Photograph: Anadolu Agency
Just like every Ramadan, this year as well, the Palestinian issue has returned to our agenda as a matter of pain and captivity due to the attacks of the occupying Israel. Towards the end of the Ramadan month, the use of tear gas inside the Al-Aqsa Mosque resulted in the world’s attention again turning to Jerusalem. The ongoing government crisis in Israel for the past two years, despite four elections, seems to have triggered these events. The forced displacement and eviction of Palestinians in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood to make way for Jewish settlers have once again exposed the Zionist occupation. The occupying state of Israel is seemingly trying to create a political mobilization within itself by exploiting the Palestinian issue to overcome this crisis in the upcoming elections. The escalation of events in the last ten days of Ramadan has made the issue even more important for Muslims. Therefore, Palestine has become a prominent agenda in the Islamic world and around the world.
The Palestinian issue has consistently held a place in the world’s agenda since its inception. Particularly during the Cold War era, with the influence of the time, the Palestinian cause was predominantly viewed from a leftist perspective as anti-Israel and, by extension, anti-Western. During that period, the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a leftist, secular, and simultaneously nationalist-leaning organization, was a reflection of this trend and the strongest pillar of resistance.
The turning point came in 1978 when Islamic organizations mobilized in resistance against the Soviet invasion attempt in Afghanistan, successfully thwarting the invasion. This marked the beginning of a period in which Islam and Islamic movements gained strength globally. With the decline of leftist influence worldwide after 1980, the ascent of religious movements in the Islamic world brought forth the heightened importance of Islamic identity within the Palestinian cause. The Iranian Revolution of 1979, which embraced the Palestinian issue, also strengthened of Islamic rhetoric. Today, when we mention the Jerusalem issue, alongside the PLO, Hamas, founded in 1987 and rooted in the Islamic tradition, stands out as a significant symbol of this transformation.
Türkiye and the Palestinian Cause
It can be said that the Palestinian issue has found significant resonance in Türkiye, much like it has globally. Until the 1980s, it was observed that the Turkish left largely embraced this issue. In Turkey, during that time, Syria’s Palestinian camps under the control of the Hafez al-Assad regime were primarily centers for guerrilla training for all left-wing organizations that were pro-Russia, pro-China, and pro-Albania. It is no secret that during that period, leading militant cadres of the Turkish leftist movement went to Palestinian camps in South Lebanon to receive training in firearms, bomb-making, sabotage, and assassination, returning to Türkiye afterwards.
However, what stands out is the emergence of Islamism as an independent movement in Türkiye since the 1970s, particularly in its adoption of the Palestinian cause, focusing on Al-Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem. So much so that on September 6, 1980, the National Salvation Party led by Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan organized a massive Jerusalem rally in Konya with the participation of tens of thousands of people. The fact that it was cited as one of the reasons for the September 12 coup is a significant reference to the importance and impact of this rally.
In Türkiye, we see that the Palestinian issue is predominantly embraced and brought to the forefront by civil society movements. However, a turning point occurred during the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, in 2009. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a speech against then-Israeli President Shimon Peres, which contained accusations of Israeli crimes against Palestinians, and subsequently walked out of the meeting. This move was met with enthusiasm in the Islamic world and Türkiye. After this incident, Erdoğan became a prominent leader, especially concerning matters related to Palestine. Similarly, in 2010, the attempt to break the Gaza blockade with the aid ship named the “Mavi Marmara,” organized by the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (İHH), and the subsequent events drew the attention of the Islamic world to Türkiye.
The fact that it was cited as one of the reasons for the September 12 coup is an important reference to the significance and impact of this rally.
In 2010, the uprisings known as the Arab Spring, which emerged against authoritarian Arab regimes in pursuit of freedom, spread to Syria in 2011. Hamas, along with Türkiye, supported the opposition from the beginning of the events, thereby opposing the Assad regime and its supporter, Iran. As the Assad regime brutally suppressed its opponents, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal, who had been living in Syria for 11 years, left the country and relocated his office to Qatar. This period marked a time when Hamas distanced itself from Syria and Iran while getting closer to Qatar and Türkiye.
The Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) 4th Ordinary Congress in 2012 should be noted as an important indicator for Türkiye. During the congress, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan conveyed messages to the Islamic world. Mohamed Morsi, who had recently taken office as the President of Egypt following elections, and Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal also attended the congress and delivered speeches. This congress provided hints about the policies that the AKP would pursue in both domestic and foreign affairs in the coming period.
