Muslim-majority countries are increasingly using religion as a form of soft power to project moderation, attract investment, and gain global legitimacy. These efforts vary by context and actor but often share the goal of aligning Islamic discourse with international norms. Despite their ambitions, such strategies face structural limitations and tend to serve political branding more than sustained geopolitical influence.

American political scientist Joseph Nye Jr., who passed away on 6 May 2025, proposed the paradigm-shifting concept of “soft power” in the 1980s.[1] Until the Cold War, power had been measured solely in military might or economic clout. In our post-Cold War world, Nye posited that a country could also influence others without resorting to coercion, to get other countries to want what it wants rather than ordering them to do so.

When imagining soft power, we often think of how the United States promotes its political, economic, and cultural values through movies, music, sports, or its historic space programme rivalry with the Soviet Union. More recently, South Korea’s investment in its music and cultural industries has become a textbook example. Yet, scholars have also pointed to religion as a potent tool of influence, and nowhere is this more evident than in the Muslim world, where religion has become a currency of statecraft. From Riyadh to Kuala Lumpur, Muslim-majority countries are using Islam not just as a domestic political tool but as a platform for global influence to meet their respective foreign policy interests.

 As middle and regional powers, these Muslim-majority countries, however, do not deploy “soft power” in pursuit of global domination. Instead, their religious soft power strategies are largely reactive; crafted to counter post-9/11 stereotypes that associate Islam with extremism, and to position themselves as credible, moderate partners in the global order. These narratives serve both diplomatic and economic objectives: to allay fears of radicalism, attract foreign investment, and secure greater international cooperation.

Muslim-majority countries, however, do not deploy “soft power” in pursuit of global domination. Instead, their religious soft power strategies are largely reactive; crafted to counter post-9/11 stereotypes that associate Islam with extremism, and to position themselves as credible, moderate partners in the global order.

At the heart of these strategies lies what Dr. Gregorio Bettiza calls  “sacred capital”[2], referring to religious resources and institutions that could indirectly produce or be mobilized by states to generate influence. While soft power refers broadly to a state’s capacity to persuade through attraction rather than coercion, sacred capital is one of its key sources – particularly in religiously resonant contexts. By investing in the authority of sacred history, holy sites, long-standing institutions of Islamic learning, or globally recognisable clerical figures, Muslim-majority states are able to convert religious legitimacy into diplomatic capital. For instance, Saudi Arabia draws from its custodianship of the Two Holy Mosques, Türkiye from its Ottoman heritage, and Egypt from its position as host of al-Azhar University – each leveraging different reservoirs of sacred capital to shape their soft power projection.

The Strategic Use of Religious Discourse

Religion has always shaped identity and power in the Muslim world, but in recent decades, it has taken on a more deliberate role in diplomacy. Muslim-majority countries are now deploying religious discourse as a tool of foreign policy – repackaging sacred tradition into a language of moderation, tolerance, and modernity aimed at global audiences. The goal is not only reputational but strategic: to project stability, attract investment, and claim moral legitimacy in a fractured world.

Saudi Arabia offers a striking case. Once synonymous with the global export of Wahhabism – a rigid, exclusivist strain of Salafism – the Kingdom has undergone a dramatic shift under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). As part of his vision to transform Saudi Arabia into a post-oil economy, MBS has reoriented the country’s religious outreach. Institutions like the Muslim World League, formerly the vehicle for Wahhabi propagation, now promote interfaith harmony and religious tolerance. The aim is clear: to reposition Saudi Arabia not as a source of religious rigidity, but as a moderate Islamic power open to Western partnerships and Asian investments. Elsewhere, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has cultivated scholars such as Shaykh Abdullah Bin Bayyah, chairing state-backed forums on peace and coexistence. In contrast, Qatar previously sponsored voices aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, such as the late Yusuf al-Qaradawi, positioning itself as a champion of popular Islamic movements after the Arab Spring. As David Warren argues in Rivals in the Gulf, these divergent religious strategies were part of broader geopolitical rivalries between Doha and Abu Dhabi, where theology served diplomacy.[3]

Institutions like the Muslim World League, formerly the vehicle for Wahhabi propagation, now promote interfaith harmony and religious tolerance. The aim is clear: to reposition Saudi Arabia not as a source of religious rigidity, but as a moderate Islamic power open to Western partnerships and Asian investments.

