Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was reached in 2015 by a consensus of countries including Russia, China, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany (the only non-permanent member of the Security Council), left little more than the name of the agreement behind. After Trump’s exit from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran also reduced its commitments under the deal and increased uranium enrichment to the 60 percent level. According to the latest IAEA report before the Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the amount was estimated at around 441 kilograms (Reuters, 2025).
With his re-election as U.S. president, Donald Trump expressed his willingness to reach a deal with Iran, although he mentioned the military option in the absence of an agreement. The United States also declared that the other option, military action, could serve the same outcome as negotiations: dismantling Iran’s nuclear program.
Ultimately, nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States began on April 12, 2025. After five rounds of talks—and while the sixth round was scheduled for June 15, 2025, in Muscat, Oman (IRNA, 2025)—on June 13, just two days before that round, Israel carried out a combined military and intelligence attack on Iran’s military and nuclear facilities, assassinating several senior military commanders and nuclear scientists. During the subsequent 12-day war, the United States also struck the nuclear facilities in Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow with bunker-buster bombs and cruise missiles, strikes Trump claimed had destroyed Iran’s nuclear program.
Following these attacks, Iran halted cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Israeli-U.S. assault occurred only days after a comprehensive IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear program, and Tehran believed that the report provided the pretext needed to attack its nuclear facilities. After the 12-day war, Iran made the continuation of talks with the United States conditional on guarantees against any further attacks on its soil and insisted on indirect negotiations. Although before the attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, European countries had discussed extending the snapback deadline, they showed little willingness to implement such an extension afterward. The three European countries tied non-activation of the snapback mechanism to three conditions:
1. Direct talks between Iran and the U.S.
2. Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA
3. Disclosure of the remaining stock of 60 percent enriched uranium after the U.S.-Israeli strikes
While Iran rejected these conditions, it continued cooperation with the IAEA under a new understanding reached through Egyptian mediation.
However, the Europeans deemed the understanding insufficient, arguing that no timeframe for IAEA inspections was included. They feared that a precise assessment of the damage to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and remaining highly enriched uranium would not be available before the deadline to activate snapback came. Therefore, the three European countries activated the snapback mechanism (UK Parliament, 2025).
A resolution proposing to extend the snapback deadlines—submitted by Russia and China to the UN Security Council—failed to win enough votes due to opposition from the U.S., the U.K., France, and six other states (UN News, 2025). After activation of the snapback mechanism, Iran terminated cooperation with the IAEA based on the Cairo agreement and announced that it would deny access to IAEA inspectors (Mehr News, 2025). The Iranian parliament also declared suspension of cooperation with the IAEA as binding law (Aftab News, 2025). Additionally, more than 71 hardline Iranian MPs wrote to the Supreme National Security Council and the heads of the three branches of government, stating that while the use of nuclear weapons is prohibited by the Supreme Leader’s 2010 fatwa, building and maintaining such weapons for deterrence is a separate issue (Asriran, 2025a).
Nevertheless, Iran has stated it will not withdraw from the NPT—aiming to avoid provoking additional U.S. or Israeli attacks in the future. Tehran believes any ambiguity about its nuclear program would give it justification for further strikes. Despite snapback activation, official reactions in Iran do not signal a rejection of negotiations with the United States. However, the key issue is that after the 12-day war and the weakening of Iran’s regional non- state armed allies, Washington considers Tehran in a weakened position and refuses to negotiate solely on the nuclear issue.
According to Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, the U.S. has demanded a reduction of Iran’s missile range to below 500 km and has also raised regional issues (Fararu, 2025). Thus, Washington currently seeks comprehensive negotiations with Iran on nuclear, regional, and missile matters. Following the 12-day war, the United States has shown no interest in talks under Iran’s preferred terms. Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, stated that the U.S. has ignored 15 Iranian requests for negotiations (Iran International, 2025). Even on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, U.S. officials refused to meet with Iranian representatives (Eghtesad News, 2025).
Iran has lost much of its leverage: its proxies are weakened; its three main nuclear sites were destroyed in U.S. strikes; and the country is stuck between war and peace, preparing for further Israeli air attacks as in June 2025. Meanwhile, its economy has steadily deteriorated over the past decade, heightening social and political pressures (ORF Online, 2025). Thus, Iran does not reject negotiations and calls for talks on equal footing, limited to the nuclear issue, and without the precondition of “zero enrichment.” The U.S., however, seeks Iran’s renunciation of its enrichment rights. Yet Iran knows that resuming nuclear activities could again trigger U.S. and Israeli strikes. Whether through exiting the NPT or covert weaponization efforts, Israel’s intelligence advantage would likely detect such steps, risking retaliation (ORF Online, 2025).
President Trump has clearly stated that if Iran resumes uranium enrichment, the U.S. will strike. In response, Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian recently said: “If we refuse negotiations, what else can we do? War? They attack, we rebuild, and they attack again” (Radio Farda, 2025). With Iran now placed under UN Chapter VII through snapback sanctions- labeling it a threat to international peace- any future attack may enjoy broader legitimacy compared to the June strikes.
