The political landscape of the Middle East in recent history has been defined by a prevailing trend of regimes exerting control over civil society, curbing its growth and inhibiting its potential as an independent force separate from the state. Numerous countries in the region have witnessed entrenched regimes actively stifling the development of civil society. Nonetheless, the growing calls for civil rights and liberties, coupled with the forces of globalization, have fostered an environment that empowers civil society to assert its autonomy and act independently, transcending the constraints imposed by the state.
In the aftermath of the Arab revolutions in 2011, the Middle Eastern countries have faced a challenging environment that has constrained the potential for civil society to thrive. Factors such as internal instability, disruptions in democratization efforts, economic hardships, and the enduring presence of repressive inclinations have created a limited operating space for civil society. Presently, it is evident that the progress of civil society varies across countries, shaped by distinct contexts. However, it remains primarily confined within the boundaries dictated by political leaderships, functioning within constrained opportunities.
In addition, as demands for democratization increased, particularly since the 1990s, Middle Eastern societies have also intensified their calls for democratic political systems, parallel to the rise of a young and educated population. This situation became most evident through the popular uprisings that started in Tunisia in 2010 and spread to several other countries in the region by 2011, resulting in the overthrow of certain authoritarian leaders. Millions of people, whose rights and freedoms were restricted, took to the streets, demanding the establishment of democratic institutions, the control of governance by civil political actors, and the development of civil society.
These processes initially seemed to hold the potential for revolutionary transformations. However, in the following years, they faced significant failures largely due to intense interventions by the external actors. The most recent example of such phenomenon is currently taking place in Tunisia, one of the countries with a strong tradition of civil society. Since the presidential election in 2021, President Kais Saied, who gained support from civil society organizations, has implemented undemocratic practices in both politics and the civil society sphere through the decisions he has made.
Despite the pressure exerted by revolutionary moves against certain regimes to undergo democratic changes, the outcomes have varied across countries. Over the course of the past decade, some nations have taken strides towards democratization and empowered civil society, while the democratic institutions in others have deteriorated. One of the greatest internal obstacles hindering the cultivation of a robust civil society culture in the Middle East is the existence of negative examples. Individuals and institutions involved in such examples face punitive measures from political authorities, thereby stifling their voices and perpetuating an environment that discourages the growth of civil society.
In this evolving landscape, the year 2021 witnessed similar dynamics in certain countries, such as Tunisia and Sudan, where civil society faced obstacles in establishing itself as an independent force and exerting pressure within democratic frameworks. Meanwhile, in Israel, civil society organizations have encountered restrictions imposed by the government and witnessed significant violations of rights, particularly affecting Palestinians. Conversely, some reforms in countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia can be viewed as a positive move towards enhancing the role of civil society within the political and social structure. However, in countries such as Syria, Yemen, and Libya, that are plagued by ongoing civil wars and instability, the decline of civil society and the erosion of democratization have reached irreparable levels. At this juncture, it becomes pertinent to delve into recent developments surrounding civil society and democratization in the Middle East through a few illustrative case studies.
Tunisia
Tunisia has suffered one of the most serious setbacks in the context of civil society and democratization (“Egypt: Implementing regulations of NGOs”, 2021) following the Arab popular movements that transformed the Middle Eastern region in political, social and economic terms. President Qais Said’s decision to dissolve parliament and dismiss the government on July 25, 2021 was undoubtedly the most serious setback to the democratic transformation process that the country has been trying to achieve since 2010. During this process, Qais Saied disregarded the appeals for national a dialogue and the demands put forth by civil society organizations in the country, thereby jeopardizing the potential loss of hard-won post-revolutionary achievements.
In a process that represents a setback in democratization, Rashid Ghannouchi, the leader of the Ennahda Movement and former Speaker of the Parliament, was arrested on April 17, 2023 (Turan, 2023). Consequently, the initiation of legal proceedings against prominent members of Ennahda, the largest social movement in Tunisia, has created an atmosphere of pressure for those advocating for civil rights in the country. Like other members of the Ennahda Movement who have faced legal processes alongside Ghannouchi, his arrest has been justified under the pretext of “conspiring against state security,” indicating that the arrests have narrowed Tunisia’s democratization processes and can be seen as politically motivated charges (Turan, 2023). Furthermore, the fact that these processes are being conducted by military courts has been deemed unacceptable by civil actors in Tunisia who aspire to a democratic transformation.