During this time, along with the winds of the Arab Spring, the “AKP model” in Türkiye and Erdoğan were presented as ideal examples for the Islamic world. With this new position, Türkiye began to get more actively involved in the issues of Jerusalem and Palestine. Following the Mavi Marmara incident, Türkiye reduced its diplomatic and military relations with Israel to a minimum and indicated its desire to play a more effective role in the Palestinian issue, especially with the new Egyptian government and the widespread belief in the imminent change of the Syrian regime, anticipating a new leadership to replace the Assad regime.
In the period after 2009, Türkiye’s assumption of a dominant role in the Palestinian issue encountered little resistance, neither in Türkiye, nor in the Islamic world, nor in Palestine itself. Türkiye’s strong position as a nation and its historical connection to Palestine played a significant role in this. The memory of over 400 years of Ottoman rule in the Jerusalem region, a period characterized by stability and peace, has not faded from memory. Furthermore, the Palestinian issue gained even more prominence among the Turkish population when the Prime Minister of the Republic of Türkiye publicly took ownership of the issue in a way that could have caused a crisis at an international gathering. Similarly, it can be said that affection for Türkiye and nostalgia for the Ottoman era have increased in the Islamic world and Palestine.
However, events that unfolded after 2013 created significant foreign policy challenges for Türkiye. The military coup in Egypt that ousted Muhammad Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, with the support of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Russia and Iran’s heavy military interventions in Syria, which prevented the opposition from completing the revolution, all led to difficulty in Türkiye’s foreign policy. In parallel, Türkiye faced deep and disruptive security concerns due to domestic events such as the emergence of a terrorism spiral known as the “ditch events” and, later, the July 15th coup attempt. This period of introspection and internal focus coincided with a rise in nationalism.
Up until this period, the AK Party had been influential in the Islamic world by using a more universal rhetoric. However, due to increasing security and survival concerns, the AK Party has started to adopt a relatively nationalist stance by becoming more inward-looking and employing a discourse centered around the state. To the extent that a symbolic transformation, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Rabia sign, which he used to express his opposition to the coup in Egypt in 2013, has been reformulated during this period as “one nation, one flag, one homeland, one state.”
Is It Possible to Combine Nationalism with an Islamic World Perspective?
The events that began in Jerusalem and Gaza before the holiday have brought the Palestinian issue back to the forefront of the agenda in Türkiye. Street protests against oppression were organized all over Türkiye, with the Israeli Consulate in Istanbul being a focal point. It’s safe to say that the majority of society is sensitive to this issue.
When addressing this issue, it is important to note that, with the increasing nationalist sentiments in recent years, a Türkiye-centered perspective on Palestine has become prominent among Islamists. In some demonstrations at the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the Turkish flag was unfurled, and the flag was used to wrap the body of a martyr. There were instances of a young person holding the Turkish flag during moments of resistance. Additionally, images were widely shared on social media depicting the Al-Aqsa Mosque with Turkish flags and soldiers added through Photoshop. Furthermore, some Palestinians made statements expressing longing for Ottoman rule, referencing Ottoman history. However, it’s worth noting that some conservative-nationalist groups expressed discomfort with comparing the suffering in East Turkestan to that of Palestine in light of the increasing nationalist sentiment. This comparison is noteworthy as it reflects a reflex that hasn’t been observed before and is tied to the rising nationalism.
It should be emphasized that this Türkiye-centric perspective on the Palestinian issue has gained legitimacy in Türkiye and has been more readily accepted by society, especially considering that nationalist rhetoric finds resonance in various segments of Turkish society. Sharing such content as acts of affection helps strengthen the bond between Turkish and Palestinian societies. It’s also important to underscore that the level of affection shown toward Türkiye, unlike any other country or community, in Palestine has been remarkable.
However, it’s important to note that in Türkiye, there’s a widespread tendency to approach the world, especially the Islamic world from a Türkiye-centered perspective. Historical references often come into play in nearly every event, and issues are often analyzed with reference to Ottoman rule. This approach not only strengthens Türkiye’s relationship with the region but also reinforces the perception of Türkiye as the leader of the Islamic world within society.
At this point, it is essential not to overlook the development of national consciousness in the modern era, both in Türkiye and the broader Islamic world. Especially during the Cold War period, Arab nationalist Baath regimes emerged, and nationalist reflexes were evident among Arabs. Although not as pronounced as before, there are still nationalist tendencies among Arabs today. In Türkiye, there has been a recent shift towards constructing Turkish identity with reference to the pre-modern era alongside Islam rather than adhering to secular Turkism. While this approach has functional implications domestically, when this issue is taken to an international level, it becomes important to consider how this concept will be received in the Islamic world.
