After the sudden collapse of the Assad regime following a 14-year war, debates over political transition, transitional justice, peacebuilding, sectarianism, and foreign policy have intensified. At the forefront is Syria’s relationship with the United States, as the new administration seeks to normalize ties, lift sanctions, and reverse decades of anti-Western policy. The text traces the turbulent US-Syria relationship since 2011. While the lifting of sanctions signals hope for a struggling society, questions remain about the cost of normalization, particularly regarding the deepened Israeli occupation and the ongoing genocide in Gaza.

Things are moving quickly again—not that they ever slowed down—in post-Assad Syria. The sudden collapse of the 54-year-old Baath regime after a grueling 14-year war opened up intense debates about domestic politics, such as political transition, transitional justice, peacebuilding, sectarianism, and foreign policy. Perhaps at the top of the foreign policy list has been Syria’s relationship with the United States. The new administration has been working hard to normalize ties with the United States, repeal the sanctions, and undo decades of the anti-Western posture assumed by Syria. This analysis surveys the turbulent relationship between Syria and the US since 2011, leading up to the dramatic meeting between Mohammed Bin Salman, Recep Tayyip Erdogan (via teleconference), Ahmad Al-Sharaa, and Donald Trump on May 15. Much political discourse and commentary highlight the positive economic and security implications for a post-conflict society seeking to stabilize and rebuild. Deal-making with Trump, however, may come at a high price in a country whose own Israeli occupation has only deepened, even as next door, the genocide in Gaza continues.

From 2011 to December 2024

Even very recent history is constantly narrated and re-narrated by various actors. The United States’ role in the early years of the “Arab Spring” provokes endless controversy. Barack Obama, President of the United States at a time when popular uprisings tore through the Arab world, eventually claimed to support the democratic aspirations of rebelling citizens. Indeed, Syrian leaders and their constantly-morphing political opposition bodies spent countless hours with American diplomats, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton herself. Once the revolution became armed, there was hope—always controversial—that the US would either intervene directly (under the Responsibility to Protect or R2P Doctrine) or provide enough weaponry to topple the dictator.

Syria’s multi-sided, internationalized war has made it a complicated case of potential democratization. The suggestion that US interests do not lie with Arab democracy stands, however, even in Syria.  

Whether seeking American support, military no less, was consistent with the demands of a popular revolution for freedom and dignity, for sovereignty and perhaps even democracy, will always be an important political and ethical question. The US did indeed arm some factions of the Syrian armed opposition, for instance, among the so-called “Free Syrian Army” (see Gani 2019). In addition, the US deployed numerous sanctions on Assad, his close circle, and many sectors of the Syrian state itself. (Other sanctions precede 2011, all the way back to 1979.) Eventually, however, the US position, and Barack Obama in particular, became synonymous with the chemical weapons “red line”[1] that he infamously drew and then erased. Assad crossed the chemical weapons threshold in August 2013 and killed over 1400 civilians in Eastern Ghouta, but the US and Russia quickly hammered out a face-saving deal allowing Assad to embark on a UN-administered process of eliminating his chemical weapon stockpile. Syrians opposed to the Assad regime discovered that the United States would not be the key to deposing him. Meanwhile, US involvement in the country shifted focus to counterterrorism, namely against ISIS in Operation Enduring Freedom. Scholars of Arab politics (Gerges, 2024) have long argued that the US has consistently worked against Arab democratization, despite some declared statements to the contrary. Syria’s multi-sided, internationalized war has made it a complicated case of potential democratization (Saleh, 2018). The suggestion that US interests do not lie with Arab democracy stands, however, even in Syria.  

So little could Syrians influence high-level US positions that they seem to have lowered their demands of Washington and the “Friends of Syria.” Groups of activists, comprising what is loosely called the “Syrian lobby,” have scrambled to secure bundles of US sanctions against Assad and his inner circle for years. It is these very same sanctions, touted as a huge win back in 2018 and onwards, that the Syrian lobbyists have worked overtime to end once Assad fell. During his first term, Donald Trump’s two airstrikes in 2017 and 2018, his theatrical labelling of Assad as a “human animal,”[2] and the killing of ISIS leader Al-Baghdadi, did little to dislodge the Butcher of Damascus. Moreover, in 2019, Trump also recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Syrian Golan Heights.