In addition to these developments, the closure of party headquarters and structures, such as the Ennahda Movement’s headquarters and the Tunis Will Party, which will be closely monitored under legal proceedings, has further interrupted the trajectory of democratization. The closure of all Ennahda offices in the mid-2023 following Kais Saied’s interventions has undermined democratization processes and hindered the participation of political movements with popular support, such as Ennahda, in democratic processes (Al Jazeera, 2023).
In processes representing one of the setbacks of democratic gains, the leader of the Nahda Movement and former Speaker of Parliament Rashid al-Ghannouchi was arrested on April 17, 2023 (Turan, 2023). In this context, the initiation of legal proceedings against prominent members of Nahda, Tunisia’s movement with the widest social base, led to a serious pressure on those defending civil rights in the country. It was stated that Ghannouchi was arrested within the scope of “conspiracy against state security”, as were other members of the Nahda Movement against whom legal proceedings were initiated, and from this point of view, it can be stated that the arrests narrowed the democratization processes in Tunisia and were political accusations (Turan, 2023). Simultaneously, the involvement of military courts in these proceedings was deemed unacceptable by civilian actors in Tunisia who aspired for a democratic transformation. Furthermore, the closure of party buildings and facilities, including the Nahda Movement’s headquarters and the offices of the Tunisian Will Party, where legal proceedings were expected to be conducted under close scrutiny, disrupted the ongoing democratization efforts. Notably, in the wake of Qais Said’s interventions, all of Nahda’s offices were forcibly shut down in the middle of 2023, undermining the democratization processes and obstructing the participation of popularly supported political movements like Nahda in the democratic sphere (Al Jazeera, 2023).
Following Qais Said’s actions, Tunisia, known for its strong emerging civil society, has witnessed independent social groups mobilizing civil organizations of their own accord. One prominent initiative, “Citizens Against the Coup,” led by independent political activists who organized through social media, gained prominence through mass protests against the Said administration. This civil initiative, which unites various segments of Tunisian society, continues to exert pressure on the government to ensure that the referendum and election roadmap outlined by Said upholds democratic principles and fulfils the demands of Tunisian citizens. These developments can be viewed as a reflection of Tunisia’s longstanding tradition of civil society engagement.
“The emergence of these new civil initiatives can also be attributed to the perceived failure of traditional civil society organizations in Tunisia to respond adequately to Qais Said’s decisions.”
Throughout this process, certain trade unions, labor unions, and civil organizations that hold significant political influence remained silent in the face of Said’s undemocratic actions. Domestic political differences and ideological divisions among certain groups opposed to the Nahda movement may have contributed to the ineffectiveness of traditional civil society actors in addressing the President’s decisions (Boussen, 2022).
Moreover, Qais Said’s position as the ultimate authority in shaping the country’s political will grants society the power and privilege to determine which movements are detrimental or beneficial. Consequently, this narrows the space and future prospects for civil society movements in Tunisia.
Egypt
Due to the political processes and arbitrary practices of the governments, a transformation in civil society was not achieved in Egypt after the change of government in 2013. Under the leadership of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, a former Chief of General Staff who assumed the presidency, civil society in Egypt encountered constitutional limitations and government-controlled mechanisms. As a result, civil society movements in Egypt have been unable to operate as they would in democratic countries, and independent civil society organizations have faced significant challenges in their survival. The Sisi administration has faced strong criticism from organizations such as the International Crisis Group, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch (HRW). These organizations, through their reports and analyses, have called for a crackdown on civil society organizations in Egypt and for the government to loosen its tight grip on such activities.
One of the major issues that was raised in this context was Egypt’s refusal to admit certain civil society organizations and their affiliates to the 27th UN Climate Change Summit (COP27) in Egypt. UN human rights experts criticized Egypt’s systematic policies in this regard and called for transparency (AP News, 2022). The fact that Egypt has been criticized on different fronts on related issues even during the organization of an international conference, which is a critical issue in terms of international prestige, shows the serious extent to which the problems of civil society movements and culture have reached.
