the normalization process with Israel. However, the Gulf countries have not taken concrete steps such as boycotts, divestments, and sanctions against Israel either through institutional structures such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or their own state-based institutional structures. Consequently, the Palestinian issue seems to have lost its historical importance in the eyes of the Gulf states.
References
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