Since April 15, 2023, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which are part of the country’s security structure, have been engaged in armed conflicts in civilian residential areas. This ongoing conflict has resulted in damage to public and private buildings and the destruction of infrastructure, leading to civilian casualties. Despite temporary ceasefires, the relentless fighting has deepened the humanitarian crisis in the country. In addition to those affected by the conflict, individuals in need of medical treatment, particularly chronic patients, are unable to access healthcare facilities due to the damage inflicted upon hospitals. With the destruction of public buildings, banks, schools, and hospitals, Sudan is on the verge of state collapse.
Although Sudan has experienced two major civil wars from 1955-1972 and 1983-2005, followed by a significant crisis in the Darfur region, the current crisis the country is facing today is unparalleled in Sudan’s post-independence history. The reason for this is that the crisis is taking place right at the centre, in the capital city of Khartoum, which is home to nearly 10 million people. Previous major crises in Sudan after independence were mostly experienced in the periphery, far away from the capital, and their impact in Khartoum was limited. The Southern issue, as well as the problems in Darfur and South Kordofan, were predominantly located in distant areas from the capital. However, today a different crisis is unfolding, with conflicts occurring in the heart of the country. It may not be entirely accurate to classify Sudan’s current situation as a civil war, as it is more of a struggle within the security forces rather than a war involving the population as a whole. Nevertheless, considering the extent of the destruction that has occurred, it is not an exaggeration to say that the conflicts have had an impact similar to that of a civil war. The atmosphere in Khartoum and the provinces where the conflicts persist resembles that of an internal war.
Key Actors of the Conflict in Sudan
It is possible to draw a parallel between the attack of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which fought for independence in the south, in terms of scale and capacity. The SPLM, which had a comparable number of soldiers to the Sudanese army, was able to achieve independence in the southern provinces after a 20-year struggle. However, the SPLM pursued an ethnic and cultural cause. The current conflicts, on the other hand, do not involve religious, cultural, or ideological rhetoric. Instead, they represent a senseless war driven by the ambitions of seizing political and economic power, instigated by external actors.
The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which have engaged in conflicts with the official Sudanese army, form a structure that is involved in seeking personal gains. They have established relationships with the UAE-Saudi alliance, providing mercenaries to Libya and Yemen, controlling arms and car smuggling, engaging in real estate investments, and most importantly, controlling significant gold mines. With their military force of around 100,000, the RSF acts as a force within the army and a state within the state in Sudan. This massive structure, which is planned to be integrated into the Sudanese army, is reluctant to give up the gains it has achieved so far. Its leader, Mohammed Hamdan Dogolo, also known as “Hemeti,” aims to seize sole power and exploit all of the country’s resources. The RSF recruits the majority of its forces from related Arab tribes in Darfur, resembling a family-run business with armed members.
The origins of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Hemeti lie in a paramilitary militia organization in Darfur, which was organized and provided logistic support by the state intelligence agencies. These militias, known as the Janjaweed, were initially formed to suppress separatist armed groups in Darfur. During Omar al-Bashir’s regime, in 2013-2014, they were transformed into Border Guards and later into the Rapid Support Forces. This structure has familial ties with Libya and Chad. If this structure were to be dismantled, it could lead to the emergence of other security issues in Sudan and create complications in neighbouring countries.
It is evident that the military’s intervention in politics and its monopoly over economic resources in Sudan are quite apparent. Except for the periods 1956-1958, 1964-1969, and 1985-1989, when civilians briefly held power, the military has predominantly been in power in Sudan since gaining independence from British-Egyptian colonialism in 1956. This pattern did not change after the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir in 2019, as the establishment of the Sovereignty Council included a military-dominated structure with the inclusion of civilians. The leaders of this structure, Abdelfattah al-Burhan and the second-in-command, Hemeti, who leads the RSF, represent the two conflicting sides in Sudan today.
Sudan, where military structures assert themselves in the political arena and coups occur frequently, has a fragile structure with intense religious and ethnic sensitivities. The previous internal wars and crises have highlighted these fragile fault lines. In such a context, a structure in which civilian entities are excluded from politics and monopolization of economic resources is evident, it is clear that Sudan cannot be led towards a bright future. The transition period that began with the end of Omar al-Bashir’s era, characterized by expectations of civilianization and democratization, unfortunately, accompanies a chaotic environment. The process that started with revolutionary cries has now evolved into an internal war dominated by coups and military involvement. Undoubtedly, the convergence of economic and political crises has made the solution extremely challenging, creating a difficult environment.
