(The original Turkish version of this article was published by the Platform: Current Muslim Affairs on February 9, 2026)
In recent years, the Horn of Africa has become a geopolitical fault line where multidimensional crises intersect, including intra-state conflicts, fragile governance structures, great-power competition, and maritime trade route security. Within this fragile balance, every unilateral step has the potential to affect not only bilateral relations but the entire regional security architecture. Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland, in this context, should be regarded not merely as a diplomatic preference but as a strategic intervention that deepens existing conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa, weakens Somalia’s sovereignty, and directly threatens regional stability.
The repercussions of this move are felt across a wide spectrum, ranging from Somalia’s internal political balance and Ethiopia’s strategy for access to the sea to the dialogue processes facilitated by Türkiye (the Ankara Declaration) and the sub-conflict zones within Somaliland itself. Therefore, Israel’s move produces a divisive and destabilizing effect not only along the Somaliland–Mogadishu axis but across the entire Horn of Africa.
A Direct Intervention Against Somalia’s Territorial Integrity
Since the state’s collapse in 1991, Somalia has been undergoing a long and painful process of reconstruction. Although the federal structure contains internal challenges, it has been shaped as a framework of consensus aimed at preserving the country’s territorial integrity. Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of independence, however, has not been recognized by the international community to date and has been rejected on the basis of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial unity.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland constitutes a step that breaks this international consensus and directly targets Somalia’s sovereignty claim. This recognition erodes Mogadishu’s claim of being the “sole legitimate representative” and encourages separatist tendencies by disrupting the center–periphery balance within the federal system. Moreover, this move sets a dangerous precedent that could prompt other federal entities, such as Puntland, Jubaland, and Southwest State, to question their relations with Mogadishu.
In this regard, Israel’s action weakens the already fragile federal consensus in Somalia and promotes a fragmented political structure rather than strengthening central authority. This directly undermines Somalia’s state-building process.
On the other hand, one of the most striking consequences of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is the deepening of Somaliland’s internal legitimacy crisis. Although Somaliland is often portrayed internationally as a homogeneous and stable entity, realities on the ground suggest otherwise. Developments along the SSC Khatumo and Las Anod axis clearly demonstrate that the Somaliland administration has failed to establish full control even over the territories it claims.
The conflicts centered in Las Anod have revealed the limited authority of Somaliland over Harti/Darod communities, while SSC Khatumo’s pursuit of direct relations with Mogadishu has significantly weakened Somaliland’s claim of a “singular and unified political will.” Israel’s recognition further complicates this already fragile landscape.
While recognition emboldens the Somaliland administration, it causes structures such as SSC Khatumo to feel marginalized and threatened. This increases the potential for internal conflict within Somaliland and carries the risk of transforming local disputes into a broader regional crisis.
Israel’s Regional Strategy and Its Destabilizing Impact
Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland should not be interpreted as an isolated or context-free diplomatic move, but rather as part of a broader regional strategy that Israel has been developing in recent years along the Red Sea–Horn of Africa corridor. This strategy revolves around objectives such as securing maritime trade routes in the Red Sea basin, gaining access to ports, acquiring military and intelligence depth, and limiting the influence of rival or alternative actors. Within this framework, the recognition of Somaliland can be seen as an attempt by Israel to establish influence through a geographically critical yet politically fragile area.
Israel’s growing interest in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa in recent years is not limited to commercial or diplomatic dimensions. The Bab al-Mandab Strait and its surroundings hold strategic importance for Israel in terms of both the security of the Asia–Europe trade route and the continuity of the Eastern Mediterranean–Indian Ocean connection. The heightened security risks in the Red Sea following the Gaza war have accelerated Israel’s search for alternative and forward access points along this corridor. The recognition of Somaliland thus emerges as part of a strategy aimed at gaining leverage through an actor claiming de facto control, rather than engaging directly with Mogadishu.
However, this approach contains serious structural flaws, as it disregards the fragile political and social fabric of the Horn of Africa.
The destabilizing nature of Israel’s strategy is not confined to internal dynamics within Somaliland. By effectively calling Somalia’s territorial integrity into question, the recognition undermines the long-standing principle in the Horn of Africa that borders should not be redefined through unilateral secessions. This sets an extremely risky precedent not only for Somalia, but also for countries such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan, which are marked by ethnic, regional, and political fault lines. Israel’s move may indirectly embolden other separatist or autonomy-seeking movements in the region.
More concretely, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland intersects with Ethiopia’s strategy for access to the sea, creating a new zone of geopolitical tension. While Addis Ababa’s pursuit of port access through Somaliland has already generated a serious crisis in relations with Somalia, Israel’s recognition further complicates this issue. It reinforces the perception in Ethiopia that “de facto situations can evolve into international recognition,” thereby weakening consensus-based solution efforts and pushing regional problems away from diplomatic negotiation toward geopolitical rivalry.
Another destabilizing dimension of Israel’s strategy lies in its indirect undermining of regional mediation and crisis-management initiatives. The Ankara Process, facilitated by Türkiye, has emerged as one of the few diplomatic efforts that have successfully prevented the militarization of tensions along the Somalia–Ethiopia axis. Israel’s recognition creates a de facto situation that renders this process meaningless and weakens negotiation-based solutions. In this sense, the recognition constitutes an indirect intervention not only against Somalia, but also against actors striving to produce regional stability.
New Lines of Tension in the Horn of Africa and Türkiye’s Stabilizing Role
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is generating a new line of division among Horn of Africa countries. For Somalia, this step is perceived as a clear violation of sovereignty, while for Ethiopia, it produces different yet equally risky consequences. Addis Ababa’s quest for access to the sea has become one of the most sensitive issues in recent regional diplomacy.
Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access via Somaliland has produced serious tensions with Somalia, tensions that have been partially eased through the Ankara Process facilitated by Türkiye. Israel’s recognition disrupts this delicate balance by weakening the diplomatic framework that pressures Ethiopia toward reconciliation with Somalia. This move risks transforming Ethiopia’s access-to-the-sea issue from a consensus-based problem into a field of geopolitical competition, potentially triggering a new regional security spiral in the Horn of Africa.
In recent years, Türkiye has stood out as an “actor producing stability” in the Horn of Africa, playing an active role in strengthening Somalia’s state capacity, maritime jurisdiction issues, security sector reform, and regional dialogue processes. Contacts conducted between Somalia and Ethiopia under the Ankara Process have been widely regarded as an important diplomatic achievement that prevented the militarization of the crisis.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland indirectly sabotages this process. By weakening Somalia’s negotiating position and creating a de facto situation that renders compromise efforts meaningless, the recognition also constrains Türkiye’s mediation and facilitation capacity. Thus, Israel’s move constitutes not only a challenge to Somalia, but also an indirect challenge to actors striving for regional stability.
Conclusion
Ultimately, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is far from being a step that contributes to peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. On the contrary, it produces an effect that weakens Somalia’s sovereignty, erodes trust among federal structures, triggers internal conflicts within Somaliland, and disrupts the relative stability achieved through Türkiye’s facilitation. In this sense, Israel emerges not as a balancing force in the region, but as a “destabilizing actor.”
What the Horn of Africa needs is not unilateral recognitions but diplomatic processes that respect international law, are inclusive, and prioritize regional consensus. Otherwise, the Somaliland issue risks evolving into a chronic security crisis affecting not only Somalia but the entire Horn of Africa.
* Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Platform: Current Muslim Affairs’ editorial policy.
