This article explores Serbia’s complex relationship with its Muslim minorities, particularly Bosniaks and Albanians, amidst historical anti-Muslim sentiment. Despite legal protections for minority rights, reports indicate underrepresentation and inadequate respect for these rights, reflecting ongoing challenges in integration and cooperation within Serbia’s diverse social landscape.
In the great transition that we are witnessing, a multitude of new and even unexpected things are emerging in relations between states, peoples, and cultures. Geopolitical realignment requires the behavior of states in which the approach is formed in accordance with their economic and security interests. Serbia is no exception in this sense, as in recent years, it has been strongly promoting cooperation with Eurasian powers without shying away from cooperation and large investments from Arab Gulf countries, too. However, the latter is interesting, considering that Serbia has a strongly emphasized and long-established anti-Muslim ideological narrative.
Probably one of the main reasons for the emergence of such a narrative lies within the process of independence from the Ottoman state during the 19th century when, through the construction of its own institutions and political system, there was cultural purification, i.e., de-Islamization through the removal of any presence of the Ottoman heritage (Mulaosmanovic, 2024, p. 75). Then, during the 20th century, this narrative was strongly anchored in the South Slavic area, which led to bloody historical periods in relations between Bosniaks, Albanians (Muslim indigenous peoples), and (Orthodox) Serbs. Precisely, the position of Islam in Serbia was dominantly treated through the relationship of these three peoples (the status of non-Serbs as national minorities) in the post-Ottoman dynamics. Since Kosovo (it was an autonomous province within Serbia) has been an independent state since 2008, the relationship between Albanians and Serbs has somewhat changed, but Serbs still feel and show the greatest animosity towards Albanians. The centuries-old presence of Islam and Muslims on the territory of Serbia was reduced to the area of Sandjak (the northern part of historical Sanjak of Novi Pazar) and the Preshevo Valley, mostly inhabited by Albanians, in the southwest of Serbia.
According to the latest population census from 2022, a total of 2.31% Bosniaks and 0.93% Albanians live in Serbia.
National minorities in Serbia are fairly territorially homogeneous, except for the Roma, so Bosniaks are mainly concentrated in 6 municipalities of Sandjak. They have an absolute majority in Novi Pazar, Tutin, and Sjenica. Also, a significant number live in Priboj, Prijepolje, and Nova Varos, while Albanians have an absolute majority in the municipalities of Preshevo and Bujanovac and a relative majority in the municipality of Medvedja. According to the latest population census from 2022, a total of 2.31% Bosniaks and 0.93% Albanians live in Serbia, which, if only these two ethnic groups were to be considered, makes the Muslim autochthonous population slightly over 3% (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia [SORS], 2023, p.12). A total of 278,212 people declared themselves to be of the Islamic faith, which makes a difference of about 50,000 people. Given that the census includes categories such as Muslims (13,000), Roma, and Yugoslavs, it is clear that this difference arises from these groups, raising the Muslim population to 4.26%, making it the second-largest religious group in Serbia (SORS, 2023).
Minority Rights & Muslims as a Minority Group in Serbia
The general state of national minorities is observed through several categories, and in the last ten years, the treatment of Muslims in Serbia has been influenced by various social and political factors. In this regard, the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities was harmonized from 2002 to 2018. Also, another special law, Law on National Councils of National Minorities, adopted in 2009, regulates these minorities’ legal position and powers in the fields of culture, education, information, and official use of language and alphabet, the procedure for electing national councils, their financing and other issues of importance for the work of national councils. However, in the process of harmonization, this Law took away acquired rights because it previously enabled the National Council of National Minorities to declare institutions in culture and education of national importance for their community. Yet, now this right is denied, and only nominations are required. Also, the Ministry of State Administration and Local Self-Government, where national minorities belong, can cancel any decision or individual act of the National Council, while it does not have the right to judicial protection because the Court is excluded from this procedure (Softić, 2018).
The Constitution of Serbia and various international treaties, to which Serbia has acceded, provide legal protection for Muslims and other minorities. However, there are many reports that these rights are not always fully respected, especially at the local level. The European Council report from 2019 shows that despite the lack of data, which does not allow for a complete assessment of the participation of national minorities in public administration, their underrepresentation is noticeable, especially when it comes to members of the Albanian and the Bosniak minority, while the representatives of the Roma minority are almost completely excluded from all levels of government in the country (“Savet Evrope poziva Srbiju,” 2019). Considering that the local level is probably the most significant for the Muslim population, it is clear that there is significant room for improvement. Political representatives of Bosniaks actively participate in the political life of Serbia, but it is evident that their activities are almost exclusively related to issues of identity protection and rights in the areas where they live (Sanjak) and thus do not show any influence on the creation of Belgrade’s policies.