According to the November IAEA report, Iran has not allowed inspections of the bombed sites, and the agency is unaware of the current status of Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium (DW, 2025). The IAEA demands that Iran “without delay” submit a precise report on its bombed facilities and enriched uranium (Radio Zamaneh, 2025). Iran’s lack of safeguards cooperation could return its nuclear file to the UN Security Council. Russia and China have also urged Iran to cooperate, although they may veto any new resolution against Tehran. If the legal track becomes blocked, it may justify new Israeli-U.S. strikes. Preventing this requires a new Iran-IAEA cooperation framework allowing inspection of war-damaged facilities and assessment of remaining high-enriched uranium—previously estimated at 418 kg.
However, this will require concessions from the West—concessions Iran expects to trade for sanctions relief and guarantees against attacks. For this reason, Iran claims all 400 kg of its 60 percent enriched uranium remains buried under rubble and that it will not remove it (Asriran, 2025b). Iran may only reveal details of its remaining uranium stockpile as part of a negotiation process involving guarantees and sanctions relief. However, the other side sees this disclosure as a legal obligation under IAEA rules, not something to trade.
Iran currently seeks to preserve its legal right to enrich, even though it is not enriching now. The nuclear program, into which billions have been invested, remains both a deterrent and a source of national pride.
With Hezbollah and Hamas weakened, Assad’s government collapsed, and Iran’s military capabilities diminished, the nuclear program is Iran’s strongest negotiation card. Tehran is unlikely to relinquish it without concessions; it could be presented as a victory, especially given political pressure from hardliners. Meanwhile, the U.S. demands a comprehensive deal beyond nuclear issues (with “zero enrichment”), emphasizing Iran’s missile and regional policies.
A middle-ground solution may involve Iran refraining from enrichment for now while retaining the right legally, provided the U.S. recognizes low-grade enrichment rights. Another possible compromise is forming a uranium-enrichment consortium, perhaps based in Oman and funded by Persian Gulf states. Iran proposed a domestic version of this before the June war (Hausheer Ali and Kline, 2025).
However, any middle path must also satisfy Israel; otherwise, another attack remains possible. While the 12-day war showed Iran’s nuclear issue has no military solution- and that “nuclear technology and knowledge” cannot be bombed- Washington’s maximalist demands make Iranian concessions highly unlikely.
References
1. Aftab News. (2025). Nikzad: Parliament Will Review the Lawmakers’ Letter on Building Nuclear Weapons on Sunday. https://aftabnews.ir/004G8t.
2. Asriran. (2025a). Letter from 71 Lawmakers to the Heads of Government Branches: We Should Build and Maintain Nuclear Weapons; Their Use is a Separate Matter. asriran.com/004bD5.
3. Asriran. (2025b). Araqchi: All 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium are under the rubble, and we have no intention of removing them from beneath it. asriran.com/004elU.
4. Deutsche Welle (DW). (2025). IAEA: Iran’s high-enriched uranium stockpiles must be inspected promptly. https://p.dw.com/p/53VFO.
5. Eghtesad News. (2025). American journalist’s claim about Araqchi’s meeting with U.S. officials. https://www.eghtesadnews.com/fa/tiny/news-744805.
6. Fararu. (2025). Larijani: Western Demands Are Unacceptable. https://fararu.com/fa/tiny/news-907161.
7. Hausheer Ali, S. and Kline, C. (2025). Will the US achieve a ‘big, beautiful’ Iran deal or stall in homeostasis? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/will-the-us-achieve-a-big-beautiful-iran-deal-or-stall-in-homeostasis/.
8. IRNA. (2025). Iran-U.S. nuclear negotiations scheduled for Muscat. https://irna.ir/xjTMRX.
9. Iran International. (2025). Iranian officials reported that Tehran’s messages for negotiations have gone unanswered by the United States. https://www.iranintl.com/202508307125.
10. Mehr News. (2025). Pezeshkian’s Reaction to Snapback Activation: We Will Not Allow Inspections. mehrnews.com/x398p3.
11. ORF Online. (2025). Following snapback sanctions: More dilemmas for Iran’s leadership .https://www.orfonline.org/research/following-snapback-sanctions-more-dilemmas-for-iran-s-leadership.
12. Radio Farda. (2025). Iran’s President Says Rebuilding Nuclear Sites Futile Without Talks With Washington. https://www.rferl.org/a/pezeshkian-negotiations-us-nuclear-sites-war/33499974.html.
13. Radio Zamaneh. (2025). International Atomic Energy Agency: The inspection of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles has “been delayed for months.” https://www.radiozamaneh.com/869433/.
14. Reuters. (2025, September 3). Iran’s near bomb-grade uranium stock grew before Israeli attack, IAEA says. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/irans-near-bomb-grade-uranium-stock-grew-before-israeli-attack-iaea-says-2025-09-03/.
15. UK Parliament. (2025). The E3 triggers snapback sanctions against Iran 2025. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10330/.
16. UN News. (2025). UN Security Council blocks China-Russia resolution on Iran sanctions. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165974.
