(This text has been translated from its original Turkish version.)
The 61-year-old Ba’ath regime and the 54-year-old Assad dictatorship in our southern neighbor Syria, consigned to the dustbin of history with the entry of the Syrian opposition forces into Damascus on December 8th, 2024. As the Assad regime exited the stage of history, it left Syria a legacy of a deeply divided society, a country reduced to rubble, and a collapsed economy. Exactly one year has passed since this moment, which constitutes a turning point in the country’s history. Over the past year, Syria has undergone a notable process of transformation. This article aims to provide an overview of developments over the past year across key fields in the country, offering a snapshot of its current situation.
Political Transformation and Syria’s Changing Geopolitical Identity
Although the fact that a figure such as Ahmad al-Sharaa, whose background is fundamentally rooted in the radical al-Qaeda organization, assumed control in Damascus was initially met with skepticism by some actors in terms of Syria’s regional and global political relations, the al-Sharaa administration, within a short span of time, displayed a high level of pragmatism that largely dispelled these doubts. In a very brief period, al-Sharaa transformed into a head of state who was received at the highest levels in both regional capitals and global power centers, thereby consolidating his legitimacy.
In addition to cultivating good relations with the Gulf countries, Türkiye, Iraq, and other neighboring states, al-Sharaa projected the image of a leader who visited Washington and Moscow, addressed from the United Nations podium in New York, met with U.S. President Trump at the White House, and shook hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin. At the same time, Syria established close relations with the European Union, and Damascus became a frequent destination for Western delegations.
The removal of Iran from the Syrian equation also played a notable role in the rapid advancement of relations with Western and Gulf countries. For a long time, Iran had been perceived as a common threat by the Gulf states. Today, Israel has effectively replaced Iran as the primary shared/common threat.
As al-Sharaa consolidated power, Türkiye encouraged Damascus to build good relations with Gulf capitals and countries such as Egypt, so that the Gulf states, which had organized counterrevolutions during the Arab Spring, would not perceive Syria as a comparable threat. The Gulf’s role was likewise crucial for the inflow of capital into Syria. Moreover, the al-Sharaa government essentially halted the narcotics (Captagon) trafficking that had been produced in Syria and exported to neighboring and Gulf countries during the Assad era. In this way, Damascus has been transformed from a source of instability into a state that mitigates security problems for its neighbors. As a result, Damascus has now established substantial diplomatic engagement with all regional capitals except Tehran. Although relations with Lebanon remain fluctuating, there is ongoing diplomatic traffic between Beirut and Damascus.
Demonstrating a remarkable degree of pragmatism to rebuild the country and revive its economy, Syria is pursuing a policy of balance among global powers and, as noted above, is seeking functional relationships with all regional capitals other than Tehran.
Syria’s geopolitical identity, which under the Assad regime had been situated within the bloc comprising Iran, Russia, and their allies, was transformed with the December 8th Revolution. The country has turned into a state that has developed a close model of engagement with the Western bloc. However, actors such as Russia and China have not been disregarded during this shift. Relations with the aforementioned great powers continue on a case-by-case basis.
Under al-Sharaa’s leadership, Syria adopted a presidential system, and a constitutional declaration was also approved. This declaration will essentially function as the constitution until a new and complete constitutional text is formally adopted. In addition, parliamentary elections were held in the country. Since, for various reasons, it was not possible to conduct elections through direct participation by the populace, the electoral process was carried out through delegates.
Economic Outlook
Before the December 8th Revolution, Syria was experiencing a profound economic crisis. The primary drivers of this crisis were the economic sanctions imposed on the country. The intensive sanctions regime enforced by the EU and the United States played a significant role in the relatively rapid collapse of the Assad regime. In particular, the Caesar sanctions imposed by the United States were crippling for Syria.
From 2020 onwards, the sanctions that had intensified economic pressure on Syria became essentially meaningless following the fall of the Assad regime. Within a short period, the EU moved to lift sanctions by easing the pressure on Syrian institutions and the country’s new leadership. The United States, by contrast, initially proceeded far more cautiously. However, after Donald Trump visited Riyadh and Ahmad al-Sharaa’s meeting with Trump in the Saudi capital, relations between Washington and Damascus gained substantial momentum. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan played a significant role in facilitating this meeting. Trump announced in Riyadh that he would lift the sanctions on Syria to give the country a new chance. Although U.S.-Syrian relations have advanced significantly in the diplomatic sphere, the same momentum has not yet been achieved in the economic domain. Following al-Sharaa’s most recent visit to the White House, a second six-month waiver was granted regarding the Caesar sanctions. However, the complete removal of these sanctions requires the approval of Congress. Since Israel prefers a weak and fragmented Syria, it is actively engaged in lobbying efforts to prevent the lifting of these sanctions.