This time around, when Trump came into office, the dominant expectation was a possible withdrawal of American troops from a Syria that was not on his list of Middle East priorities, as Israel’s (US-aided) war on Gaza raged. In fact, in November 2024, the Syrian “lobby”  was seeking to curb Western and Arab normalization with the Assad regime. And then in December 2024, the regime fell through an unforeseeable combination of global conflict (Russia-Ukraine), regional bloodletting (in Gaza and Lebanon), related US airstrikes (on Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria), and deal-making between major players (Russia, Iran, Türkiye). The complete details of the lead-up to Assad’s widely celebrated ouster have not yet fully come to light. A swift military campaign led by Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s Abu Mohammed Al-Jolani, now known as Ahmad Al-Sharaa, did more than unseat a widely reviled, brutal dictator. It also precipitated a new direction, Gulf-ward and Westward, for Syria in regional and global power relations.

Groups of activists, comprising what is loosely called the “Syrian lobby,” have scrambled to secure bundles of US sanctions against Assad and his inner circle for years. It is these very same sanctions, touted as a huge win back in 2018 and onwards, that the Syrian lobbyists have worked overtime to end once Assad fell. 

No Free Lunch?

The widely circulating image of Trump, Bin Salman, and Al-Sharaa would have been unthinkable merely six months ago. Describing his decision as a favor to both Bin Salman and Erdogan, Trump’s declaration of the end to the American sanctions regime in Syria topped many predictions of what would unfold in the US President’s first overseas visit of his second term. This begs the question: what does Trump, the notorious deal-maker, get in return for this apparent bout of generosity, for his surprising praise of its ex-Al Qaeda leader?

Syrian ties to Iran and affiliated militias (namely, Hezbollah) have long rankled Washington. With Iran driven out of Syria, Iran is now a moot point. When considering US sanctions relief in Syria, the question of whether post-Assad Syria will “normalize” or make peace with Israel is perhaps the most pressing political and moral issue. In recent years, details have come to light about the now-deposed Bashar Al-Assad’s serious talks with the Americans about a peace agreement with Israel, perhaps even on the cusp of an agreement, immediately before the revolution broke out in 2011 (Hof, 2022).

After Trump’s declaration lifting the sanctions, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio “welcomed the Syrian government’s calls for peace with Israel”.[3] It is notable that so far, the interim Syrian government’s declared positions on Israel have been weaker than anticipated. Syrian officials, including Foreign Secretary Asaad Al-Shaybani, have condemned repeated Israeli airstrikes[4] on the country after December 8. They have maintained a commitment to the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement, while insisting that Syria would not threaten Israeli security.

Speculation abounds over whether Trump’s lifting of the sanctions has been in return for a promise of Syria joining the Abraham Accords. Certainly Syria, a neighboring country to Israel, its Golan Heights directly occupied by the Zionist state, would be a valuable addition for the Trump Administration, a foreign policy triumph. This has reportedly been one of the President’s publicized demands[5] of the Syrian administration. State Department spokespeople and the Syrian lobby in the US insist that the sanctions were lifted with no preconditions. Still, it is difficult to ignore the prospect of an eventual peace or normalization agreement with Israel. In addition to Trump’s reported requests, the possibility is not being categorically ruled out by Syrian officials. Perhaps Syria will follow Saudi Arabia’s lead in terms of timing and conditions. For the time being, no such deal had been made yet. But there is no doubt that the possibility of peace with Israel is being discussed with the utmost seriousness, even by commentators on the revamped Syrian state TV, Al-Ikhbariyyah Al-Sooriyyah.[6]

The taboo of public political deliberations regarding peace with Israel appears to have been broken. And thus, we must confront the matter. Certainly, normalization with Israel, which continues its genocide and starvation campaign[7] in Gaza, was not on the agenda of the protestors rebelling against Assad’s rule in 2011, or those who carried arms months later. But revolutions bring with them unexpected consequences. It is impossible not to rejoice that the suffocating sanctions on Syria’s economy are set to end. Like sanctions generally, it has been the Syrian public and not its authoritarian leader (or his corrupt coterie) who have borne the brunt of their punishing damage. Like their Arab Spring brethren (see Sadiki and Saleh 2024), Syrians waged a storied revolution for freedom and dignity, paying dearly in hundreds of thousands killed and millions (still) displaced. Months after Assad’s departure, 90% of Syrians still live in poverty, facing extreme shortages in electricity and clean water.[8] The end to oppressive US sanctions is unequivocally a cause for celebration.

Especially as Gaza has been left to suffer alone, the very idea of the Abraham Accords, or anything similar, speaks volumes of betrayal to both Palestine and Syria. 

