(The original Turkish version of this article was published by the Platform: Current Muslim Affairs on March 24, 2026)
The war that began on 28 February 2026 with the United States–Israel attacks on Iran, and subsequently expanded across the region as Iran targeted Gulf countries, has shattered a foundational assumption that the Gulf had painstakingly constructed over the past two decades: that the Gulf is secure. Small Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar had long operated under the premise that by cultivating close relations with major powers, they could insulate themselves from the region’s recurrent conflicts. However, recent weeks have demonstrated that this assumption does not always hold. The unfolding developments have once again underscored a fundamental reality: the Gulf remains an integral part of the Middle East and is, therefore, inevitably susceptible to its instabilities.
The war has not only intensified the military confrontation between Iran and the United States–Israel axis, but has also profoundly destabilized the political, economic, and psychological order that the Gulf has constructed over the past two decades. One of the most striking consequences of the conflict has been Iran’s targeting of all Gulf states without exception, including those not directly engaged in hostilities against it. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia have all been subjected—at varying levels of intensity—to missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks. This development has revealed that, in the context of contemporary regional conflicts, maintaining neutrality or refraining from direct involvement in war no longer provides sufficient protection.
Iran’s direct targeting of these countries may, at first glance, be interpreted as part of a punitive and deterrent strategy. From Tehran’s perspective, even if the Gulf states were not formally engaged in the war, they nevertheless constituted integral components of the United States’ regional military architecture: hosting American bases, maintaining security partnerships with Washington, and occupying positions that could not be entirely excluded from the logistical or intelligence dimensions of the conflict. Through these attacks, Iran conveyed not only a military signal but also a political message: the costs of a regional war would not be confined to its principal belligerents. This approach has once again reminded the Gulf monarchies of the structural constraints imposed by geography.
A particularly notable aspect of this development is that Iran did not limit its strikes to countries openly aligned against it, but also targeted those that had, in recent years, sought to preserve channels of dialogue. The fact that even an actor such as Oman—long recognized for maintaining a balanced relationship with Iran—was not fully insulated from these attacks has exposed the limits of the recent policy of de-escalation and rapprochement in the Gulf. Since 2019, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in particular, have adopted a more cautious approach aimed at reducing confrontation with Iran, enhancing bilateral dialogue, and lowering regional tensions. However, the recent war has demonstrated that such a strategy has been insufficient to shield the Gulf from Iranian retaliation.
A Blow to the “Safe Haven” Image
One of the most significant consequences of these developments has been the severe erosion of the Gulf’s long-cultivated image as a “safe haven.” For years, Gulf states, particularly Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Riyadh, have positioned themselves as islands of stability, prosperity, and predictability within an otherwise turbulent Middle East. This image has constituted a foundational pillar sustaining tourism, global capital inflows, logistics networks, air transportation, multinational corporate headquarters, and large-scale investment projects. In the wake of the Iranian attacks, however, the most critical underpinning of this model has been shaken: the perception of security.
For a country or region to function as an economic hub, it requires not only infrastructure, capital, and strategic vision, but also a credible sense of security. The Gulf’s success to date has been rooted precisely in its ability to render this sense of security purchasable, sustainable, and governable. Yet recent developments, such as the targeting of oil and natural gas facilities, the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the vulnerability of civilian infrastructure, and explosions occurring in urban centers, have rendered the fragility of Gulf economies more visible than ever before. This situation does not merely represent a short-term security challenge; rather, it constitutes a structural test that may directly affect ambitious transformation initiatives such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, the United Arab Emirates’ aspiration to serve as a global financial and logistics hub, and, more broadly, the Gulf’s economic diversification strategies.
How Will the Attacks Transform the Gulf?
The transformation that lies ahead for the Gulf states will, above all, manifest in their understanding of security. It is highly likely that measures such as increased defense spending, enhanced protection of critical infrastructure, the expansion of air defense systems, the fortification of energy facilities, and the integrated management of cyber and physical security will move to the forefront of policy agendas. However, this transformation will not be confined to technical or military dimensions alone. Gulf capitals are now likely to recognize more clearly that security cannot be guaranteed solely through an externally provided protective umbrella. This realization may, in turn, compel them both to diversify their external partnerships and to reconsider and strengthen security coordination among themselves.