The Syrian diaspora and countries friendly to Syria are conducting a counter lobbying campaign. The complete removal of the Caesar sanctions is highly significant for accelerating the functioning of Syria’s economic machinery. Many actors and states interested in investing in the country are waiting for these sanctions to be fully lifted. For the multimillion-dollar memoranda of understanding signed with various countries and actors to translate into tangible capital inflows, sanctions must be lifted and the country’s institutional capacity firmly established.
Before December 8th, the average salary of a public servant in Syria was a shockingly low 25–30 dollars. The al-Sharaa administration introduced a 200% increase in these wages. Qatar agreed to pay the salaries of public employees in Syria for one year, an amount corresponding to tens of millions of dollars. Similarly, Saudi Arabia and Qatar also paid off Syria’s debt to the World Bank.
In addition, Syria, which had been politically marginalized due to the war crimes of the Assad regime, had also been excluded from the global economic and financial system. Following the establishment of an inclusive government in Syria after December 8th and the gradual improvement of relations with the West, the country was reintegrated into the global financial system. Syria rejoined the international banking system SWIFT after 14 years. During his most recent visit to the United States, Ahmad al-Sharaa also visited the IMF headquarters, where he discussed potential economic arrangements necessary for his country. To briefly summarize the economic file, Syria is transitioning to a liberal economic model that encourages foreign investment.
Energy File
Following the introduction of sanctions exemptions, Syria exported oil abroad for the first time in 14 years at the beginning of September. Through the port of Tartous, the Syrian Ministry of Energy sold 600,000 barrels of crude oil to external markets. While this constituted a positive step for the Syrian economy, it was, of course, insufficient in itself. The Northeastern Syria region, where the country’s oil and natural gas fields are heavily concentrated, remains under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the group’s integration into the Syrian state has yet to be resolved.
One of the key aspects of the energy supply issue in Syria is electricity. The delivery of Azerbaijani natural gas to Aleppo via Kilis has increased Syria’s electricity supply. Whereas even the capital, Damascus, used to receive only a few hours of electricity per day before December 8th, today a significant portion of the country’s urban centers can access electricity for 16–20 hours a day. In Damascus, 24-hour electricity provision began in November, which constitutes a highly significant achievement. However, the electricity supply to rural areas has not improved to the same extent, and substantial time will be required to repair and rehabilitate the relevant infrastructure.
Syrian Refugees
The massacres perpetrated by the Assad regime resulted in millions of people fleeing Syria. In addition, millions more escaped from areas captured by regime forces through military assaults. They took refuge in regions under the Syrian opposition control, such as Idlib, where they sought to survive in tent camps under extremely harsh conditions. Following the fall of the regime, there has been a substantial return of refugees to Syria. According to United Nations data, more than one million people have returned to the country from abroad. Over half a million Syrians have also returned from Türkiye. It is likewise known that a significant number of internally displaced persons have returned to their hometowns; however, due to conditions on the ground, no precise statistics are available. With sanctions on Syria lifted, the resumption and intensification of economic activity, along with the acceleration of reconstruction efforts, are expected to further boost returns to the country.
Transitional Justice and Minorities
One of the key dossiers on which Syria has so far failed to make substantial progress is the establishment of transitional justice in the country. Following the bloody incidents that took place with Alawites in the coastal region in March and with Druze communities in Sweida in July, investigative committees were formed. However, the names of those implicated in the March violations could not be submitted to the al-Sharaa administration for months. In November, the first court dealing with the coastal incidents was established in Aleppo. The rulings to be issued by this public court are expected to set a precedent for transitional justice in Syria. Likewise, a court is anticipated to be established for those involved in violations during the clashes with the Druze.