The Freedom to Object?

But (possible) “peace” or “normalization” with Israel, after Gaza no less, might be the high price imposed by the US for lifting (unjust) sanctions. It is jarring that Trump, partner and enabler of genocide, along with Mohammed Bin Salman, have been celebrated by some Syrians as saviors. One lesson is clear: Weakness of state and society—from grinding war, paralyzing sanctions, harrowing displacement—is a recipe for exacting concessions. And in this sense, sanctions may actually work, pressuring leaders (and possibly publics) to bow to American pressure, facilitating its plans for so-called “regional integration” of Israel.[9]

One sentiment that has floated on Syrian and Arab social media recently is that Syrians may have no choice if normalization (or at least the more euphemistic “peace”) is what it takes to rebuild the war-battered country. Nobody would deny that Al-Sharaa’s (self-appointed) mandate as transitional president of Syria is daunting, complicated, overwhelming, even. There is no shortage of international actors involved in a very complicated (post-)conflict setting. For instance, the US and Türkiye have just announced a Syria Working Group[10] focused primarily on security and counterterrorism. US troops remain in Syria but will reportedly be decreased to about 1000. Relations with the (Western-backed) Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are not yet quite resolved. Security problems and sectarian violence compound a decimated economy. Not to mention that concrete steps toward democratization seem less and less likely, at least for the next five years.

But those of us outside the dizzying circuits of domestic and international power politics can at least recognize that the question of relations with Israel pose an enormous moral quandary, an ethical test, for the new (transitional) Syrian regime. Especially as Gaza has been left to suffer alone, the very idea of the Abraham Accords, or anything similar, speaks volumes of betrayal to both Palestine and Syria. And it may not be popular with Syrians themselves—not that the Syrian people have been consulted. Here is where the newfound freedom of expression, which the interim government has promised in both its constitutional declaration and through the mouth of its Information Minister[11], is a good opportunity. Might some measure of popular outcry against normalization, against the farce of “peace” with Israel (still an occupying state), send a message that Trump’s dream of attaining the peace prize at the expense of Palestine, at the expense of Syrian sovereignty, not pass muster in a post-Assad world? Might enough writers and activists, media personalities and thought leaders, remind Syrians, Arabs, and the world that this public will not accept normalizing relations with Israel? It would be a good use of the hard-won freedom to speak out in advance against such “deal-making,” against such compromises, made on behalf of entire peoples. 

References

Gani, J. (2019). US policy towards the Syrian conflict under Obama: Strategic patience and miscalculation. In R. Hinnebusch & A. Saouli (Eds.), The war for Syria: Regional and international dimensions of the Syrian uprising (Chapter 5). London: Routledge.

Gerges, F. A. (2024). What really went wrong: The West and the failure of democracy in the Middle East. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hof, F. C. (2022, May 26). I almost negotiated Israel-Syria peace. Here's how it happened. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/i-almost-negotiated-israel-syria-peace-heres-how-it-happened/

Sadiki, L., & Saleh, L. (2024). Revolution and democracy in Tunisia: A century of protestscapes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Saleh, L. (2018). Civic resilience during conflict: Syria's local councils. Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research, 11(2), 135–155.

Saleh, L. (2024, July 5). Diasporic Syrian activism in the US: Successes and challenges. Syrian Dialogue Center. https://sydialogue.org/en/diasporic-syrian-activism-in-the-us-successes-and-challenges/

[1] See. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-president-blinked-why-obama-changed-course-on-the-red-line-in-syria/

[2] See. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-condemns-assad-suspected-chemical-attack

[3] See. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/secretary-rubios-meeting-with-syrian-foreign-minister-al-shaibani/

[4] See. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/02/israel-launches-airstrikes-near-syria-presidential-palace-in-damascus

[5] See. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-trumps-meeting-with-syrias-new-leader-is-a-turning-point-for-the-war-torn-nation

[6] See. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxoeDsdIkLo

[7] See. https://www.bbc.com/audio/play/w172zss2c9myv5c

[8] See. https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis-explained/

[9] See. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/one-year-israel-gaza-war-regional-integration-still-way-forward-213113

[10] See https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-turkiye-syria-working-group/

[11] See https://www.france24.com/ar/الشرق-الأوسط/20250101-سوريا-وزير-الإعلام-الجديد-يتعهد-تعزيز-حرية-التعبير-والصحافة-وبناء-إعلام-حر