The Global Sumud Flotilla, which seeks to overcome Israel’s blockade of Palestine, aims to establish a secure and sustainable maritime corridor to enable the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza. As the ILKE Foundation’s “Platform Project: The Agenda of the Muslim World” team, we present excerpts from interviews conducted with the flotilla’s organizers to understand the initiative’s on-the-ground dynamics, sources of motivation, and place within the framework of international law.
Dr. Hüseyin Durmaz
- How did the Global Sumud Flotilla come into being?
In the aftermath of October 7, strong indications emerged that world political history had entered a turning point, with a new conjuncture and process taking shape. During this period, an atmosphere developed in which the perception-building that Israel had long sustained across European societies and governments, as well as in various regions—foremost the United States—began to reverse. The policies pursued and the practices on the ground brought to light certain realities that could not be made sufficiently visible through conferences and publications to date. In particular, the threat perception generated by Zionism on a global plane has been opened to debate.
The current conjuncture has laid the groundwork for an intellectual awakening, reappraisal, and questioning of established assumptions in many societies. As significant as the severity of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza is, the conjunctural opportunity it has generated on a global scale is equally substantial; it indicates that humanity stands at a new crossroads and possesses a potential for broad-based solidarity. Recognizing this potential, articulating it systematically, and mobilizing existing means and capacities in this direction were the core of our appeals to the public, which we conveyed through texts, calls, and a book.
In line with contacts established in Europe, an initiative that may be counted among the first at a global scale was launched, initially through health professionals. With the participation of thousands of physicians and healthcare workers from 15 countries, the “Five-Day White Tent Action” was held in front of the United Nations in Geneva. This action contributed to opening new channels of contact and establishing relations of trust between the Western and Islamic worlds. Subsequently, with the same team, the Egypt–Rafah march was organized, drawing tens of thousands of participants from 80 countries. This march was particularly significant in demonstrating humanity’s potential to come together. Thereafter, the idea emerged to combine all global actions under a single umbrella and carry out the most critical civil action in world history—a maritime flotilla. This is how the central dynamic of the process took shape.
- What criteria and decision-making processes formed the basis for removing certain planned participants from Turkey—particularly members of parliament—from the list?
As is known, although Turkey and certain Islamic countries have taken steps regarding Gaza, we need to center the Western world when constructing our strategy, given that, on the international stage, they appear as supporters of Palestine. It was necessary to develop a strategy in which the Western world and Western publics were central, thereby creating a framework that Israel could not risk losing to, or that could halt Israeli oppression. Within this strategy, for both the Geneva and Rafah marches and the Sumud action, we developed an approach that did not place Turkey and other Islamic countries at the center, but rather in a supportive position. This point is critical because we aimed to prevent Israel’s manipulation—specifically, its potential to criminalize the action by associating it with terrorism, support for Hamas, or similar claims of radicalism. Likewise, it was crucial to sustain the momentum gained in the Western world to counter and stop Israeli oppression.
For this reason, in selecting the leadership team and in building the strategy, we defined Turkey as occupying a supportive role and proceeded accordingly. We also pursued a similar approach for the Global Sumud Flotilla, positioning ourselves as observer members in the selection of the delegation’s leadership. This is not an action based on Islamic principles, but on humanitarian grounds. To achieve success and maximize benefit, it was necessary for the Western world to be at the center and to deprive Israel of all arguments with which it could manipulate the process. In line with these considerations, as the Turkish delegation, we decided not to exceed a certain quota, planning it to be at most ten percent. Since we issued an open call for the Sumud journey, there was a very high volume of requests from Turkey to join the Sumud Flotilla.
Due to a miscalculation by the global team (accrediting a 25-person vessel as carrying 40 people), the situation on the ground resulted in a decrease in participants from all delegations. In particular, the Turkish delegation had declared that the ships should not enter Tunisia, and the global team had accepted this view. Consequently, the ships were not to enter Tunisia; however, the vessels departing from Spain were delayed by three days due to technical malfunctions and, needing maintenance, entered Tunisia. This, in turn, increased the human burden on our local partners in Tunisia, causing their primary task of preparing the ships to fall into the background. Additionally, in Tunisia, Israel undertook moves through the media, issuing threats and insinuations about arms transport. In response, we issued counter-statements under the auspices of the United Nations and with the support of international observers. During the Tunisian phase, however, Israel then sought to reduce the number of vessels through domestic influence agents and acts of sabotage.
First, our local partners were unable to resolve the chaos and crisis caused by the heavy human load on the ground, the arrival of large numbers of people, and the over-accreditation of participants; second, there were acts of sabotage carried out under the guise of “mechanics” and similar pretexts, which led to a reduction in the number of our vessels—this in turn caused several rounds of downsizing in the lists. Until October 7, there was Islamophobia in the Western world. After October 7, Gaza’s stance enabled a turn toward Islam in the West and a recognition of the Islamic world in the specific context of Gaza. This has been one of the foundations for our joint action.
Nevertheless, the exceptionally high number of participants from Turkey and the Islamic world on the ground gave rise to concerns that it might create an opening for Israeli intervention. Turkey has a Mavi Marmara legacy of which we are proud. Therefore, the high number of participants from Turkey and the presence of individuals who might be labeled as “radical” could hand Israel a pretext on the ground and lead to a harsh intervention against the flotilla. Even so, within the flotilla, the Turkish delegation comprises the most significant number of members on board the ships. The reasons why both members of parliament and specific other figures were excluded from the list may be summarized as follows:
- The global team’s call for an excessive number of participants at the time of accreditation,
- The inability of local partners in Tunisia to fully prepare the ships,
- A reduction in the number of vessels due to internal acts of sabotage,
- The coordination team’s conduct of background screenings and its request to remove individuals whom Israel could accuse of radicalism.