The control and restrictions imposed on civil society organizations in Egypt have taken a significant turn with the introduction of Law No. 149 on Civil Society Organizations in 2019. The implementation of this law has been temporarily delayed due to both national and international outcry. However, the recent announcement that the law will be fully enforced by 2021 has sparked a strong backlash within the civil society community. Prominent civil society organizations in the country have come together to issue a collective statement, urging the government not to implement the law (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 2021). They argue that this law will further intensify the pressure on civil society organizations and curtail the rights and freedoms guaranteed by international conventions in Egypt.
Despite some progress, the absence of specific regulations for individuals detained for political reasons over many years has resulted in ongoing criticism of the Sisi administration by proponents of democracy. In the face of this criticism, Egypt may adopt a more lenient approach towards its stringent policies in this regard and gradually transform the activities of institutions, organizations, and individuals who are not directly involved in terrorism. This shift is particularly significant considering the importance of improving relations with Western countries and institutions for Egypt’s reputation. As part of these efforts, certain political prisoners were granted amnesty and released in 2022 and 2023 (Deng and al-Fekki). Human rights advocates have called for the continuation of these decisions (ISHR, 2023).
Palestine
In recent years, Israel has intensified its policies of oppression and marginalization against Palestinians, while simultaneously accelerating measures to restrict civil society organizations, particularly in the occupied territories. These policies align with the strict agenda pursued by Israeli political leaders in order to prevent the Palestinian population from gaining strength within civil society and exerting pressure on both Israel and the Palestinian government. This practice, which is part of Israel’s broader occupation policies, targets not only civil society organizations engaged in political or human rights activities but also institutions working across various sectors, including agriculture, health, humanitarian aid, and freedom of expression.
Within this framework, the Palestinian Farmers’ Unions Committee building was subjected to a six-month closure following a raid by the Israeli army in July 2021. Additionally, the office of Defense of Children, an organization advocating for the rights of children arrested by Israel, was raided by Israeli security units during the same period (Harawi, 2021). The Israeli government designates Palestinian civil society groups it wishes to suppress as terrorist organizations. Consequently, in October 2021, Israel declared six Palestinian civil society organizations as terrorist entities and suspended their activities (“Israel declares,” 2021). Following this decision, both the Palestinian side and international organizations, including the United Nations, strongly condemned the actions of the Tel Aviv administration (“Outraged over Israel’s Designation,” 2021).
These systematic Israeli practices have persisted throughout 2022 and 2023 (Mekelberg, 2023). In August 2022, Israeli security forces halted the operations and sealed the offices of seven non-governmental organizations in Ramallah, including the Palestinian Women’s Union Committee and the al-Haq Center for the Protection of Children. The United Nations Human Rights office issued a statement condemning these actions (OHCHR, 2022). While the Israeli government’s crackdown on civil society organizations has been widespread, it has also targeted human rights defenders based in Israel. In August 2022, the Israeli government decided to suspend the activities of 53 civil society organizations, including several based in Israel, that had shown solidarity with Palestinian civil society organizations or criticized the practices of the Tel Aviv administration. In response, these organizations released a statement denouncing the government’s suppression of civil society (B’tselem, 2022).
Simultaneously, Palestinian cyber versions of civil society organizations have emerged as a novel form of resistance, which have faced repression from Israel. This new dimension of resistance plays a significant role in establishing a fresh civic space for Palestinians. Cyber-organized organizations like “disarmingdesign,” “The Mosaic Rooms,” and “culturalboycott for Palestine” not only provide a platform for Palestinian civic engagement but also serve as mechanisms to exert pressure on Israel by increasing civil and social visibility. These initiatives are vital in shaping a digital space that contributes to the Palestinian cause (Disarming Design, 2023).
