(The original Turkish version of this article was published by the Platform: Current Muslim Affairs on February 6, 2026)
In recent days, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has been facing one of the most severe trials since its founding (1979) and may be preparing for a final war that could determine its existential fate. This difficult crossroads—where domestic and external pressures intersect and where the country’s destiny is being decided—alarms not only Iran but the entire region. Regional states increasingly find themselves drawn into the “Iran question.” From protests inside Iran to the possibility of a U.S.–Iran war, developments have prompted regional countries to turn their attention to Iran with great caution and sensitivity. The main reason is that any major transformation in Iran would create a rupture across the region that would be difficult, if not impossible, to contain.
Following the end of last year’s 12-Day War between Iran and Israel on 27 June, the region is once again facing the risk of a major interstate war. The 12-Day War was initiated by Israel and concluded with the U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. This time, however, there is a risk that the United States could directly target Iran, potentially triggering a large-scale regional conflict.
Although even last June’s war required viewing Israel not in isolation but together with the United States, the situation is different now. In the previous war, Trump was the actor who set the boundaries of the conflict and ultimately brought it to an end. This time, he appears to be the actor poised to initiate a chain of developments whose trajectory is unclear. Unlike last time, Iran and the United States now seem on the verge of confronting each other directly as parties to a long, comprehensive war. For this reason, the likely scale, intensity, and impact capacity of the conflict are markedly different. Moreover, the drums of war have begun to beat at a time when state–society relations in Iran have become highly fragile and increasingly problematized through protests.
Iranian decision-makers do not treat these two processes as separate. In their view, the unprecedented atmosphere of violence revealed through protests is merely one stage in a long-term plan by the “enemy” to destroy and subdue Iran. Hence, they feel compelled to treat both domestic and foreign policy as elements of a single function that transforms and reshapes the other.
The Political Impact of Economic and Social Erosion in Iran
Iran’s economy has been in steady decline since Donald Trump took office in 2017. In fact, intensifying sanctions pressure during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s second term had already affected the Iranian economy severely through key macroeconomic indicators such as inflation and unemployment. Yet the opportunity created during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency—namely the nuclear deal—briefly generated a partial economic recovery, both due to the expectations surrounding the agreement and thanks to roughly one year of implementation. When the United States unilaterally withdrew from the deal in 2018, and when European parties proved unwilling to sustain the agreement without U.S. support, Iran’s economy once again deteriorated under heavy sanctions pressure.
As economic vulnerability increased, the pandemic—like it did worldwide—shook Iran deeply, especially given its sensitive internal balances. In addition, international crises such as the downing of the Ukrainian passenger plane further heightened domestic social pressures. Factors such as Israel’s covert operations on Iranian soil, the losses suffered by proxy forces in the region after 7 October, and the erosion of Iran’s influence in Syria weakened Tehran’s regional posture and left the country exposed both in foreign policy and in internal economic balances. The weakening of reformist and moderate politics, and the shift toward a more monochromatic political structure, seriously damaged state–society relations. As the public ceased to view politics as a vehicle for change or a source of hope, large protest waves began erupting nearly every two years.
Although they may begin for different reasons, recent protests have increasingly taken on an anti-system character directly targeting the political order. The most recent major wave—according to official figures—began on 28 December at Tehran’s Grand Bazaar due to economic grievances, but quickly turned into a spiral of violence in which more than three thousand people reportedly lost their lives. This brought the bond between state and society close to a breaking point. The violence witnessed during this period and fears of foreign intervention led the regime to code protests as an existential security issue. As a result, basic public demands—such as the high cost of living and economic deterioration—remained unmet, overshadowed by security policies. Widespread internet shutdowns inflicted additional damage on the economy while further inflaming public discontent. At this stage, even figures such as Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi—long associated with advocating reform within the system—have almost shifted toward an extra-systemic line, indicating that reformist politics has lost its mediating function between society and the governing order.
Iranian politics is now defined by a much deeper structural crisis than the traditional reformist–conservative divide. Yet Iran is no longer an issue that can be discussed only with reference to domestic balances. Regional countries closely monitor all developments due to the potential spillover effects and take precautions accordingly.
Regional States’ Positions
The domestic and external challenges Iran faces have been read by regional countries as sources of risks and threats that could spill over onto them. For this reason, even the most limited to the most extreme forms of instability that protests could generate in Iran have triggered anxiety across the region. Among these states, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Türkiye have stood out.
Since the normalization agreement signed in 2023, Saudi Arabia has sought to keep relations with Iran on good terms. Qatar, meanwhile, has not traditionally had a problematic relationship with Iran. Still, instability in Iran affects Qatar directly—as seen last year when Iran struck the Al Udeid base in Qatar in retaliation against the United States. For this reason, Qatar is highly sensitive to any Iran-origin instability.
Regional countries have treated protests in Iran particularly in conjunction with the rising risk of U.S. intervention and have mobilized against a potential destabilization. Avoiding direct commentary on Iran’s internal political affairs, they nonetheless maintained diplomatic engagement with Tehran and signaled that they favored the restoration of order as soon as possible in the face of protests. Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan remained in contact with his Iranian counterpart. Qatar’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Majed al-Ansari stated that a military conflict between Iran and the United States would have a “devastating” impact on the region.
Türkiye, through statements by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, also underscored its preference for stability; yet unlike Gulf states, it additionally voiced the existence of Iran’s internal problems. Fidan stated, “We are against a military intervention against Iran; Iran needs to resolve its own authentic internal problems itself.”
Just as regional states quietly supported the Iranian state in the face of protests, they adopted a more visible and vocal position against a possible U.S. intervention. Gulf countries, in particular—through Saudi Arabia’s efforts—undertook intensive diplomatic initiatives to deter the United States from launching a military operation against Iran. These states remained in contact and dialogue with Iran and also served as intermediaries for message exchanges between Washington and Tehran. Some regional countries announced that they would not allow their airspace to be used in the event of a possible strike on Iran. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan are among them. Oman has long been known for conducting diplomatic efforts to reduce Iran–U.S. tensions. At the same time, Iran reportedly favored Oman as the venue for the Iran–U.S. negotiations planned for 6 February.
Türkiye’s stance appears to have been decisive in persuading the U.S. administration toward negotiations. Alongside Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s shuttle diplomacy, it was reported that President Erdoğan, in a phone call with U.S. President Donald Trump, proposed diplomatic solutions and that Trump responded positively. Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Istanbul on 30 January and the statements made on that date also indicated that Türkiye has come to the fore in mediation efforts.
Conclusion
It is reported that talks between Iranian and U.S. delegations will take place in Muscat, the capital of Oman, on Friday, 6 February. Some reports, however, claim that the talks will not take place. Even if they do, there is little optimism that they will result in a comprehensive agreement or open the path toward one. There is a difficult-to-bridge mismatch between the parties’ expectations and demands. Negotiations, of course, occur between actors in opposing positions; yet even a common ground on the subjects of negotiation has not been established. While Iran insists that negotiations must be limited to the nuclear issue, the United States insists that other topics—foremost ballistic missiles—must also be put on the table.
The U.S. military presence in the Gulf is the clearest indicator of how seriously Trump is taking the option of an attack. Regional actors working to de-escalate tensions and reach an agreement are being kept outside the negotiation process by Iran. Consequently, we are facing a repetition of the unproductive format that preceded the 12-Day War. There is no compelling reason to expect a different outcome this time—other than assuming that Iran will not step back despite U.S. threats and that the U.S. side will conclude that threats will not produce results. Yet it remains unlikely that Trump will be persuaded of that.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Platform: Current Muslim Affairs’ editorial policy.