The ships we had committed were ready to depart until the very last day. The lists indicating that participants from Turkey would board the vessel together with Europeans were also prepared. However, the following day, the Tunisian Government issued a decision stating that some of our boats would be unable to set sail. In this incident, we believe that, rather than an external intervention, a maneuver was made from within by casting doubt on the safety of the ships to prevent their departure.
- What crisis management plan do you have in the event of a potential obstruction or attack by Israel?
We anticipated that Israel would initially resort to media manipulation. To counter potential accusations of radicalism and terrorism, we repeatedly emphasized the civilian, nonviolent, and entirely peaceful nature of the action—in which Western participants were at the forefront and Muslims were in supporting roles—thereby thwarting such manipulation. Under UN auspices and with international observers, we dispelled suspicions regarding the ships.
The simultaneous departure of participants from forty-seven countries toward Gaza constitutes a major diplomatic crisis for Israel. This situation will lay the groundwork for the opening of a permanent humanitarian corridor. We set sail by underscoring that we are not transporting weapons, do not constitute a military force, and represent the will and conscience of the world as a peaceful and civilian initiative. This approach places Israel before a significant diplomatic challenge, which we expect to catalyze the establishment of a lasting humanitarian corridor.
Of course, Israel may carry out attacks along the route or issue statements seeking to manipulate the process; however, the team is resolute, as tolerance for what is happening in Gaza has been exhausted. The flotilla will not turn back until a permanent maritime and humanitarian corridor is established.
In this context, should Israel intervene, it will face a substantial diplomatic crisis. If it refrains from intervening and allows the entry of aid, the embargo will have been broken. In a scenario where we are kept waiting on the high seas—neither permitted entry nor granted safe passage—the social and international pressure on Israel will intensify, compelling it to make a decision and take concrete action.
- What is the significance of the Global Sumud Flotilla for Turkey?
From Turkey’s standpoint, we have established a collective structure comprising people of conscience who come together without prioritizing any civil society organization, public figure, political party, or institutional entity, while keeping individuals and institutions in the background. In this respect, we believe a new phase will emerge in Turkey. For specific worthwhile and valuable endeavors, having a sufficient pool of human resources is enough; with such human capital, we can accomplish monumental tasks. The current initiative is a concrete example of this.
Another emphasis is that the mechanism and mission are more important than individuals. To reinforce the primacy of the mission, the presence of specific figures on board has been kept limited and symbolic. We also emphasize the importance of being goal-oriented, working collectively, and setting out independently of high-profile names, as well as organizing human resources effectively. This is one of the challenges facing the Islamic world: first, to diagnose the situation accurately and to know what you have and what you lack; then to develop a strategy accordingly and act. In this regard, we aim to foster a strategic and intellectual transformation within the Islamic world.
İsmail Songur
How does the Global Sumud Flotilla differ from the Mavi Marmara and earlier Gaza flotilla initiatives?
Assessments regarding the Global Sumud Flotilla should be considered within the trajectory spanning from the Mavi Marmara up to 7 October. Following the Mavi Marmara, there were additional vessels that set sail with the aim of reaching Gaza. As the Freedom Flotilla Coalition, we have undertaken 18 separate initiatives to date. Some ships departed from Ireland and Norway. Some vessels succeeded in reaching Gaza. Others were unable to do so—intercepted by Israel, not yet returned, and still subject to ongoing legal proceedings.
Following October 7, the first vessel we prepared was the ship Vicdan. As is known, the vessel, which was kept waiting for approximately 150 days at the Haydarpaşa Port, departed for European ports after the vigil for freedom. The Vicdan became the first ship to be struck by Israel after October 7, off the coast of Malta, after which the Madleen was prepared. Subsequently, Madleen and Hanzala set sail. The Sumud Flotilla’s current route is not the first link in this chain but rather the continuation of an ongoing humanitarian aid and solidarity initiative. Within this framework, eighteen prior maritime attempts to reach Gaza have been undertaken; the current Sumud Flotilla constitutes the nineteenth.
What is different this time is that civil society organizations from various parts of the world and other countries have come to recognize that states will do nothing and that condemnations by organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation or the United Nations will be of no effect. This has further fueled the idea of breaking the sea blockade in particular. At this stage, the Sumud Flotilla has gained a strong momentum. In this sense, with participants from many different countries and a large number of vessels, it possesses the qualities of a robust flotilla. The most fundamental problem here is that we are currently at a time when the Mediterranean has fully entered the winter season. Consequently, due to certain logistical obstacles within the Sumud Flotilla, the ships set out during a seasonally challenging period. Our greatest hope is that our boats reach Gaza. In this respect, the Sumud Flotilla will create a butterfly effect ahead of larger flotillas. It will pave the way for much larger ships to set sail and for a broader range of ports to open thereafter. While there is a significant awakening in global public opinion, we hope that thousands of ships will also set out from Turkish ports to break the Gaza blockade.
The increase in the number of vessels and the participation of activists from different countries has created an additional pressure factor on political actors. Nevertheless, many countries around the world are still unable to adopt comprehensive sanction measures against Israel; the current situation is likely to have a catalytic effect in this direction.
At the current stage, the process that began with the Mavi Marmara has gained stronger momentum with the Sumud Flotilla and has served as a promising sign that will lay the groundwork for the preparation of larger flotillas. We remain in a monitoring posture; preparations for the second and third waves of the flotilla are ongoing, and their departure is anticipated in the near future.