In 2021, the UN declared Israel’s human rights record disastrous due to the ongoing pressure on Palestinians, including home demolitions, killings, and the expansion of illegal settlements. It is evident that Israel intensified its oppression of Palestinians in 2021, capitalizing on the normalization agreements with Gulf countries and the concessions granted by the Trump administration. The events that unfolded in May 2021, starting with the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood and the subsequent attacks on Muslims at Al-Aqsa Mosque, can be seen as significant indications of this escalation. The political fragmentation within Palestine, coupled with the inability of Palestinians to unite both domestically and in determining foreign policy, hampers the development of a cohesive civil society movement throughout the region.
Conclusion
The Middle East region exhibits a range of disparities concerning the presence of civil society movements across its countries. Civil society organizations typically encompass groups advocating for causes such as environmental conservation, women’s rights, and various social issues. However, there has been a concerning trend in recent years where certain governments seek to exert full control over civil society organizations.
Civil society movements in the Middle East strive to make an impact. Nevertheless, due to limited economic opportunities and growing political pressures, they face challenges in operating at their desired level of effectiveness.
Numerous factors impede the progress and empowerment of civil society movements in the region. Primarily, the repressive frameworks of political regimes, along with specific laws, regulations, and the prevalence of self-censorship, hinder the critical, transnational, and intellectual nature of these movements. Additionally, the perception of civil society movements and their institutional structures as non-national entities contributes significantly to the restrictions imposed on their activities and the challenges faced in their development.
Given all these conditions, it seems challenging to make hopeful assessments about the future and development of civil society in the Middle East, based on various examples. Despite the potential for continued existence of civil society in the face of enduring oppressive structures of political will in the region, it can be stated that its impact may remain limited, generating modest outcomes in social and political spheres. In this regard, an important aspect is the significant youth population, particularly in larger countries of the Middle East, and the ability of young people to engage in various civil domains. Civil society activities in technologically supported realms such as cyberspace can contribute to shaping the future civil space in the Middle East.
Furthermore, various political developments in the region, security-focused policies, and geopolitical challenges may hinder the creation of a conducive social environment for the proliferation of civil society activities from the grassroots level. However, the expanding youth population and demands for democratization are exerting pressure on Middle Eastern governments to adopt a more progressive agenda concerning rights and freedoms. Simultaneously, there will persist a grassroots demand for the strengthening and support of civil society. Therefore, the future of civil society will be contingent upon the grassroots demands and the stances of regimes in response, alongside diverse structural, political, economic, and geopolitical realities.
References
Al Jazeera (2023). Tunisian authorities close opposition Ennahdha party HQ. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/3NrKOLe
Anadolu Agency (2023). Israel declares 6 Palestinian human rights groups as ‘terrorist organizations. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/43R7UA6
AP News (2022). UN experts: Egypt hinders civil society role in COP27. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/3CmndFl
B’tselem (2023). 53 civil society organizations in solidarity with the Palestinian organizations designated by Israel as “terrorist groups” Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/3qDa7kq
Boussen, Z. (2023). “Tunisian society finds itself stuck in silence and limbo post-July 25. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/42uzimo
Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (2021). Egypt: Government must end relentless attempt to “eradicate” independent civil society, Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/45QMJjo
Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. (2021). Egypt: Implementing regulations of NGO law intended to cripple civil society. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/3PaKHET
Deng, C. & El-Fekki, A. (2022). Egypt released hundreds of political prisoners this year; some say they were tortured. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from: https://on.wsj.com/3qCvSAM
Disarming Design Web Site. Erişim adresi: https://disarmingdesign.com/
Hawari, Y (2021). Why Israel is trying to criminalise Palestinian civil society. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/3Co0k4h
International Service for Human Rights (2023). Egypt should immediately release all political prisoners and lift restrictions on civic space. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/3JaSf6J
Mekelberg, Y. (2023). And then they went after civil society organizations. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/461psva
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2022). UN experts condemn Israeli suppression of Palestinian human rights organisations. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/3qHnfVs
The United Nations (2021). Outraged over Israel’s Designation of Six Civil Society Groups as Terrorists, Speakers Tell Palestinian Rights Committee Harassment against Human Rights Defenders Must End”. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/45T6Spf
Turan, M. A. (2023). Tunus’ta 17 Nisan’da gözaltına alınan Nahda Hareketi Lideri Raşid el-Gannuşi tutuklandı. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/43RuA3h