It is essential to underline the following point. Thus far, Damascus has largely failed to bring even the war criminals of the former regime before the courts thoroughly and transparently. With this in mind, questions remain as to what kind of penalties will be imposed on members of the Syrian security forces who have been involved in crimes, and whether these measures will be sufficient for achieving transitional justice.
Similarly, there has been no significant progress in implementing the March 10th agreement with the SDF or in integrating the country’s northeastern regions under Damascus’s authority. The events that first occurred in the coastal region and subsequently in Sweida have further complicated the implementation of the March 10th agreement. In the aftermath of events in the coastal areas and in Sweida, the SDF adopted an even more uncompromising stance on its decentralization demands.
Although SDF leader Mazloum Abdi visited Damascus and met with al-Sharaa, the group’s integration into the Syrian army remained unresolved. In recent months, Abdi has also adopted a discourse asserting that Alawite and Druze representatives must participate in any future negotiations with Damascus. He is doing this to help outline a new political vision for the country in his talks with al-Sharaa.
Religious, sectarian, and ethnic fault lines run deep in Syria. There is profound mutual mistrust among different segments of society. To build confidence, an inclusive constitutional process needs to be implemented, and evidently, this will take considerable time.
Syria’s Most Significant Regional Threat: Israel
With the fall of the Assad regime, Israel declared that the ”Separation of Forces” agreement signed between the two countries in 1974 was no longer valid. Thus, Israel moved beyond the buffer zone and launched a wave of attacks against Syria. It heavily targeted, by means of airstrikes, the military equipment/munitions left over from the Assad regime as well as Syria’s naval capabilities, thereby further blunting an already weak Syrian defensive capacity. Since December 8th, Israel has carried out more than 1,000 attacks on Syria. During the Assad era, Iran-backed elements in Syria were also targeted by Israel. However, the number of Israeli attacks before December 8th was far below the number recorded after that date.
Israel, which has also intervened in Syria through the Druze community, targeted the capital Damascus with fighter jets in July, thereby altering the balance of power in favor of Israel and Tel Aviv-backed Druze militias. Following the Israeli attacks, Sweida was effectively transformed into a “city-state” under the control of the Druze religious leader Hikmat al-Hijri. Damascus failed to establish its authority in the region and does not appear likely to do so in the near future. Due to the bloody events of July, bonds between the Druze and Damascus have also weakened considerably. Sweida has become a region where Israeli flags and posters of Netanyahu are frequently carried in demonstrations. Moreover, by taking steps to extricate the Syrian Druze from the broader Islamic framework to which they had generally ascribed, Hijri has embarked on what is, in effect, a process of constructing a new identity for the Syrian Druze.
In addition, the face-to-face talks held in Paris and Baku to conclude a security agreement between Syria and Israel, similar to the 1974 accord, have so far produced no concrete results. Israel is attempting to impose on Damascus conditions for southern Syria that go far beyond the 1974 agreement and that are unacceptable from the Syrian perspective. Tel Aviv does not want Syrian army forces to enter the south, seeks to demilitarize the area of heavy weaponry, and is trying to dictate to its counterparts an agreement that would designate southern Syria as a no-fly zone for the Syrian air force. Israel is unwilling to relinquish the operational freedom it has gained in south Syria through Hikmat al‑Hijri. Furthermore, Tel Aviv has no intention of putting up for discussion the status of the Golan Heights, which are Syrian territory but remain under Israeli occupation. Due to these unacceptable Israeli conditions, which directly target Syria’s sovereignty, it appears unlikely that a comprehensive security agreement will be reached between Damascus and Tel Aviv in the near future. Tel Aviv has also done everything in its power to prevent Türkiye, one of Syria’s most important allies, from establishing an air base in Syria. For instance, Israel has bombed some locations that were considered potential sites for such a Turkish air base.
In sum, although specific key problems in Syria remain unresolved, the country is now at a far more advanced stage than it was before December 8th, 2024. Syria has acquired the character of a state much more deeply engaged with the international community. For the country to advance further, it will be necessary to ensure, through an agreed formula, the integration of all armed groups into the authority of Damascus; to restructure the army into a more disciplined and professional force; to accelerate the constitutional drafting process; to improve economic indicators; to address the question of transitional justice with due seriousness; and to launch new initiatives aimed at building trust among the different segments of society.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Platform: Current Muslim Affairs’ editorial policy.