Interestingly, this phenomenon is not unique to the Arab world. In Southeast Asia, Malaysia has made attempts to step onto this stage. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s Malaysia Madani framework – rooted in values like compassion, trust, and inclusivity – has been accompanied by outreach to a wide spectrum of Muslim scholars, from traditionalist Sufis to modernist preachers. In 2023, Anwar organized several Majlis Ilmu Madani or Gatherings of Civilisational Knowledge, which featured Dr. Ali Gomaa, the former grand mufti of Egypt, and Habib Umar Bin Hafiz, founder and dean of the Dar al-Mustafa seminary in Tarim, Yemen. Other international influential scholars and personalities included Jamal Farouk Jibreel from Egypt, Muhammed Fadıl Geylani from Turkey, Muhammad Nuruddeen Lemu from Nigeria, Ismail Menk from Zimbabwe, Muhammad Salah from the United States, and Wael Ibrahim from Australia. These gatherings were curated performances of Islamic pluralism, designed to position Malaysia as a convenor of religious discourse which blended aspects of Islam from Egypt’s traditional scholarship, Tunisia and Turkey’s nationalist-Islamism, Yemen’s Hadhrami tradition and historical network, sympathy for oppressed Muslims worldwide, the teachings of popular Salafi figures, and experiences of Muslim scholars from the West and even from Africa. Nevertheless, across these cases, religion is not incidental to diplomacy – it is central. Sacred capital is now managed, curated, and exported like any other strategic resource.

Competing Models of Moderate Islam

While many Muslim-majority states have embraced the language of “moderate” Islam, the models they promote differ significantly in form, content, and intent. These divergences reflect not only theological preferences but also political contexts and strategic objectives. What unites them is a desire to present a version of Islam that is compatible with global norms – particularly those prized by Western and investment-oriented audiences – while preserving local authority over religious meaning.

The UAE’s state-sponsored moderation is rooted in stability and hierarchy. Figures like Shaykh Abdullah Bin Bayyah, long associated with traditional Maliki jurisprudence, have been recast as standard-bearers of post-Arab Spring orthodoxy – pro-government, anti-revolution, and wary of democratic activism. By contrast, Qatar once elevated scholars like Yusuf al-Qaradawi, whose Muslim Brotherhood affiliations gave Doha symbolic capital among Islamist-leaning publics, particularly during the Arab uprisings.

Southeast Asia, too, exhibits variation. Malaysia’s Islam Hadhari and Malaysia Madani both articulate state-led visions of progressive Islam grounded in civilizational values. Islam Hadhari was introduced by Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi in the early 2000s as a framework for a progressive and moderate Islam that emphasizes harmony, inclusivity, and good governance.[4] It aimed to modernize Malaysia’s Islamic discourse by promoting values such as knowledge, economic development, and interfaith dialogue. Malaysia Madani[5], launched by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, is a governance framework that focuses on sustainability, prosperity, innovation, respect, trust, and compassion. It seeks to foster a just and inclusive society by integrating Islamic principles with contemporary governance, emphasizing good governance, sustainable development, and social justice.

In Indonesia, however, religious discourse is shaped more by mass organisations than the state.[6] Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) promotes Islam Nusantara, a pluralistic theology rooted in local custom and traditional scholarship, while Muhammadiyah’s Islam Berkemajuan emphasises rationality and reform. The Indonesian Ulama Council’s Islam Wasatiyyah, endorsed by the state, seeks a middle ground between liberalism and radicalism.

What these models have in common is that they are less about theology and more about politics. Moderation is not a matter of doctrine – it is a strategy of governance and branding.

At face value, these models share common values – tolerance, nonviolence, pluralism – but their function diverges. In Malaysia, religious discourse remains embedded in electoral politics and the ongoing contest over Malay-Muslim identity.[7] In Indonesia, it is a reflection of institutional competition between mass organisations with different constituencies and visions. In the Gulf, it is a mechanism of top-down control, legitimizing the monarchy and suppressing dissent. What these models have in common is that they are less about theology and more about politics. Moderation is not a matter of doctrine – it is a strategy of governance and branding.