Political representatives of Bosniaks actively participate in the political life of Serbia, but it is evident that their activities are almost exclusively related to issues of identity protection and rights in the areas where they live (Sanjak).
Muslims in Serbia often face social prejudice and discrimination, especially in the context of ethnic and religious tensions (an echo of the anti-Ottoman campaign and wars during the dissolution of Yugoslavia), while in some cases, they are exposed to verbal attacks, spreading hatred and stigmatization, especially in the media and on social networks. Attacks due to religious intolerance in the otherwise tolerant northern province of Vojvodina have attracted attention in recent years (“Napadnuta porodica”, 2024). Muslims in Vojvodina also face great difficulties due to the focus on Sandjak and Preshevo, they exercise their rights on a very minimal basis so that they are not able to have at least their own cultural and artistic societies (Subašić, 2024, p. 27). Traditionally, in former Yugoslavia, these types of associations were well known and supported by the government so every minority could organize itself to enrich its own cultural life from the municipal to the federal level.
Moreover, in Novi Pazar, which is the center not only of the Bosniak people but also of the Muslim community in Serbia, there were earlier incidents of vandalism on Islamic religious buildings, from 1999 until 2011, which indicates the existence of tension in society (Glavonjic, 2011). We should not forget, of course, that the Bosniak (Muslim) population also experienced great divisions and conflicts within themselves, partly initiated by the official Belgrade. Namely, since 2007, in the midst of great political turmoil, Belgrade has supported the establishment of the Islamic Community with Adem Zilkić at the head, opposing then Mufti Zukorlić, who led the Muftiate of Novi Pazar as part of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the full support of the nationalist-controversial regime, the then-president of Serbia, Vojislav Koštunice, managed to divide the Muslims of Sandjak. The state, while “taking care” of the problems it produced itself, often acted as an equal partner to two Islamic communities, violating the Law on Churches and Religious Communities. In this relationship of double standards, the state acted aggressively, actively denying some of the basic human rights (Kladnicanin, 2013). Since then there have been several new earthquakes as well as further divergences.
One of the most significant achievements at the state level was the opening of the Serbian Parliament to the language and alphabet of national minorities. Deputies of the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina won that right through an amendment (2018) so that deputies from the ranks of minorities got the opportunity to speak in their native language and use the alphabet, which was not the case until then (Papuga, 2018). While there has been notable progress in the field of education, it has not been evenly distributed among all national minorities. Certain minority groups, especially Bosniaks and Albanians, are at the very beginning and encounter significant challenges when it comes to education in their mother tongue. In this regard, the unequal treatment of the mother tongue in schools is a daily occurrence because parents fill out special surveys to decide whether their children will learn their mother tongue.
While there has been notable progress in the field of education, it has not been evenly distributed among all national minorities. Certain minority groups, especially Bosniaks and Albanians, are at the very beginning and encounter significant challenges when it comes to education in their mother tongue.
There are optional classes for the native language of the minority groups as well. Yet, although these classes are evaluated, they are not included in the average grade, which means that the mother tongue is not mandatory and is treated as a third optional subject. There is, of course, a great controversy over the position of the Bosnian language at the state university in Novi Pazar. One of the biggest problems for Serbian nationalists is the existence of the Bosnian language. When it comes to higher education, things are even worse. Due to the influence of nationalists, it was impossible to establish studies of the Bosnian language and Bosnian literature at the state university in Novi Pazar. Numerous Bosniak professors are alarming both the public and international institutions, pointing out this state pressure, but so far, without success. On the other hand, representatives of the Serbian Church and other institutions attack such efforts by denying the very existence of the Bosnian language (“There is no ‘Bosnian language,’” 2024). It means that the double game policy also continued during Vučić’s rule. While President Vučić speaks with chosen words about Islam and Muslims, his top associates from the government and parliament brutally attack both religion and anyone who tries to achieve a better status for Muslims in Serbia. The area where the attacks are most evident is in the media (Kurir, Alo, Blic, etc.), which are under the direct control of Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party very often by using geopolitics and current animosities (Atanackovic, 2024).
Conclusion
From the above examples, one can see the reasons why Islam is under pressure in Serbia. The generally constructed anti-Muslim narrative within which Islam is a threat is applied to the indigenous population (Bosniaks and Albanians) through pressure on their cultural, educational, and religious autonomy. In the last 20 years, not only have Bosniaks experienced political disintegration, but several organizations of Islamic Religious Affairs have also emerged, some of which are under the direct influence of Belgrade. Although the legal acts follow general European trends and are harmonized with European regulations, Muslims are under pressure to enjoy their rights in various ways, often unjustifiably accusing them of terrorist activities. The whole game is most clearly reflected in the state’s approach towards Muslims. But could the current geopolitical transformation help in this matter?
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