Just as anti-Arab sentiment was propagated for years as an official and widespread discourse in Türkiye, it should not be ignored that a similar process may be underway in the Arab world. In this context, when formulating international politics, societal memories should always be taken into account.
Interpreting the occupation of Jerusalem through the lens of the Turkish nation, Ottoman rule, and the Istanbul-centered caliphate can provide legitimacy to this issue in Türkiye especially. However, it should be remembered that if the dosage in such discourse used by politics and the media is not well-adjusted, it may lead to Arab communities distancing themselves from Türkiye, or even causing resentment or backlash. It is not realistic to expect acceptance similar to the one in Northern Cyprus, where we share the same roots, language, religion, and culture, when we do not have the same racial and linguistic commonality with Palestine and Arab communities. It is important to emphasize the need to evaluate Türkiye’s historical memory inherited from the Ottoman Empire not through an “imperial” understanding of ruling and being ruled but through the perspective of equal societies. Although the demonstrations of affection from Palestinians towards Türkiye are welcomed, it is necessary to handle this issue with sensitivity. Palestinians living in occupied territories should perceive the affection for Türkiye as a request for solidarity on the path to freedom, shared history, and Islamic brotherhood. Otherwise, there is a risk of getting trapped in the rhetoric of “You were free while we were here; if we are not, you will become captives.”
It is important to emphasize the need to evaluate Türkiye’s historical memory inherited from the Ottoman Empire not through an “imperial” understanding of ruling and being ruled but through the perspective of equal societies.
Türkiye’s approach to the issue, both as a state and as a society, having a transnational perspective, is important. Currently, due to the presence of despotic regimes in Arab countries, there is an opportunity for Türkiye to take a more prominent stance on the Palestinian issue for contextual reasons. Additionally, we are faced with the reality that our geographical and historical ties have assigned a mission to Türkiye. However, this situation also contains vulnerabilities. The lack of a land border between Türkiye and Palestine, political crises with neighboring countries of Palestine (especially Egypt and Syria), and foreign policy problems with the West are obstacles to Türkiye’s comprehensive support for the issue.
The most reasonable option for Türkiye at the moment is to raise awareness of this issue in international public opinion and support other lobbying efforts to make the importance and urgency of the issue recognized worldwide. Additionally, supporting the Palestinian diaspora in every way is crucial. Furthermore, it is important for both our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and our civil society organizations to continue their cultural and humanitarian support in Palestine.
As a society, it is essential to approach the issue not from a nationalistic perspective but with Islamic-based solidarity and brotherhood sentiments. Approaches to the contrary are nothing more than empty rhetoric and imperial fantasies, lacking historical and societal foundations, and cannot be supported economically, militarily, or politically. A national approach to the Palestinian issue, while contributing partially to the emotional climate in Türkiye, should be carefully considered for how it will be perceived among the Arab-Palestinian community and how much benefit it will bring to the issue. It should not be forgotten that the Palestinian case has a dimension of the occupation of Palestine, which is a national “nation-state,” and there are those among the Palestinians who argue that a national perspective will be effective in solving the problem.
A national approach to the Palestinian issue, while contributing partially to the emotional climate in Türkiye, should be carefully considered for how it will be perceived among the Arab-Palestinian community and how much benefit it will bring to the issue, and this should be approached with sensitivity.
Jerusalem is the common problem of all Muslims and then of all humanity, which must be addressed from a perspective that transcends nations and nationalities. Even if Turkish flags are not unfurled at the Al-Aqsa Mosque, even if messages of love for Türkiye are not expressed, even if there are no warm contacts between the two states, our support for Palestine and Jerusalem must continue by increasing and expanding. The mission of the state and civil society in Türkiye should be to oppose the occupation, to demand the freedom of all Palestinian lands, especially Al-Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem, to take reasonable steps politically, diplomatically and, if necessary, militarily, to announce to the whole world the Zionist occupation, which represents only barbarism with its policy of massacre and deportation, and to maintain its supra-national position while doing so. Maintaining this sensitive tone in approaching the Palestinian issue will be an important attitude for the freedom of Jerusalem since this attitude is essential for Türkiye’s legitimacy and appeal, which is reciprocated in Palestine and the Islamic world.