In 2011, after 20 years of war, South Sudan’s secession from Sudan through a referendum resulted in a significant economic loss, as Sudan lost two-thirds of its oil revenue. The petroleum sector, which had become the main driver of the country’s economic growth, suffered a major blow. Despite efforts to accelerate agricultural and gold production in the aftermath of this blow, these initiatives proved insufficient in the short term, and the country fell into a severe economic crisis. In the final days of 2018, protests erupted due to high cost of living, bread and fuel shortages, later gaining momentum and creating an atmosphere reminiscent of the Arab Spring. Omar al-Bashir, who turned a deaf ear to these demands, was unexpectedly ousted from power by a military coup. With the end of a 30-year rule, a hollowed-out state structure was left in the hands of the military.
The Role of International Actors in Sudan
Sudan, being rich in gold and oil, is a country that should be an agricultural powerhouse with approximately 200 million feddans of arable land. It has 110 million heads of cattle and holds 42,000 tons of fish reserves. The country is a major producer of “gum Arabic”, which is used in the pharmaceutical industry, accounting for 80% of global production, mostly exported to the United States. Sudan also cultivates agricultural products such as sesame and cotton. Its location in the Nile basin and its coastal proximity to the Red Sea give Sudan strategic importance both in the context of Africa and the Middle East. The country serves as a bridge, resembling a crossroad between African and Middle Eastern cultures. Therefore, in addition to China, the United States, Russia, and European countries, countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Israel, and in recent years, Türkiye, have shown significant interest in Sudan.
It is observed that the United States, China, Russia, the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany are competing forces in Sudan, and instead of openly supporting the conflicting parties, they pursue less risky strategies and maintain collaborations with both sides. These foreign actors, who have played a role in legitimizing military factions that would maximize their own interests, have not acted in Sudan’s best interests during the transitional period. In the post-Omar al-Bashir era, it can be seen that the Rapid Support Forces (RSP) have developed close relationships with Haftar, the UAE, Israel, and Wagner. On the other hand, the generals in the army have maintained their traditional relations with Egypt and have occasionally had contacts with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Wagner, and Israel. The continuation of the conflict in this manner only delays the process of civilianization and the realization of legitimate demands of the people in the country.
Indeed, China has been purchasing oil from this region since 1999 and has also undertaken numerous infrastructure projects in Sudan. The Sudanese market is filled with Chinese goods, ranging from electronics to plastics. During Omar al-Bashir’s regime, China enjoyed privileged status due to the US embargo, and it engaged in arms sales and military technology transfers. However, with the instability following the fall of the Bashir regime and the lifting of the US embargo, China began to lose its privileged position. In 2021, Sudan took a normalization step under US guidance, and Israel, as an unseen actor behind the scenes, has made its presence felt. Israel, through its engagement with both military officials and the Rapid Support Forces (RSP), sees strategic importance in securing the Red Sea, using Sudan’s airspace, and accessing the country’s energy and mineral resources. Israeli officials have visited Khartoum occasionally in recent years or met with the command structure in Sudan through Egypt and the UAE.
Russia’s relations with Sudan have been noteworthy since 2014. Moscow maintained good relations with Omar al-Bashir and continued to maintain its position in Sudan even after the regime change in 2019. It is known that the Rapid Support Forces (HDK) and the Sudanese military intelligence have relationships with Wagner, and they sell gold from the controlled gold mines to Meroe Gold and M-Invest, which are close to Wagner, in exchange for money and weapons. Furthermore, it is a known fact that Russia has been trying to establish a military base in Port Sudan.
It is essential to take action without delay to prevent a country of great importance in the Islamic world from being pushed towards the group of unstable and chaotic countries such as Somalia, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Unfortunately, it can be observed that the Islamic world, which is trapped in its own internal agenda or engaged in artificial issues, has not shown sufficient interest in Sudan and has practically abandoned the country to its own fate. The forces of Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Haftar, who are important actors, appear to be seeking to redesign the region where Sudan is located according to the strategic interests of global actors.
Today, it is observed that the conflicts in Sudan are intensifying in the capital, Khartoum, and the Darfur region. Possible scenarios do not indicate a bright future for Sudan. The first scenario is the failure of permanent peace and mediation efforts, leading to a prolonged conflict. In this case, the complete collapse of the state, polarization of the neutral population, and further escalation of chaos are expected. The second possibility is that mediation efforts result in a political and economic power-sharing agreement, allowing the parties to continue governing from where they stand. Another possibility is that one side emerges victorious over the other. In this case, it could either mean the dissolution of the military and the handover of power to the civilian government or the military suppressing and dispersing the civilian leadership. If the civilian leadership manages to defeat the military and seize control, it would be an indication of a dark period for Sudan. On the other hand, if the civilian structure is dispersed, it may lead to the emergence of numerous micro-conflict areas in the country. The chronic issues in Darfur and Kordofan, where the civilian leadership has a presence, could particularly worsen in such a scenario.
* Dr., Expert in African Politics