At this juncture, the question of whether it is feasible to establish a collective security mechanism for the Gulf region gains particular salience. In theory, the fact that the Iranian threat has targeted all Gulf states creates a compelling rationale for the construction of a shared security architecture. A converging threat perception could incentivize the development of joint early warning systems, coordinated air defense networks, maritime security cooperation, and political-military platforms capable of collective action in times of crisis. Historically, however, Gulf states have not maintained uniform threat perceptions with regard to Iran. The varying degrees of risk assessment have, at times, limited deeper security integration. Yet the recent attacks—affecting all countries without exception—have transformed the Iranian threat into a more concrete and collectively experienced reality than ever before. For this reason, although the emergence of a fully integrated Gulf security architecture in the short term appears unlikely, a significantly higher degree of coordination and cooperation among Gulf states can be expected in the period ahead.
The principal challenge facing the Gulf states is not limited to Iran alone. This war has also further eroded an already fragile trust in the United States. Although Gulf monarchies have long operated under the American security umbrella, recent developments have reinforced the perception that Washington is no longer a stabilizing force in the region, but rather one that contributes to insecurity and instability. From the Gulf perspective, the issue is no longer confined to the question of “how to protect ourselves from Iran,” but has expanded to include “how to manage the costs of conflicts driven or escalated by the United States.” Accordingly, while Gulf states are unlikely to disengage from the United States in the foreseeable future, they will increasingly factor in the risks of overreliance on Washington. The long-standing strategy of diversifying defense partnerships is therefore likely to gain further momentum. Nevertheless, a complete strategic rupture from the United States remains, at least for now, an unlikely scenario.
Possible Scenarios
Within this broader context, several possible scenarios emerge for the Gulf. The first scenario envisions the post-war emergence of an Iran that, while weakened, becomes more rigid, resentful, and unpredictable. Under such conditions, Gulf states may find themselves confronting an Iran whose capabilities have been degraded but whose sense of grievance is heightened, which is closer to the nuclear threshold, and more inclined toward both proxy and direct forms of aggression. This scenario would likely generate a prolonged environment of low-intensity yet persistent threat across the region.
The second scenario involves the internal unraveling of the Iranian state and its descent into a profound cycle of instability. While such an outcome might initially be perceived by some as an opportunity, it arguably represents one of the most perilous possibilities from the Gulf perspective. An Iran that has lost state capacity, fragmented along ethnic fault lines, and capable of exporting weapons, militias, refugees, and instability across its borders would create a far more complex and unmanageable security environment. For the Gulf states, there is no clear answer as to whether a strong but hostile Iran or a fragmented and chaos-producing Iran constitutes the greater threat; however, neither scenario offers a reassuring outlook.
The third, and comparatively more plausible, scenario is one in which Gulf states simultaneously seek to establish a compelled equilibrium with Iran while deepening their multi-vector foreign policy and defense partnerships. The expansion of relations with actors such as China, Russia, Türkiye, France, and others may provide the Gulf with greater strategic maneuverability. However, this diversification is unlikely to translate into a genuinely collective and stable regional security order. Instead, it may give rise to a more multipolar, increasingly transactional, fragmented, and fundamentally uncertain regional environment.
In sum, the post–28 February war represents a critical turning point for the Gulf. Iran’s targeting of neighboring states not directly involved in the conflict has demonstrated that modern regional wars no longer leave space for neutrality. The Gulf’s long-cultivated “islands of stability” narrative has suffered a significant blow. Going forward, the region is likely to enter a phase that is more defensive, more cautious, more multi-directional, and ultimately more insecure.
The central question is whether the Gulf can translate this rupture into a coherent shared security vision. For now, what appears more likely is not a more orderly regional environment, but rather one that is increasingly fragile and unpredictable—an evolving Middle East from which no actor can remain insulated.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Platform: Current Muslim Affairs’ editorial policy.