Conclusion – The Limits of Islamic Soft Power

Despite their ambitions, religious soft power projects in the Muslim world face structural and strategic limits. While these initiatives offer compelling narratives of tolerance and pluralism, they often struggle to convert sacred capital into sustained geopolitical leverage. Malaysia’s Madani approach, for instance, has lost momentum. Anwar Ibrahim’s early enthusiasm for convening diverse scholars was notable, but over time, the Majlis Ilmu Madani gatherings became exclusive events with limited resonance among rural Malay-Muslims[8] or neighboring Muslim societies. Malaysia’s soft power projection remains largely elite-driven and domestically fragmented, leaving its broader impact uncertain. On the other hand, Indonesia’s own religious diplomacy, once globally admired through Nahdlatul Ulama’s Islam Nusantara and the state’s support of Islam Wasatiyyah, is now constrained by economic priorities. President Prabowo Subianto’s focus on his Free Nutritious Food Programme, coupled with sweeping budget cuts, risks diverting resources away from projects like the Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII). UIII was potentially a regional and global rival to Malaysia’s International Islamic University (IIUM). Its stagnation, if allowed to happen, reflects a broader trade-off between visionary religious diplomacy and immediate domestic deliverables.

Even the deeper goal of religious soft power – to attract foreign investment – deserves scrutiny. It is often assumed that the rebranding of Islam as “moderate” and “inclusive” reassures international investors. But has it worked? When former U.S. President Donald Trump announced the lifting of economic sanctions on Syria during his visit to Saudi Arabia, it was unlikely the sole result of a new-found confidence in Syria’s Islamic moderation. Rather, it was a transactional calculation: a convergence of interests between Gulf states eager to expand trade and Washington’s strategic balancing amid the looming shadow of reciprocal tariffs and the U.S.-China trade war.

Soft power in the Muslim world, then, could be less about changing minds and more about clearing the runway for realpolitik.

Such examples highlight the instrumental limits of religious soft power. In practice, its efficacy may not lie in persuasion through values, but in its ability to function as a signalling device – signalling political alignment, market openness, and regime stability. Soft power in the Muslim world, then, could be less about changing minds and more about clearing the runway for realpolitik. And yet, despite these contradictions, one must ask: What would the diplomatic landscape have looked like without these religious soft power efforts? In the two decades since 9/11, Muslim-majority states have been playing catch-up, battling a global narrative that too often equates Islam with violence or regression. In this sense, sacred capital has not always been a winning card – but it may have been a necessary one.

[1] Nye, J. S., Jr. (1990). Soft power. Foreign Policy, 80, 153–171.

[2] Bettiza, G. (2020). States, religions, and power: Highlighting the role of sacred capital in world politics. Washington, DC: Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. Retrieved from https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/states-religions-and-power-highlighting-the-role-of-sacred-capital-in-world-politics

[3] Warren, D. H. (2021). Rivals in the Gulf: Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Abdullah Bin Bayyah, and the Qatar-UAE contest over the Arab Spring and the Gulf Crisis. London: Routledge

[4] Saat, N. (2025). Pak Lah and Islam Hadhari’s hits and misses. Fulcrum. Retrieved from https://fulcrum.sg/pak-lah-and-islam-hadharis-hits-and-misses/

[5] Musa, M. F. (2023). The evolution of Madani: How is 2.0 different from 1.0? Trends in Southeast Asia, (TRS18/23). Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. Retrieved from https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/TRS18_23.pdf

[6] Bin Ali, Mohamed, & Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani. (2024). The growing salience of moderate Islam. RSIS Commentary. Retrieved from https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/the-growing-salience-of-moderate-islam/

[7] Alkaff, Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman & Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani. (2023). Malaysia Madani and the Muslim world: Anwar Ibrahim’s soft power strategy. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2023/07/malaysia-madani-and-the-muslim-world-anwar-ibrahims-soft-power-strategy/

[8] Ibid.